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Asymmetric Encryption for Wiretap Channels
Salah Yousif Radhi Al-Hassan
Abstract
Since the definition of the wiretap channel by Wyner in 1975, there has been much
research to investigate the communication security of this channel. This thesis presents
some further investigations into the wiretap channel which improve the reliability of
the communication security. The main results include the construction of best known
equivocation codes which leads to an increase in the ambiguity of the wiretap channel
by using different techniques based on syndrome coding.
Best known codes (BKC) have been investigated, and two new design models which
includes an inner code and outer code have been implemented. It is shown that best
results are obtained when the outer code employs a syndrome coding scheme based on
the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code and the inner code employs the McEliece cryptosystem
technique based on BKC ′s.
Three techniques of construction of best known equivocation codes (BEqC) for syndrome
coding scheme are presented. Firstly, a code design technique to produce new (BEqC)
codes which have better secrecy than the best error correcting codes is presented. Code
examples (some 50 codes) are given for the case where the number of parity bits of the
code is equal to 15. Secondly, a new code design technique is presented, which is based
on the production of a new (BEqC) by adding two best columns to the parity check
matrix(H) of a good (BEqC), [n, k] code.
The highest minimum Hamming distance of a linear code is an important parameter
which indicates the capability of detecting and correcting errors by the code. In general,
(BEqC) have a respectable minimum Hamming distance, but are sometimes not as good
as the best known codes with the same code parameters. This interesting point led to
the production of a new code design technique which produces a (BEqC) code with the
highest minimum Hamming distance for syndrome coding which has better secrecy than
the corresponding (BKC). As many as 207 new best known equivocation codes which
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A traditional digital communication system consists of three basic elements: transmitter,
channel, and receiver, as depicted in Fig. 1.1. In this model, digital data{0, 1} from a
transmitter are encoded for transmission over an unreliable channel. The transmitted
signal propagates along the channel, the noise and interfering signals are added to the
channel output, therefore the received signal is a corrupted version of the original trans-
mitted data. The role of receiver is to decode the received data and try to recover the
original data.
The internet began in 1969 when the US Department of Defense decided to establish
an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) meant to protect the communications
network during war time and as a result the ARPA network appeared and evolved dur-
ing the eighties rapidly. In 1983, ARPA network split into two different networks: the
ARPA network which was earmarked for civilian use and the mil network which was
earmarked for military use.
Nowadays, the internet has become the universal communication between countries and
is used in many different fields, such as information retrieval, commercial dealing and





Figure 1.1: Traditional digital communication system
1
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diplomatic contact among nations and military contact due to the ease and flexibility
in operation of these systems and the freedom of roaming in and out of the workplace.
In addition to all these advantages, there is also the cost-effective provision of the most
important services provided by communication systems via the internet. It follows that
the security of that information has become very important.
Many users of wireless communication can use network services such as email and in-
ternet applications. In addition, they have flexibility to move their smart devices from
one place to another and to allow users to share data with network systems and other
compatible devices. On the other hand, wireless networks transmit data through radio
frequencies and are open to eavesdroppers unless protected. Eavesdroppers have ex-
ploited this openness to access systems, steal data and launch attacks that limit network
bandwidth and reject service to authorised users.
For the purpose of maintaining the confidentiality and privacy of information, it is nec-
essary to employ modern techniques to deal with such information. This could be done
by using renewed methods to prevent intrusion on secret data in order to ensure the
transfer of information securely through the channels of communication by taking into
consideration the existence of another channel in addition to the main channel between
the transmitter and the receiver, a so-called eavesdropping channel. Therefore, in 1975,
Wyner [1] suggested a new type of communications channels dubbed the Wiretap chan-
















Figure 1.2: General wiretap channel
The wiretap channel contains one transmitter(Alice) and two receivers, one of which
is the legitimate receiver(Bob) and the second is the eavesdropper(Eve). This model
attempts to maximise the transmission rate of information between the transmitter and
2
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legitimate receiver and to minimise the information leakage (i.e. maximise the equivoca-
tion, a mathematical description of secrecy) to the eavesdropper. We will describe more
deeply this channel in Section 2.4.
1.1 Thesis Aims and Organisation
This thesis investigates the communication security for the wiretap channel when the
main channel is an error free channel and the eavesdropper channel is a binary symmet-
ric channel(BSC). The main aim of this thesis is to improve and guarantee the reliability
of the communication security by increasing the equivocation rate in the eavesdropper
side by using different techniques based on the syndrome coding scheme.
To investigate the issue of the communication security, firstly the impact of the best
known codes1 (BKC) are investigated on the wiretap channel by using a combination
of the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on BKC coupled with syndrome coding
scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code. A code design technique is proposed
to construct new best known equivocation codes (BEqC) for syndrome coding scheme.
Notably new codes with 15 parity bits are presented. In addition, we present a code
design technique to extend the binary linear [n, k] code to [n+ 2, k+ 2] code to produce
best known equivocation codes. Finally, we present a new code design technique which
produces best known equivocation codes (BEqC) with highest minimum distance (dmin)
for the syndrome coding scheme which have better secrecy than the best known codes
(BKC).
This thesis is organised into five chapters as follows:
Chapter 2 contains four main parts. The first part presents the software platform and
tools used in this research, which includes the NTL Library and Magma software suite.
The second part presents the syndrome coding scheme for the wiretap channel, in which
all algorithms which includes the encoder, legitimate receiver’s decoder and eavesdrop-
pers decoder are described. Also, the encoding and decoding algorithms of the (23, 12, 7)
binary Golay code which can correct all error patterns up to 3 bit error have been pre-
1These are the highest performing error correcting codes that have so far been discovered.
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sented as an example.
The third part of chapter 2 describes in detail the Best known linear code (33, 23, 5).
The construction of the parity check matrix of this (33, 23, 5) code has been done using
two methods, the first method based on the evaluation of the primitive root of the ir-
reducible polynomial which required to calculate the values of all columns of the parity
check matrix. In the second method, the parity check matrix of the (33, 23, 5) code can
be obtained directly by using Magma software.
In the last part of chapter 2, a literature review for wiretap channel, syndrome coding
scheme and code design techniques have been presented.
In chapter 3, two models are proposed to improve the security of the communication
channel by maximise the equivocation rate in the eavesdropper channel. The secrecy
coding for the wiretap channel using a Best Known Linear Code (BKLC) has been im-
plemented. The designed models includes an inner code and an outer code, the outer
code employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code and
the inner code employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on BKLC.
Chapter 4 presents many techniques to construct Best Known Equivocation Codes(BEqC)
for syndrome coding in the wiretap channel. Techniques are presented based on a recur-
sive method for evaluation the equivocation rate of any linear, binary code when used in
syndrome coding for the Binary Symmetric Channel(BSC).
This chapter can be divided into three main parts. The first part presents a code design
technique to extend a set of good equivocation codes of length [n, k] to [n + 1, k + 1]
code which have better equivocation rate for syndrome coding scheme. Also, all the best
known equivocation codes(BEqC) have been enumerated for the case where the number
of parity bits of the code is equal to 15.
The second part presents a code design technique for producing the best known equiv-
ocation codes of highest minimum distance for the syndrome coding scheme by using a
combination of the best known equivocation code design technique coupled with tech-
nique of the determination of the highest minimum distance. Also, best known equivo-
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cation codes are listed in exhaustive tables for various values of parity bits of the code.
In the last part of chapter 4, a code design technique has been proposed to produce best
known equivocation codes by extending a set of good equivocation codes of length [n, k]
to [n+ 2, k + 2] code.
In chapter 5, the work presented in this thesis is concluded and some suggestions for
future work in this area are given.
1.2 Contribution to Knowledge
The following list summarises the main contributions of the dissertation.
• An implementation of secrecy coding for a special case of wiretap chan-
nel using a best known linear code. A special case of wiretap channel is
analysed when the main channel is an error free channel and the eavesdropper
channel is a binary symmetric channel. New two models are proposed to increase
the equivocation rate in the eavesdropper side and as a result the communication
security is improved. The design of two models are based on the combination of
the technique of the McEliece cryptosystem using best known linear code(BKLC)
coupled with syndrome coding. The implementation results show that the perfor-
mance of the proposed models considerably reduce the information leakage to the
eavesdropper compared to previously published schemes.
This contribution was presented by the author and published in the fol-
lowing conference:
S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“Secrecy coding for the
wiretap channel using best known linear codes”, IEEE Conference, The
5th Global Information Infrastructure and Networking Symposium ,
Trento, Italy, October 2013.
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• Modifying the syndrome coding scheme. In the traditional syndrome coding,
it is necessary to generate a look up table for error patterns and syndromes, but
for long codes a syndrome table is impractical. Therefore we propose an encoding
algorithm that shows this look up table is unnecessary and that the parity check
matrix H of the code is sufficient.
• A recursive method to calculate the equivocation rate of any linear code
of syndrome coding scheme. The traditional method for evaluating the equiv-
ocation rate works well for short codes, but for long codes it is impracticable.
Therefore we propose an efficient recursive method to calculate the equivocation
rate for the binary symmetric channel(BSC) and any linear binary code. This
method is based on the evaluation of the probability mass function of the syn-
dromes of a code which depends only on the columns of the parity check matrix
and the probability of error of the binary symmetric channel.
• Enumeration of new best known equivocation codes for syndrome cod-
ing with 15 parity bits. A code design technique to extend the binary linear
[n, k] code to [n+ 1, k+ 1] code to produce best known equivocation codes(BEqC)
for syndrome coding in wiretap channel is presented. The code design technique
is based on the realisation that the syndrome probability mass function(pmf) of a
new extended code is a function of the original code and good equivocation codes
produce good extended codes. The design results for a given number of parity bits
of the code (m = 15) show that the equivocation rate of these new BEqCs have
been increased by a large margin compared to all previously published best error
correcting codes, the best known codes(BKC) compiled by Grassl [2].
This contribution was presented by the author and published in the fol-
lowing conference:
S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“New Best Equivocation
Codes for Syndrome Coding”, IEEE Conference, International Con-
ference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence
(ICTC), Busan, South Korea, October 2014.
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• Construction of best known equivocation codes by adding two best
columns to the parity check matrix of [n, k] code. The code design technique
that produce the best known equivocation codes (BEqC) for syndrome coding has
been presented by extending the binary linear [n, k] code to [n + 2, k + 2] code.
This technique is based on the extension of the parity check matrix of a good
BEqC, [n, k] code by selecting the two best columns that extend the length of the
code. The results obtained show that the BEqC that are produced by adding two
columns gives better equivocation rate compared to those codes that are generated
by the addition of one column in two phases.
This contribution was presented by the author and published in the fol-
lowing conference:
S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“Extension of the Parity
Check Matrix to Construct the Best Equivocation Codes for Syndrome
Coding”, IEEE Conference, Global Information Infrastructure and Net-
working Symposium (GIIS), Montreal, QC, Canada, September 2014.
• Construction of new best known equivocation codes with highest mini-
mum Hamming distance for syndrome coding. To date, all the best known
equivocation codes from recent research have a respectable minimum Hamming
distance, but are sometimes not good as the best known code with the same pa-
rameters. Therefore, the most interesting goal in coding theory is to find new
best known equivocation codes such that the minimum distance is maximal. The
minimum distance of a linear code is an important parameter that lead to the
mechanism of detection on correction of transmission errors by the code.
The new best known equivocation codes of highest minimum distance have been
determined by using a combination of a code design technique based on extension
of the parity check matrix from an optimal set of good equivocation codes coupled
with the technique of the determination of the highest minimum distance of these
codes.
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Code examples have been presented for a given number of parity bits of the code
(m = 7, 11, 12) and the design results show that the equivocation rate of these best
known equivocation codes of highest minimum distance exceeds by a large margin
the best known error correcting codes having the same parameters.
This contribution was presented by the author and published in the fol-
lowing conference:
S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“Construction of Best Equiv-
ocation Codes with Highest Minimum Distance for Syndrome Coding”,
IEEE International Conference on Communication, IEEE ICC 2015 -
Workshop on Wireless Physical Layer Security, London, UK, June 2015.
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Chapter 2
Syndrome Coding Scheme and Best
Known Linear Codes
2.1 Software Platform and Tools Used
2.1.1 NTL Library
NTL library was first introduced by Victor Shoup in 1990. It is a high-performance,
portable C++ library providing data structures and algorithms for arbitrary length in-
tegers; for vectors, matrices, and polynomials over the integers and over finite fields; and
for arbitrary precision floating point arithmetic [3].
NTL provides tools and high quality implementations of algorithms for:
• arbitrary length integer arithmetic and arbitrary precision floating point arith-
metic.
• Polynomial arithmetic over the integers and finite fields including polynomial fac-
torisation, irreducibility testing and computation of minimal polynomials.
• Basic linear algebra over the integer, finite fields, and arbitrary precision floating
point numbers.
NTL can be easily installed on any platform, including virtually any 32- or 64-bit ma-
chine running any version of Ubuntu, as well as PCs running Windows or NT , and
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Macintoshes. NTL achieves this portability by avoiding esoteric C++ features, and by
avoiding assembly code; it should therefore remain usable for years to come with lit-
tle or no maintenance, even as processors and operating systems continue to change and
evolve. However, NTL can be used in conjunction with GMP (the GNU Multi-Precision
library) for enhanced performance. NTL can also be used in conjunction with the gf2x
library for faster arithmetic of large degree polynomials over GF(2).
There are many available modules in NTL, the most important modules that have been
used in this work are:
• GF2 class : deals with integers mod 2.
• GF2X class : deals with Polynomials over GF(2).
• mat_GF2 class : deals with matrices over GF(2); includes basic matrix arithmetic
operations, determinant calculation, matrix inversion, solving non-singular systems
of linear equations and Gaussian elimination.
• vec_GF2 class : deals with vectors over GF(2), with arithmetic.
2.1.2 Magma Software Suite
The Magma Software was introduced by the Computational Algebra Group at the Uni-
versity of Sydney. The first release of Magma V1.30 was proposed in 1996.
Magma is a computer algebra system designed to provide a software environment to
solve problems in algebra, number theory, algebraic geometry and combinatorics that
may contain hard computations. Also, it enables the users to compute with structures
such as groups, rings, fields, modules, schemes, curves, graphs, codes designs and many
others. The main platforms that are supported by Magma:
• Linux(i386/PC, AMD64/Intel64, IBM PowerPC64, Intel IA64).
• Mac OSX(64-bit Intel).
• Solaris(AMD64/Intel64, Sparc 64-bit).
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• Windows(32-bit).
Magma Software has databases for Best Known Linear Code(BKLC) over GF (q) =
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. The database for codes over GF(2) contains constructions of best
codes of length up to nmax=256. By giving any two parameters of the code: length(n),
dimension(k) and minimum distance(d), then Magma will return the code with the best
value of the omitted parameter [4]. The construction of the BKLC tables was achieved
by Grassl [2].
2.2 Definition
2.2.1 Binary symmetric channel(BSC)
This is realised in code by using the NTL Library:
NTL : : Vec_GF_2 BSC(NTL : : Vec_GF_2 C, f l o a t pe )
{ f o r ( i n t i =0; i<C. l ength ( ) ; i++)




2.2.2 Definition of Information Theory
Entropy
The Entropy(H) of a discrete random variable X is a measure of the amount of uncer-
tainty(or information) related with the value of X [5, 6]. Assume p(x) is the probability




p(x) log2 p(x) (bits) (2.1)
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The special case of information entropy for a binary random variable which takes two
values with probabilities p and 1− p is the binary entropy function:
H(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (2.2)
Joint Entropy
The Joint Entropy H(X, Y ) of a pair of discrete random variables (X, Y ) is a measure
of the amount of information in X and Y [5, 6]. Assume p(x, y) is the joint probability
of some x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , then the joint entropy H(X, Y ) is defined mathematically as
follows:





p(x, y) log2 p(x, y) (2.3)
Equivocation
The Equivocation (or conditional entropy) quantifies the remaining uncertainty of a ran-
dom variable Y given that the value of another random variable X is known. Assuming
p(x, y) and p(y | x) are expressions of the joint and conditional probabilities, then the
equivocation is defined mathematically in Eq.(2.4) [7, 8]:





p(x, y) log2 p(y | x) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log2H(Y | X = x) (2.4)
the Equivocation can be written as:
H(Y | X) = H(X, Y )−H(X) or H(X | Y ) = H(X, Y )−H(Y )
Channel Capacity
Channel Capacity (or Mutual Information) I(X;Y ) is the common information between
X and Y . It can be expressed as [6]:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X | Y )
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y | X)
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I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y )
Shannon’s Capacity Theorem
In 1948, Shannon [9] published his paper which includes an interesting theorem in infor-
mation theory that give us an idea about the information rate that can be transmitted
with low probability of error. Shannon’s Capacity Theorem (or the Shannon-Hartley
Theorem) states that the channel capacity of a channel C of bandwidth B, perturbed
by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is given by:




where S is the average transmitted signal power and N is the average noise power.
Shannon showed that the transmission over a noisy channel with low probability of error
is possible as long as the information rate R does not exceed the channel capacity C(i.e.
R ≤ C).
2.2.3 Definition of Coding System
Discrete Memoryless Channel(DMC)
A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) can be described in terms of an input alphabet
X = {x1, x2, · · · , xM}, an output alphabet Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yM}, and a likelihood func-
tion (probability transition matrix) p(y | x) as shown in Fig. 2.1. The channel is said to
be memoryless if the output depends only on the input at that time and is statistically
independent of the outputs or inputs at other times [10].
All transition probabilities from xi to yi are placed in a transition matrix of DMC as
follows:
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p(yi | xi) =

p(y1 | x1) p(y2 | x1) · · · p(yM | x1)
p(y1 | x2) p(y2 | x2) · · · p(yM | x2)
...
... · · · ...
p(y1 | xM) p(y2 | xM) · · · p(yM | xM)

X = {x1, x2, ..., xM}
Input Discrete Memoryless
Channel Y = {y1, y2, ..., yM}
Output
Figure 2.1: Discrete Memoryless Channel
Linear code
An [n, k, d] code C over a field Fq of q symbols and qk codewords is said to be a q-ary
linear [n, k, d] code of length n and dimension k if C is a k-dimensional subset of F nq .
Each vector in the k-dimensional subset of F nq is called a codeword and can be expressed
as c = (c0, c1, ..., cn−1). The symbol d represents the minimum Hamming distance of
the code. The rate of a linear [n, k, d] code is R = k/n. For a linear code, any linear
combination of codewords is a codeword and this property led to the use of the term
‘linear’ for such a code [11].
Binary Linear Code
A binary code C of length n and dimension k is said to be linear if for all codewords(2k)
c1, c2 ∈ C, c1 + c2 ∈ C. A linear code C must contain the zero codeword. For example,
the following code C1 = {000, 001, 010, 011} is a linear code, because all the sums are in
C1
000 + 001 = 001
001 + 010 = 011
001 + 011 = 010
010 + 011 = 001
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And so on. But C2 = {000, 001, 101} is not a linear code, since 001 and 101 are in C2
but (001+101=100) is not in C2 [12].
Dual Code
For any code C ⊂ F n, the dual code C⊥ ⊂ F n can be defined by
C⊥ = {x ∈ F n | 〈x, y〉 = 0 ∀y ∈ C} (2.6)
i.e., C⊥ consists of all vectors in F n which are orthogonal to all the vectors in C [11].
Generator Matrix (G)
A generator matrix G for a linear code C is a binary matrix whose rows are the code-
words belonging to some basis for the code [11, 13]. A generator matrix G for [n, k, d]
code has dimension k × n, which contains k linearly independent codewords of C, and
every codeword c in C can be represented as a linear combination of these codewords.
Let w = [w0 w1 · · · wk−1], then c = wG, and every codeword c ∈ C has such represen-
tation for some vector w. The generator matrix G can be transformed into systematic
form by elementary row operations. The systematic form for a generator matrix is
G = [Ik | P ]
Where the first k coordinates of G are an identity matrix Ik of dimension k × k and P
represents the remaining n− k coordinates of G.
Parity Check Matrix (H)
A Parity Check Matrix H of a linear code C is a generator matrix of the dual code.
It can be derived from the generator matrix G of the code (and vice-versa) [11]. If the
generator matrix for an [n, k, d] code is in systematic form
G = [Ik | P ]
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Then the parity check matrix H of dimensions (n− k)× n is given by
H = [−P T | In−k]
because G.HT = 0.
Syndrome
Let C be a linear [n, k, d] code over F = GF (q) and H be a parity check matrix of C.
Then, for a given vector c ∈ F nq , the vector s ∈ F n−kq defined by
s = cHT (2.7)
is the syndrome of a code whose parity check matrix is H. If the vector c ∈ C, then
s = 0. That is, the codewords of C are strictly the vectors of F nq whose syndromes are
0 [13].
Hamming weight
The Hamming weight wt(c) of a codeword c = (c0, c1, ..., cn−1) is the number of non zero
components in c. The minimum weight wmin of a code C is the smallest Hamming weight
of any nonzero codeword [11,13]. That is
wmin = minc∈C,c6=0 wt(c) (2.8)
Minimum Hamming Distance
If the code C has at least two distinct codewords(c1, c2), the minimum Hamming distance
d of C is the smallest distance between c1 and c2 [5]. We can represent d mathematically
as
d = d(C) = min{d(c1, c2) | c1, c2 ∈ C, c1 6= c2} (2.9)
Any linear code C of length n, with dimension k, and with minimum distance d can be
represented in the form of [n, k, d] code. The minimum distance of any code must be at
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least 1, because any two distinct codewords in C are not equal. A code C of minimum
distance d is capable of correcting all error patterns of weight t ≤ b(d− 1)/2c.
The Hamming Bound
For any linear code C with the given values of length n and distance (d = 2t + 1), the
Hamming bound is [Eq.(2.10)]:















The Hamming bound is an upper bound for the size or dimension k of a linear code C.
A code C of distance d will correct all error patterns of weight t ≤ b(d− 1)/2c [12].
The Hamming bound is useful to calculate the dimension of the linear code C that has
length n and distance d. Also, it is used to investigate the perfect code that attains
Eq.(2.10).
Perfect Codes
Any code C has length n and odd distance d = 2t+1 is called a perfect code if C satisfies
the Hamming bound, i.e.,















The main condition of binary perfect codes is that the denominator of | C| must be a
power of 2 [12]. Perfect codes are very useful in the coding systems that deal with error
correcting codes. An example of a perfect code is the (23,12,7) binary Golay code because
it has ability to correct all error patterns t up to and including 3 (where t ≤ b(d−1)/2c).
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Coset of linear code
Assume C be an (n, k) linear code over GF(q) and x be any vector of length n. Then
the subset
x+ C = {x+ y | y ∈ C}
is called a coset of C. Each coset x+C of a linear code has qk elements and the number
of different cosets is qn−k [13].
Coset leader
A word of a coset that has a minimum weight in that coset is called a coset leader.
Best Known Linear Code (BKLC)
If the [n, k] linear code C has a highest minimum distance d among all known [n, k] linear
codes, the code C will be called a Best Known Linear Code(BKLC) [4].
It is clear from the definition that BKLC has a largest value of d among the other codes.
Since d is associated with the number of error patterns t (where t ≤ b(d − 1)/2c), this
means that the use of BKLC will give us the ability to investigate and correct the largest
possible number of errors in the linear code.
Cyclotomic Coset
Assume p and pm − 1 are coprime. The cyclotomic coset of p modulo pm − 1 containing
s for any s with 0 ≤ s < pm − 1 is defined by:
Cs = {(spjmod(pm − 1)) : 0 ≤ j < m} (2.12)
The cyclotomic coset of s is denoted by:
Cs = {s, ps, p2s, ..., pms−1s}(mod(pm − 1)) (2.13)
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where ms is the smallest positive integer such that pmss ≡ s(mod(pm − 1)).
The smallest element in Cs is s and called the coset representative [12]. For example,
the cyclotomic cosets mod 15 (with p = 2) can be calculated as follows:
pm − 1 = 24 − 1, this means that the maximum number of elements for each cosets is
equal to 4. For (0 ≤ s < 15), Cs = {(spjmod(15)) : 0 ≤ j < 4}, then the cyclotomic
cosets are as following:
C0 = {0},
C1 = {1, 2, 4, 8},
C3 = {3, 6, 9, 12},
C5 = {5, 10},
C7 = {7, 11, 13, 14},
Also, the coset representative is 0,1,3,5,7.
Quadratic Residue Code
An integer Q is said to be quadratic residue modulo n if the congruence x2 ≡ Q(mod(n))
has a solution. Otherwise, Q is a quadratic non-residue modulo n [14]. If n is an odd
prime, then n has (Q−1
2
)quadratic residue and (Q−1
2
)quadratic non-residue. The quadratic
residue are congruent modulo n to the integers {12, 22, ...(Q−1
2
)2}; that is
Qn = {j2mod(n) : j = 1, 2, · · · , (n− 1
2
)} (2.14)
The knowledge of quadratic residues of a number is very useful to find its factors. For
example, the set of quadratic residues modulo 17 can be calculated as follows :
Q17 = {j2mod(17) : j = 1, 2, ..., (17−12 )}
Q17 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16}
Also, let N17 be the set of quadratic non-residues, then
N17 = {3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14}
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The Standard Array of the Linear Code
A standard array of a linear [n, k, d] code is a (qn−k × qk) array that lists all elements
of a particular vector space F nq . It plays an important role in the decoding the linear
codes, thereby helping us to find the corresponding codeword for any received vector.
The standard array is configured as follows [15]:
1. The first row lists all codewords starting with the 0 codeword on the left.
2. Each row is a coset with the coset leader in the first column.
3. Each codeword in the array is the sum of the codeword at the top of its column
and the coset leader at the far left of its row.
2.3 The Binary Symmetric Channel(BSC)
The binary symmetric channel(BSC) is one of the simplified communication channels
model that are used in coding systems. The BSC deals with binary symbols; so, it can
be transmit only one bit 0 or 1 per unit of time with a probability of error pe < 12 . The
simplified form of BSC is shown in Fig. 2.2 [16]. Assume a transmitter, Alice sends












Figure 2.2: Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC)
incoming messageMi without any errors is (1−pe), and received in error with probability
pe. The BSC adds errors to the input sequence before transmission, which are generated
as a random error sequence of zeros and ones. The transmitted message Ci that can be
20
Chapter: 2 Section: 2.3
seen by Bob is:
Ci = Mi + Ei (2.15)
Where Ci ∈ {0, 1} are the output bits, Mi ∈ {0, 1} are the input bits, Ei ∈ {0, 1} are
the possible error bits. If Ei = 1 , that mean an error occurs on bit i [17].
For example, assume Alice sends a messageMi = 01101101 and the BSC adds randomly
an error sequence Ei = 00100101. The transmitted message Ci to Bob can be calculated
by using modulo 2 addition as follows:
Ci = Mi + Ei
Ci = (01101101) + (00100101)
Ci = (01001000)
As mentioned above, a BSC is a channel has probability of error equal to pe. Assume
that M (input) is sent through a BSC and C (output) is received, then the conditional
probabilities of BSC can be characterised as :
Pr(C = 0 |M = 0) = 1− pe
Pr(C = 0 |M = 1) = pe
Pr(C = 1 |M = 0) = pe
Pr(C = 1 |M = 1) = 1− pe
Where 0 ≤ pe ≤ 12 .
Therefore, the BSC matrix is 1− pe pe
pe 1− pe

The capacity of BSC can be expressed in terms of the binary entropy function H(pe):
Capacity = 1−H(pe) (2.16)
Where
H(pe) = −pe log pe − (1− pe) log(1− pe) (2.17)
The special case of the eavesdropper channel model is shown in Fig. 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Special case of the eavesdropper channel
The model assumes the main channel(between Alice and Bob) is an error-free channel
and the eavesdropper chanel is a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with probability of
error pe. The secrecy capacity of BSC represents the maximum equivocation rate at the
eavesdropper when the maximum transmission rate has been achieved [18]. Therefore,
the secrecy capacity Sc of a BSC can be calculated from the following equation:
Sc = 1− Capacity (2.18)
Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5 shows the channel capacity and secrecy capacity(Equivocation) of
BSC as a function of probability of error pe.
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Figure 2.4: Channel Capacity of 1-bit BSC
Figure 2.5: Secrecy Capacity (Equivocation) of 1-bit BSC
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2.3.1 Worked example of 2-bit BSC
For the Fig. 2.6 , draw the curves of capacity and equivocation of the 2-bit BSC in the
case of 1-error occurs, for the following probability of errors:








Figure 2.6: 2-bit BSC Example
1) For pe = 0.01, from Table 2.1, H(x) =
∑
Pr × I = (0.25× 2)× 4 = 2
Tx Probability(Pr) Information(I)




Table 2.1: Transmitter Entropy H(x) for pe = 0.01
From Table 2.2, H(y) =
∑
Pr × I = (0.25× 2)× 4 = 2
Rx Probability(Pr) Information(I)




Table 2.2: Receiver Entropy H(y) for pe = 0.01
I(x,y) = H(x)-H(y)-H(x,y)
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Capacity = I(x,y) = H(x) + H(y) - H(x,y) = 2 + 2 - 2.1615 = 1.8384
Equivocation = H(x,y) - H(y) = 2.1615 - 2 = 0.1615
Tx Rx Probability(Pr) Information(I)
00 00 0.25×0.99×0.99 = 0.245025 2.029
00 01 0.25×0.99×0.01 = 0.002475 8.658
00 10 0.25×0.01×0.99 = 0.002475 8.658
00 11 0.25×0.01×0.01 = 2.5×10−5 15.2877
01 00 0.25×0.99×0.01 = 0.002475 8.658
01 01 0.25×0.99×0.99 = 0.245025 2.029
01 10 0.25×0.01×0.01 = 2.5×10−5 15.2877
01 11 0.25×0.01×0.99 = = 0.002475 8.658
10 00 0.25×0.01×0.99 = 0.002475 8.658
10 01 0.25×0.01×0.01 = 2.5×10−5 15.2877
10 10 0.25×0.99×0.99 = 0.245025 2.029
10 11 0.25×0.99×0.01 = 0.002475 8.658
11 00 0.25×0.01×0.01 = 2.5×10−5 15.2877
11 01 0.25×0.01×0.99 = 0.002475 8.658
11 10 0.25×0.99×0.01 = 0.002475 8.658
11 11 0.25×0.99×0.99 = = 0.245025 2.029
Table 2.3: Joint Entropy H(x,y) for pe = 0.01
2) For pe = 0.5, from Table 2.4, H(x) =
∑
Pr × I = (0.25× 2)× 4 = 2
Tx Probability(Pr) Information(I)




Table 2.4: Transmitter Entropy H(x) for pe = 0.5
From Table 2.5, H(y) =
∑
Pr × I = (0.25× 2)× 4 = 2
From Table 2.6, H(x,y) =
∑
Pr × I = [(0.0625× 4)]× 16 = 4
Capacity = I(x,y) = H(x) + H(y) - H(x,y) = 2 + 2 - 4 = 0
Equivocation = H(x,y) - H(y) = 4 - 2 = 2
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Rx Probability(Pr) Information(I)




Table 2.5: Receiver Entropy H(y) for pe = 0.5
Tx Rx Probability(Pr) Information(I)
00 00 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 01 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 10 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 11 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 00 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 01 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 10 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 11 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 00 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 01 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 10 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 11 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 00 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 01 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 10 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
00 11 0.25×0.5×0.5 = 0.0625 4
Table 2.6: Joint Entropy H(x,y) for pe = 0.5
The remaining values can be calculated in the same manner. Table 2.7 show all val-
ues of channel capacity and equivocation for the example.
Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8 shows the channel capacity and equivocation as a function of prob-
ability of error pe. Fig. 2.9 and Fig. 2.10 shows the normalised channel capacity and
normalised equivocation for 1-bit and 2-bit BSC together as a function of probability
of error pe. Clearly, the normalised values of equivocation and channel capacity are
identical for 1-bit and 2-bit BSC.
26
Chapter: 2 Section: 2.3












Table 2.7: Channel Capacity and Equivocation values
Figure 2.7: Channel Capacity for 2-bit BSC
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Figure 2.8: Secrecy Capacity (Equivocation) of 2-bit BSC
Figure 2.9: Normalised Channel Capacity for 1-bit and 2-bit BSC
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Figure 2.10: Normalised Equivocation for 1-bit and 2-bit BSC
2.4 Wiretap Channel
The wiretap channel proposed by Wyner in 1975 [1] is one of the channels that takes
the security of transmitted information into consideration. The wiretap channel contains
one sender and two receivers, one of them is the legitimate user and the second is the











Figure 2.11: wiretap channel Model (special case)
In this model, Alice(transmitter) wants to send a secret message M to Bob(legitimate
receiver) in the presence of an eavesdropper,Eve. The model assumes the main channel
between Alice and Bob is an error-free channel and the eavesdropper channel is a Binary
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Symmetric Channel(BSC) with probability of error pe (0 < pe ≤ 12).
In practice the link between Alice and Bob would be a link with high communication
margin such as a line of sight digital microwave with no significant error rate. The
eavesdroppers some distance away with a non line of sight link with errors similar to
that of a BSC.
Assume the message consists random binary K-bits M = SK = {S1, S2, .., SK}, where
Pr{S = 0} = Pr{S = 1} = 12 . Now, Alice encodes SK as a vector XN of length N where
XN = (X1, ..., XN) and transmits XN . Bob and Eve receive the encoding message via
their respective channels.
Suppose that Bob has an idea about the encryption system that was used by Alice
and is therefore able to retrieve the original message. Assuming that SK is uniformly





The eavesdropper, Eve, receives the encoded message XN via a BSC with probability
of error pe. The corresponding output received by Eve is ZN = (Z1, ..., ZN). The








The equivocation is a measure of the uncertainty of Eve about the message SK after
observing ZN .
The main objective of this design by Wyner is to maximise the rate of reliable communi-
cation from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver and to minimise the information(i.e.
maximise the equivocation) that can be gained by the eavesdropper.
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2.5 Syndrome Decoding
The syndrome can be used as an error detection scheme. Syndrome decoding is one of
the high efficiency methods in the decoding a linear code in channels that add errors.
Let C be a linear [n, k, d] code, and H be a parity check matrix for C. Assume M is the
transmitted message, r the received message and e the error vector, then
r = M + e
When r is received, the decoder calculates the following:
s = rHT
s is called the syndrome of r.
Note that s = rHT = (M + e)HT = MHT + eHT = eHT
i.e., The syndrome depends only on the error. The following procedure shows the steps
for syndrome decoding [13,15]:
1. List the cosets and select coset leaders for the code.
2. Calculates the syndromes for each coset leader and construct the syndrome look
up table.
3. Calculate the syndrome of the received messages and from the table determine
which coset leader (this is the error e) corresponding to this syndrome.
4. Calculate M = r − e.




1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1

The standard array for the code C is shown in Table 2.8 and the syndrome look up
table is shown in Table 2.9. If the string r = 00110 is received, the syndrome equation
is applied as follows: s = rHT = (00110) × HT = 001. Using the look up table, we
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find that the corresponding coset leader is e = 00001. Therefore, we correct the received
message as M = r − e = 00110− 00001 = 00111.
Coset leader + C Coset
C 00000 11100 00111 11011
10000 + C 10000 01100 10111 01011
01000 + C 01000 10100 01111 10011
00100 + C 00100 11000 00011 11111
00010 + C 00010 11110 00101 11001
00001 + C 00001 11101 00110 11010
01001 + C 01001 10101 01110 10010
10001 + C 10001 01101 10110 01010
Table 2.8: The standard array of example









Table 2.9: The Syndrome look up table of example
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2.6 Syndrome Coding Scheme for the Wiretap Chan-
nel
Traditionally, the syndrome coding scheme uses a [n, k, 2t+ 1] code capable of correcting
t errors, defined either by a k × n generator matrix G or by a (n − k) × n parity check
matrix H [19]. The syndrome coding scheme for the wiretap channel introduced by
Wyner [1] is shown in Fig. 2.12, We consider a special case of the wiretap channel when
the main channel is an error-free channel and the eavesdropper channel is a BSC with a
probability of error (pe). The encoding and decoding process of syndrome coding scheme














Figure 2.12: The syndrome coding scheme for the wiretap channel
2.6.1 Encoder
The block diagram of the Encoder is shown in Fig. 2.13, and the following algorithm
shows how Alice starts the encoding process in order to generates the n-bit transmitted
vector C2 from the m = (n− k)-bit message M .
Algorithm 1 Encoding Algorithm of [n, k, 2t+ 1] code
Require: [G]k×n . The Generator Matrix of [n, k, 2t+ 1] code
Require: [H]Tn×(n−k) . The Parity Check transpose Matrix of [n, k, 2t+ 1] code
Require: [DR]1×k . Generate random data vector
1: Generate [DR]1×k
2: [C1]1×n ← [DR]1×k × [G]k×n
3: [E]1×n ← [M ]1×(n−k) . Generate E from M1
4: [C2]1×n ← [C1]1×n + [E]1×n
5: return [C2]1×n
1All 2n error patterns, E, are partitioned into 2n−k cosets. There are 2k error patterns ∈ E, which
have same syndrome.
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[M ]1×(n−k) From Look up Table






C2 = C1 + E
[C2]1×n[E]1×n
Figure 2.13: Block Diagram of the Encoder
To carry the m-bit message M , Alice looks up the error pattern E corresponding to the
syndrome s which is set to be M .
2.6.2 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Since the main channel is the error-free channel, Bob receives the transmitted vector C2,
and he recovers the original message M as shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Decoding Algorithm of [n, k, 2t+ 1] code
Require: [H](n−k)×n . The Parity Check Matrix of [n, k, 2t+ 1] code
Require: [C2]1×n . The transmitted vector from Alice
1: Generate [H]Tn×(n−k) . The Parity Check transpose Matrix
2: [s]1×(n−k) ← [C2]1×n × [H]Tn×(n−k)
3: M = s
4: return M
2.6.3 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
The block diagram of the BSC channel and eavesdropper’s decoder is shown in Fig. 2.14.
Eve receives a corrupted vector D instead of the transmitted vector [C2]1×n as a result
of passing through the BSC which adds additional errors [EBSC ]1×n as follows:
[D]1×n = [C2]1×n + [EBSC ]1×n, Where [EBSC ]1×n is a random binary error vector which
depends on the crossover probability pe of BSC. Assuming that Eve uses the same
type of decoder that has been used by Bob, the following steps explain how she gets the
estimated message Mˆ from the corrupted vector D:
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Algorithm 3 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: [H](n−k)×n . The Parity Check Matrix of [n, k, 2t+ 1] code
Require: [D]1×n . The corrupted vector
1: Generate [H]Tn×(n−k) . The Parity Check transpose Matrix
2: [sc]1×(n−k) ← [D]1×n × [H]Tn×(n−k)










Figure 2.14: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and Decoder of Eavesdropper
2.7 The (23, 12, 7) Binary Golay Code
2.7.1 Perfect Binary Golay Code
The (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code is a perfect linear error-correcting code, that is, the
number of correctable error patterns equal to the number of syndromes. It was found by
M. J. Golay in 1949, is one of the most important binary quadratic residue(QR) codes.
The parameters of Perfect binary Golay code are:
Block length(n)=23 Dimension(k)=12
Information Rate(R)=12/23=0.522 Distance(d)=7
The minimum distance is d = 7, therefore the (23, 12, 7) Golay code can be correct all
error patterns up to 3 (where t ≤ b(d− 1)/2c) [20, 21]. The total number of these error
patterns are listed in Table 2.10. The total no. of error patterns = 2048 = 211= no. of
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= 211 = 2048
According to the property above, the (23, 12, 7) Binary Golay code can be encoded and
decoded simply by using look-up tables.
2.7.2 Generator matrix and Parity check matrix of Golay Code
There are two Golay code generator polynomials [20,22]:
g1(x) = x
11 + x9 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x+ 1
or
g2(x) = x
11 + x10 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1
Both of them g1(x) and g2(x) are factors of x23-1 in GF (2); in fact, we have:
x23 − 1 = (x− 1)g1(x)g2(x)
By using g(x) = 1 + x + x5 + x6 + x7 + x9 + x11 as the generator polynomial of Golay
code, the Generator matrix G of the (12× 23) elements are:
36
Chapter: 2 Section: 2.7
G =

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

Now, we should systematise the generator matrix G by using row operation in order to
protect the information bits. Consequently, the Generator matrix G will change into the
form [Q12×11, I12×12] that shown as follows:
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G =

1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

The parity check polynomial of Golay code is:
h(x) = (x23 − 1)/g(x) = x12 + x10 + x7 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
and the parity check matrix H of the (11× 23) elements are:
H =

1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1

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By using row operation, or directly by transform systematic G of [Q12×11, I12×12] into
[I11×11, QT11×12]. The systematic parity check matrix is shown as follows:
H =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1

2.7.3 Weight distribution of Golay Code
To verify that the minimum distance of Golay code is 7, the weight distribution needs
to be calculated. Table 2.11 shows the weight distribution of the (23, 12, 7) Golay code
has been found by Magma Software [4].
> C := BKLC(GF(2 ) , 2 3 , 1 2 ) ;
> WeightDist r ibut ion (C) ;
[ <0, 1>, <7, 253>, <8, 506>, <11, 1288>, <12, 1288>,
<15, 506>, <16, 253>, <23,1> ]
The total number of codewords is 212 and the minimum Hamming distance of this code
is indeed 7, as shown by Table 2.11.
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The total No. of Codewords 4096
Table 2.11: The Weight distribution of (23, 12, 7) Golay Code
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2.7.4 The Codewords and Algebraic Decoder of Golay Code


























i = c(x) + e(x) (2.23)
Assume α is a primitive 23rd root of unity in GF(211). Now, we need to find an element
of order 23.
Since 211-1= 2047 = 23×89. Therefore; the element α89 ∈ GF(211) has order 23.
The cyclotomic coset with respect to 23 can be calculated by assuming Q23 to be the set
of quadratic residues modulo 23:
Q23 = j
2(mod 23); (j = 1, 2, · · · , (23− 1)/2) (2.24)
This gives Q23 = {1,2,3,4,6,8,9,12,13,16,18}.
Note that g(αj)=0 for all j ∈ Q23, the syndromes Sj can be obtained by:
Sj = r(α
j) = c(αj) + e(αj) = e(αj) (2.25)
As the Golay code has a cyclotomic set Q23 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18}. Conse-
quently, g(x) has three roots (α1, α3, α9). Hence the three syndromes (S1,S3,S9) can
be calculated by: S1 = r(α1), S3 = r(α3), and S9 = r(α9). The process of finding the
errors and its locations has been explained by Elia [24]. To illustrate this method, the
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Where σ1= z1+ z2+ z3, σ2= z1z2+ z2z3+ z3z1 and σ3= z1z2z3.
Here, z represents the root of error locator polynomial,then z = αj, where j locates
the position of error to be corrected. The all error cases that have been obtained is
summarised as follows:
1) If no error occurs, then S1= S3= S9 = 0 and L(z)= 0.
2) If one error occurs, then S13= S3 , S33= S9 and L(z) = z + S1.
3) If two error occurs, then L(z) = z2 + S1z + (S21 +
S3
S1
), if S1D1/3 = S3.
4) If three error occurs, then L(z) = z3 + S1z2 + (S21 +D1/3)z + (S3 + S1D1/3),
if S1D1/3 6= S3.
Where D = S61 + S23 + (S91 + S9)/(S31 + S3), and the cube root D1/3 is in GF(211), and
it can be calculated as a power of exponent 1365, i.e., D1/3 = D1365. Finally, the error
locations can be found from L(z).





M [11− bit] C[23− bit]
To illustrate the procedure of encrypting the message [M ]1×11 into cipher text vector
[C]1×23, the following four steps must be achieved :
Step 1 : Select the Generator Matrix [G]12×23 of Golay Code.
Step 2 : Generate [12-bit] random data vector [DR]1×12 randomly.
Step 3 : Calculate
[C1]1×23 = [DR]1×12 × [G]12×23 (2.27)
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Step 4 : Calculate
[C]1×23 = [C1]1×23 + [E1]1×23 (2.28)
Where E1 is a [23-bit] error pattern of weight between 0 and 3. The error vector E1
is related to the Message [M ]1×11. So, for each error pattern a syndrome must exist
because the Golay code is a perfect code. Therefore; the error vector can be calculated
by setting Si = Mi.
E1 can be calculated from
S = C ×HT = M (2.29)
Where HT is the transpose matrix of H
M = C ×HT = [C1 + E1]×HT
M = [DR×G+ E1]×HT = DR×G×HT + E1 ×HT
Since G and H are orthogonal(G×HT = 0)
M − E1 ×HT = 0 (2.30)
From the last equation, M and HT are known. Therefore; the error vector E1 can be
computed.
Decoding Algorithm
Assuming that the main channel is error-free channel, the legitimate receiver receives the
cipher text C. Now, to recover the original message, the legitimate receiver calculates
the syndrome of C for Golay code S = C ×HT , which equates to the message M .
Worked Example
The generator matrix [G]12×23 and parity check matrix [H]11×23 of the (23, 12, 7) Golay
code can be obtained directly by using Magma software as shown below:
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> C:=BKLC(GF(2 ) , 2 3 , 1 2 ) ;
> C;
[ 2 3 , 12 , 7 ] "Quadratic Residue code" Linear Code over GF(2)
Generator matrix :
[ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 ]
[ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 ]
> ParityCheckMatrix (C) ;
[ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 ]
[ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 ]
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Assuming that Alice wishes to send the message [M ]1×11 = [01111000011] to Bob, she
first generates a random data vector, say [DR]1×12 = [000110101000] and computes:
[C1]1×23 = [DR]1×12 × [G]12×23 = [00011010100011110110010]
Now we illustrate how to calculate the error pattern [E1]1×23 of weight between 0 and
3. The error vector E1 is related to the message [M ]1×11. So the mapping between each
error pattern and syndromes is one-to-one. The error vector can be calculated by setting
Si = Mi(i = 0, 1, . . . , 2047)
S1 = E1 ×HT = M
where HT represent the transpose of parity check matrix. As there are only 2048 syn-
dromes, it is straightforward to generate a look up table linking S1 to E1.
[E1]1×23 = [00000000010001000000001]
[C]1×23 = [C1]1×23 + [E1]1×23
[C]1×23 = [00011010100011110110010] + [00000000010001000000001]
[C]1×23 = [00011010110010110110011]
which she then sends to Bob.
Upon receiving [C]1×23, Bob decodes C by calculating the syndrome:
S = C ×HT = [01111000011]
which equals the original message M .
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HT =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

3) P.16 , Modify Table 1.7
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2.8 Best Known Linear Code (33, 23, 5)
2.8.1 Construction of Binary Linear Codes of minimum distance
five
There are many techniques for constructing binary linear codes of minimum distance 5
as shown in [16, 25, 26]. Any codeword of length n, number of information bits k and
minimum distance d is called an [n, k, d] linear code, which can be defined by a (n−k)×n
parity check matrix H. In one of these methods, as shown in [27], two binary matrices B
and Q were assumed with (n− k) rows and n1, n2 columns, respectively. The following
parity check matrix is used to define a binary code C of length n = n1 + n2 with (n− k)
check bits as follows:
H =
000 · · · 0 111 · · · 1
B Q

In this method, two matrices B and Q should be constructed. In addition, the minimum
distance d of C is 5 if all combinations of any 4 columns of H are linearly independent.
Assume α be a primitive element in F=GF(2m). The element of F has been constructed
as a binary m-tuple using (1, α, α2, · · · , αm−1) as a basis of F [16, 25,26]. The B matrix
was constructed with 2m − 1 columns as follows:
B =
1 α · · · αi · · · α(2m−2)
1 α3 · · · α3i · · · α3(2m−2)

In order to calculate Q, assume L(x) to be a linear map from F to F . So, the i′th column





where yi(i = 1, 2, ..., n2) are distinct elements of F.
In particular, several (33, 23, 5) codes are constructed by using another approach, these
47
Chapter: 2 Section: 2.8
codes have one more information bit than the best known code (32, 22, 5) [28]. One of
these codes is described in section 2.8.2.
2.8.2 Construction of Parity Check Matrix H[10, 33] of (33, 23, 5)
code
Generates a field with 1024 elements
Assume the irreducible polynomial f = 1 + x3 + x10 and α be a primitive root of the
polynomial. Therefore, α10 = 1 + α3.
Thus, the following Table 2.12 of field GF (210) is obtained. This table shows the vectors
of coefficients with respect to the basis (1, α, α2, · · · , α9).
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α9 α8 α7 α6 α5 α4 α3 α2 α1 α0 Polynomial α
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 α0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 x α
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 x2 α2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 x3 α3
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 x4 α4
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 x5 α5
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 x6 α6
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x7 α7
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x8 α8
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x9 α9
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 x3+1 α10
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 x4+x α11
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 x5+x2 α12
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 x6+x3 α13
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 x7+x4 α14
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 x8+x5 α15
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 x9+x6 α16
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 x10+x7=x7+x3+1 α17
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 x8+x4+x α18
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 x9+x5+x2 α19
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 x10+x6+x3= x6+x3+1= x6+1 α20
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 x7+x α21
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 x8+x2 α22
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 x9+x3 α23
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 x10+x4= x4+x3+1 α24
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 x5+x4+x α25
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 x6+x5+x2 α26
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 x7+x6+x3 α27
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 x8+x7+x4 α28
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 x9+x8+x5 α29
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 x10+x9+x6=x9+x6+x3+1 α30
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 x9+x2 α1022
Table 2.12: Galois Field of GF(210), primitive polynomial = x10+x3+1
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Construction H[10, 33] for (33, 23, 5) code
H is divided into two partitions, the first one contains 22 columns and the other has
11 columns. Assume β = α31 and let B the matrix that contains the 22 elements βi,
i = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 31, 29, 25, 17, 3, 6, 12, 24, 15, 30, 27, 21, 9, 18, 11, and 22. The values of
βi are calculated as shown below [27]:
β = α31
α10 = 1 + α3
α20 = 1 + α6
α30 = α10 × α20 = (1 + α3)× (1 + α6) = 1 + α3 + α6 + α9
α31 = α× (1 + α3 + α6 + α9) = α + α4 + α7 + α10 = 1 + α + α3 + α4 + α7 = β
β = 1 + α + α3 + α4 + α7
β2 = β × β = 1 + α2 + α4 + α6 + α7 + α8
β4 = β2 × β2 = 1 + α2 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α8 + α9
β8 = β4 × β4 = α + α2 + α3 + α4 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α8 + α9
β16 = β8 × β8 = 1 + α + α3 + α4 + α5 + α7 + α9
β32 = β16 × β16 = α + α2 + α3 + α6 + α7
β31 = β × β2 × β4 × β8 × β16 = α5 + α6 + α7
β29 = β × β4 × β8 × β16 = 1 + α2 + α3 + α4 + α5 + α7
β25 = β × β8 × β16 = α3 + α6 + α7 + α8
β17 = β × β16 = α2 + α4 + α5 + α7 + α9
β3 = β × β2 = 1 + α3 + α6 + α7 + α9
β6 = β2 × β4 = 1 + α + α2 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α8
β12 = β × β11 = α3 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α9
β24 = β8 × β16 = 1 + α + α2 + α3 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α8
β15 = β3 × β12 = α3 + α5 + α7 + α9
β30 = β15 × β15 = 1 + α + α3 + α6 + α7 + α8
β27 = β3 × β24 = 1 + α4 + α5 + α7 + α9
β21 = β6 × β15 = α + α3 + α7
β9 = β3 × β6 = α2 + α4 + α6 + α7
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β18 = β9 × β9 = α2 + α5 + α7 + α8
β11 = β2 × β9 = 1 + α2 + α3 + α5 + α6 + α7
β22 = β11 × β11 = α2 + α3 + α5 + α6 + α7
The next step is constructing the remaining 11 columns of B in order to get H for
(33, 23, 5). These columns can be calculated through the computer search as a set of αj,
j=1, 16, 106, 195, 281, 460, 609, 786, 891, 941, and 979.
The values of αj is calculated as shown below [27]:
α10 = 1 + α3; α20 = 1 + α6; α30 = 1 + α3 + α6 + α9
α16 = α6 × α10 = α6 + α9
α25 = α5 × α20 = α + α4 + α5; α50 = α25 × α25 = 1 + α2 + α3 + α8
α100 = α50 × α50 = 1 + α4 + α9
α106 = α6 × α100 = 1 + α3 + α5 + α6 + α8
α24 = 1 + α3 + α4 ; α48 = 1 + α6 + α8 ; α96 = 1 + α2 + α5 + α6 + α9
α192 = α + α2 + α3 + α5 + α8
α195 = α3 × α192 = α + α5 + α6 + α8
α34 = 1 + α4 + α6 + α7 ; α68 = 1 + α2 + α4 + α5 + α7 + α8
α136 = α3 + α6 + α7 + α8 + α9; α272 = α + α2 + α5 + α7 + α8 + α9
α281 = α9 × α272 = α4 + α6 + α8 + α9
α28 = α4 + α7 + α8 ; α56 = α4 + α6 + α7 + α8 + α9
α112 = α + α2 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α9 ; α224 = 1 + α + α3 + α4 + α5 + α7 + α8
α448 = α2 + α3 + α4 + α7 + α8 + α9
α460 = α12 × α448 = 1 + α + α2 + α4 + α8
α19 = α2 + α5 + α9 ; α38 = 1 + α + α3 + α8 ; α76 = 1 + α2 + α9
α152 = 1 + α + α8 ; α304 = 1 + α2 + α6 + α9 ; α608 = 1 + α2 + α4 + α5 + α8
α609 = α× α608 = α + α2 + α3 + α6 + α9
α192 = α + α2 + α3 + α5 + α8 ; α384 = 1 + α2 + α3 + α4 + α9 ; α768 = 1 + α + α6
α786 = α18 × α768 = 1 + α + α2 + α3 + α5 + α8 + α9
α27 = α3 + α6 + α7 ; α54 = α2 + α4 + α5 + α6 + α7 ; α108 = 1 + α2 + α3 + α5 + α7 + α8
α216 = α3 + α7 + α9 ; α432 = α + α6 + α7 + α8 ; α864 = α4 + α5 + α6 + α7 + α9
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α891 = α27 × α864 = α2 + α4 + α6
α29 = α5 + α8 + α9 ; α58 = 1 + α + α3 + α4 + α6 + α8 + α9
α116 = 1 + α + α4 + α5 + α9 ; α232 = α + α2 + α3 + α4
α464 = α2 + α4 + α6 + α8 ; α928 = α2 + α4 + α5 + α6 + α8 + α9
α941 = α13 × α928 = 1 + α3 + α4 + α8 + α9
α30 = 1 + α3 + α6 + α9 ; α60 = 1 + α + α2 + α4 + α5 + α6 + α8
α120 = α3 + α4 + α5 + α6 + α8 + α9 ; α240 = 1 + α + α2 + α3 + α4 + α5 + α9
α480 = α + α2 + α3 + α6 ; α960 = α4 + α5 + α6
α979 = α19 × α960 = 1 + α + α5 + α9
Now, the H[10, 33] for (33, 23, 5) code is constructed as shown below:
H =

1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1

2.8.3 Generation of Parity Check Matrix using Magma Software
The parity check matrix H of the (33,23,5) code has been obtained directly by using
Magma software as shown below:
> C := BKLC(GF(2 ) , 3 3 , 2 3 ) ;
> C;
[ 3 3 , 23 , 5 ] L inear Code over GF(2)
Generator matrix :
52
Chapter: 2 Section: 2.8
[ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 ]
[ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 ]
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> ParityCheckMatrix (C) ;
[ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 ]
The Weight Distribution of the (33,23,5) Code.
To verify that the minimum distance of this code is 5, the weight distribution of the code
needs to be found. Table 2.13 shows the weight distribution of the (33,23,5) code that
has been obtained by Magma Software:
> C := BKLC(GF(2 ) , 3 3 , 2 3 ) ;
> WeightDist r ibut ion (C) ;
[<0 ,1> , <5,275>, <6,1287>, <7,4037>, <8,13090>, <9,37840>,
<10 ,90937>,<11 ,189027>, <12 ,346247>, <13 ,559350>, <14 ,799590>,
<15 ,1013298>, <16 ,1139325>, <17 ,1139325>, <18 ,1013298>, <19 ,799590>,
<20 ,559350>, <21 ,346247>, <22 ,189027>, <23 ,90937>, <24 ,37840>,
<25 ,13090>, <26,4037>, <27,1287>, <28,275>, <33,1> ]
The total number of codewords is 223 and the minimum Hamming distance of this code
is indeed 5, as shown by Table 2.13.
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The total No. of Codewords 8,388,608
Table 2.13: The number of codewords of weight (n-w) is equal to number of codeword
of weight w
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2.9 Literature Review
The wiretap channel has been investigated by several researcher. In [29] Leung showed
that the secrecy capacity is equal to the difference between the capacities of the main
channel and eavesdropper channel for symmetric wiretap channels. In [30], Leung and
Hellman extends Wyner’s results for discrete memoryless wiretap channels to the Gaus-
sian wiretap channel.
Wyner’s results have been generalised by Csiszar and Korner [31], who considered a dis-
crete memoryless channels with a common input and two receivers. In this model, the
main results have been obtained as the set of triples (R1, Re, Ro), such that the secret
message is transmitted to receiver1(legitimate receiver) at rate R1 and common messages
to both receivers at rate R0, while maximising the equivocation rate Re of receiver2(the
eavesdropper channel) as much as possible. Further, if the eavesdropper channel is a
degraded version of that used by a legitimate receiver and no common message is sent,
Wyner’s results will be generalised. Another generalisation of Wyner’s coding scheme [1]
has been done by Cohen and Zemor [32], which assumes that the main and eavesdropper
channels are noisy. In addition, they proved that the generalised scheme achieves the
Shannon capacity of the system.
Studies of the syndrome coding scheme, whose basic idea is to transmit information in
the syndromes of a code so as to increase the communication security has been done
by several researchers. For example, Cohen and Zemor [33] analysed the information
leakage of syndrome coding for the wiretap channel and proposed a method to select a
syndrome function in order to minimise both the length of the transmitted vector and
the information leakage to the eavesdropper. Rouayheb and Soljanin [34] analysed the
problem of securing a multicast network against an eavesdropper who has the ability to
observe a limited number of network links of his choice. They showed that the problem
can be solved by generalisation of the wiretap channel type II (which was analysed by
Ozarow and Wyner [35]). Also, they proved that network security can be achieved by
using syndrome coding as an additional layer to a network code.
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Thangaraj et al. [36] focused on the problem of developing coding schemes for wire-
tap channels in order to increase communication security by providing an alternative
view of the proof for the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels. Several cases of main
and eavesdropper channels have been analysed, for the case where the main channel
is noiseless and the eavesdropper channel is BSC, they showed that codes with good
error detecting properties provide security. Also, they presented code designs for codes
achieving secrecy on the wiretap channel when the main channel is noiseless and the
eavesdropper channel is a binary erasure channel(BEC). In addition, they showed that
the secrecy can be achieved by constructing linear-time decodable secrecy codes based
on low-density parity-check(LDPC) codes.
In [37], Reddy et al. presented the video coding system with syndrome coding by using
low-density parity-check(LDPC) codes.
Dai et al. [38] studied a new wiretap combination model which includes Wyner’s wiretap
channel and wiretap channel of type II by assuming that an eavesdropper can not only
catch the main channel output via an eavesdropper channel, but also get some transmit-
ted information from the encoder,Alice. They provided the reliable transmission rate R
of the main channel, the equivocation rate of eavesdropper and the ratio α of the leaked
transmitted symbols of the new model, and they found that the perfect secrecy can be
achieved when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−R.
Liang et al. [39] studied the compound wiretap channel, which can be interpreted as the
multicast channel with multiple eavesdroppers. They have obtained the lower and upper
bounds on the secrecy capacity for the general compound wiretap channel. The main
objective of this design was to generalise Wyner’s wiretap channel to permit both the
legitimate and the eavesdropper channels to take a number of possible states, ensuring
that the transmitter sends the information to all legitimate receivers and protects it from
all eavesdroppers.
Chen and Vinck [40] also investigated the binary symmetric wiretap channel and they
showed that the secrecy capacity can be obtained by using random linear codes with
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syndrome coding. Suresh et al. [41] showed that duals of LDPC codes have achieved
strong secrecy on the binary erasure wiretap channel when used in a syndrome coding
scheme.
Recently, researchers have directed their studies on how to increase the equivocation rate
of the eavesdropper in the wiretap channel to obtain perfect secrecy. Bafghi et al. [42]
introduced a new technique of Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, this tech-
nique is based on sending the information to the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
through the different channels with different channel states. They have assumed that
the state of the main channel is known for the transmitter and uses this knowledge to
randomize its information and to disable the eavesdropper in decoding. This leads to
an increase the security. In addition, the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper will be
increased due to the complexity of extracting the main channel’s state for the eavesdrop-
per.
For the traditional wiretap channel, Zhang et al. [43] analysed the equivocation rate
of the McEliece cryptosystem under full-code attack and Brickell’s attack and showed
that there is a significant amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper. Therefore,
Zhang et al. proposed a modified system based on the McEliece system to reduce the in-
formation leakage under Brickell’s attack, which employs two encoding stages to improve
the communication security. The original message is first processed using a syndrome
coding scheme based on the (23,12,7) Golay code and then by the traditional McEliece
cryptosystem with the following parameters(1024,524,101). The results obtained showed
that the eavesdropper cannot recover any useful information under the Brickell’s attack
but the price for the higher security is a lower information rate. The negative aspects of
this design have not succeeded with full-code attack. The results showed that the equiv-
ocation rate is zero under full-code attack, meaning that the eavesdropper can recover
the original information under this attack.
The security performance of (n, k) random linear binary codes in syndrome coding scheme
has been analysed by Zhang et al. [44]. The average equivocation of random codes has
been calculated by proposed theoretical analysis based on a putative (n, k) code having
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the same distribution of syndrome probabilities as the ensemble of all (n, k) random
codes. Also, Zhang et al. showed that a higher value of average equivocation has been
obtained for syndrome coding using a randomly chosen code of length greater than 150
bits. In addition, the theoretical results have been compared with the simulation results
obtained from Monte Carlo analysis. The results reveal that there is little difference
between the theoretical and Monte Carlo analysis when the random codes have a value
of m = 20 (m is the number of parity bits), but with increasing values of m, the Monte
Carlo analysis becomes impractical.
New constructions for the wiretap channel with security and error-correction guaran-
tees have been proposed by Cassuto and Bandic [45]. They have discussed the state of
wire-tap II channel in two directions: in the first case of error-free main channels, two
families of codes were constructed with optimal encoding and decoding complexities for
their wiretap security to ensure access to perfect security against an eavesdropper. For
the second case of main channels with errors, two concatenation types were investigated
for wiretap and error correcting codes in order to obtain an optimal construction with
security and error-correction guarantees.
Recently, Zhang et al. [46] proposed a chain-based syndrome coding scheme in a wire-
tap channel, where the main channel is noiseless and the eavesdropper channel is the
binary symmetric channel. The main difference between the conventional syndrome cod-
ing scheme and the chain-based syndrome coding scheme is the chain depth, where the
encoding and decoding processes are memoryless in the conventional syndrome coding
scheme. This is a special case of the chain-based syndrome coding scheme where the
chain depth is equal to zero. In contrast, the encoder and decoder exhibit memory
in the chain based syndrome coding scheme. The simulation results showed that the
equivocation rate has been increased significantly in the proposed model compared with
the conventional syndrome coding scheme and they found from analytic results that the
chain technique helps to increase the equivocation of the eavesdropper as long as the
chain depth increases.
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Code design for error correcting codes is an important and long standing topic in
coding theory. Numerous contributions have been made in concatenating, extending or
shortening the codes to obtain good codes [16]. Traditionally, these codes are designed
for an error correcting system to eliminate the noisy transmission channels and secure
the reliability of communications. The essential and fundamental parameter of an error
correcting code that is responsible for achieving reliable communication is the minimum
Hamming distance, d, which provides a measure of the number of errors that can be
corrected.
An error correcting code can be used in syndrome coding, but this does not necessarily
mean getting the best performance and better codes. Generally code performance in
syndrome coding can be measured by the equivocation rate of the codes when used in
an unreliable channel and the best codes have the highest value of equivocation rate.
It is worth mentioning that all the codes used in this thesis are restricted to binary, linear
codes. The information rate of a syndrome coding scheme using an [n, k, d] linear code
is (n−k
n
) and all binary vectors of length n may be transmitted, while the information
rate of error correcting coding applications is ( k
n
) but only codewords are transmitted.
Determining the generator matrix G or the parity check matrix H is the critical objective
of code design. Traditional code design methods are either based on the design of the
generator matrix or based on the design of the parity check matrix. For example, good
codes may be derived by extending good short codes in length or by shortening good long
codes [16]. In [47], Bouyukliev introduces two algorithms to extend the length of codes,
by modifying the generator matrix of the code. In deriving the best known codes (BKC)
table, methods have been used, such as code extension [48–50] and code shortening [16].
The entire purpose of these methods is to maximise the minimum Hamming distance d
of the codes. Construction X and its variations increase the length of a code in order
to enlarge the minimum weight, which use two or more codes of the same length where
one code contains the other codes which have a higher minimum weight [49,50].
Construction Y1 is a construction method which decreases both the length and the num-
ber of parity bits m (m = n−k) without compromising the minimum Hamming distance
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d of the shortened code [16].
Recently, Zhang et al. [51] proposed a code design technique which produces some best
known equivocation codes2 for the syndrome coding scheme. The best known equivo-
cation codes have been determined for a given number of parity bits m, of the code as
follows: m = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26.
The main objective of this design is to produce a best known equivocation codes of higher
equivocation rate for the syndrome coding scheme compared to all best known error cor-
recting codes. The codes are listed in an on-line database [52] in packed integer format.
These codes have a respectable minimum Hamming distance d, but are sometimes not
as good as the best known code with the same parameters.
2For given code parameters n and m the best known equivocation code has the highest equivocation
rate for BSC compared to all other known codes with the same parameters.
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Implementation of Secrecy Coding for
the Wiretap Channel using BKLC
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, two models are proposed for a special case of wiretap channel when the
main channel is an error free channel and the eavesdropper channel is a binary symmetric
channel. The desired goal in this phase is to maximise the equivocation rate in the eaves-
dropper side with the result that the communication security is improved. The model
design in Fig. 3.1 includes an inner code and an outer code. Best results are obtained
when the outer code employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary
Golay code and the inner code employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on
Best Known Linear codes(BKLC).
In the first model, referred to as Model-1, the transmitted message is first encoded by a
syndrome coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code and secondly using
McEliece technique based on the BKLC(33, 23, 5).
In the second model, referred to as Model-2, the first stage employs a syndrome coding
scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code and the second stage employs the
McEliece technique based on the BKLC(58, 46, 5), by concatenating two Golay coded
vectors and using this as the input to the second stage.
62
Chapter: 3 Section: 3.1
Analysis shows that the second model increases the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper
compared to the first model. In addition, the results obtained show that the arrange-
ment reduces the information leakage by a large margin compared to previously published
schemes.
Parts of this chapter are published in the following conference:
S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“Secrecy coding for the wiretap
channel using best known linear codes”, IEEE Conference, The 5th Global





















D = BSC(C, pe)
Figure 3.1: Block Diagram of Proposed Coding scheme for the Wiretap Channel
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3.2 McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem
3.2.1 Definitions
Irreducible polynomial
A polynomial that cannot be written as the product of two polynomials is called an
irreducible polynomial.
Binary Goppa Code
Let G(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree t over GF(2m) and L=(α1, ..., αn) subset
of GF(2m) such that G(αi)6=0. The binary Goppa code Γ(L,G) is defined by the rational





z − αi = 0 mod G(z) (3.1)
The parameters of Goppa code can be described as [53]:
• The length of Γ(L,G) is n = 2m.
• The dimension of Γ(L,G) is k ≥ n− tm.
• The minimum distance of Γ(L,G) is d ≥ 2t+ 1.
McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem is an asymmetric encryption algorithm that was proposed by
Robert McEliece in 1978. Based on algebraic coding theory [54], the original algorithm
uses binary Goppa codes; these codes are linear and has a fast decoding algorithm. Any
linear code with a fast decoding algorithm can be used in McEliece cryptosystem [55],
but the general problem of finding a codeword of a given weight in a linear binary code
is NP-complete [56].
Although the McEliece cryptosystem was one of the first public key algorithms and very
efficient, it has not received wide acceptance in the cryptographic community.
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M MG¯ c = MG¯+ E c¯ = cP−1 Decoding Algorithm
(Correct t errors)












of binary Goppa Code
P SG
GP
Private keys generated by Bob
Figure 3.2: Block Diagram of McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem have some advantages compared with other public key
cryptosystems, like RSA [57]. Firstly, the speed of the encryption and decryption pro-
cess are faster. Secondly, it employs the probabilistic encryption which is better than
deterministic encryption in preventing information loss against any attacks [58]. On the
other hand, a drawback of the system is that the length of the public key is large and the
length of the ciphertext is much longer than the original message. The block diagram of
McEliece cryptosystem is shown in Fig. 3.2.
3.2.2 Key Generation
In general, the parameters of the McEliece cryptosystem are the parameters of the se-
lected Goppa code . Bob selects a (n, k, 2t + 1) binary Goppa code and the error cor-
recting capability of the code t. The process of generating the public and private keys
are summarized in Algorithm 4 [59–61].
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Algorithm 4 Key Generation for McEliece Cryptosystem
Require: m, t . Security parameters of binary Goppa code
1: n← 2m , k ← n−m× t . Bob select a (n, k, 2t+ 1) binary Goppa code
Require: [G]k×n . Select a Generator matrix for the Goppa code
Require: [S]k×k . Select randomly a Scrambler(binary non-singular) matrix
Require: [P ]n×n . Select randomly a Permutation matrix
2: [G¯]k×n ← S ×G× P . Compute the public Generator matrix
3: return Public key(G¯, t); Private key(G,S, P )
3.2.3 Encryption Algorithm
Assume Alice wants to send a message M to Bob. Firstly, Alice must be obtain the
public key of Bob (G¯, t). Algorithm 5, shows the encryption process that is performed
by Alice [59–61].
Algorithm 5 Message Encryption for McEliece Cryptosystem
Require: (G¯, t) . Obtain public key of Bob
Require: [M ]1×k . Represent the message M as a blocks of binary string of k-bit
Require: [E]1×n . Generate a random error vector E of length n-bit and weight t
1: c←M × G¯+ E . Compute the ciphertext c
2: return c . Alice sends the ciphertext c to Bob
3.2.4 Decryption Algorithm
Bob receives the ciphertext c from Alice. Bob should do the following steps to recover
the original message M [59–61]:
Algorithm 6 Message Decryption for McEliece Cryptosystem
Require: (c,G, P )
Require: [P ]−1 , [S]−1 . Compute the inverse of permutation and scrambler matrix
1: c¯← c× P−1
2: M¯ ←M × S . Use the decoding algorithm for the Goppa code to decrypt c¯ to M¯
3: M ← M¯ × S−1
4: return M . Bob recovers the plaintext M
From Algorithm 6(step 2), we can prove that M¯ = M × S as follows:
c¯ = c× P−1
c¯ = (M × G¯+ E)× P−1
c¯ = (M × S ×G× P + E)× P−1
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c¯ = (M × S)×G+ E × P−1
c¯ = M¯ ×G+ E¯
3.3 Proposed Coding scheme for the Wiretap Channel
[Model-1]
The model design in Fig. 3.3 includes two Best Known Linear Codes to increase the se-
curity of the transmitted message to the legitimate receiver and to maximise the equiv-
ocation rate of the eavesdropper. The first stage employs a syndrome coding scheme
based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code and the second stage employs the McEliece





code (23, 12, 7)
[DR]1×12
[C2]1×23













D = BSC(C, pe)
Figure 3.3: Block Diagram of Proposed Coding scheme for the Wiretap Channel[Model-1]
The (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code is used because it is a perfect linear error-correcting
code. In addition, the BKLC(33, 23, 5) was selected as the second stage because the
output vector from the first stage of Golay code has a length of 23-bits. Therefore, the
length of the public key of second stage must be equal to 23.
The model will be analysed through three parts. The first part shows the encoding
operation(from Alice), which includes two stages. The second part will explain the de-
coding operation in the legitimate receiver (Bob). Finally, the information received by
the eavesdropper via the binary symmetric channel will be explained.
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The modified coding scheme has been implemented using C++ with the support of the
NTL library and Magma software.
3.3.1 Encoding Algorithm
First Stage [Syndrome coding scheme based on (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code]
The (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code has the following parameters shown below:
Length(n) = 23 Dimension(k) = 12 Message(M) =n− k=11
No. of syndromes = 211 = 2048 Minimum distance(d) = 7
No. of correctable Errors(t ≤ bd−1
2
c) = (0→ 3) errors
The block diagram of syndrome coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code
is shown in Fig. 3.4 and Algorithm 7 shows how Alice started the encryption process in
order to generate the 23-bit vector C2.
[M ]1×11 From Look up Table






C2 = C1 + E1
[C2]1×23[E1]1×23
Figure 3.4: Block diagram of syndrome coding scheme based on (23, 12, 7) Golay code
Algorithm 7 Encoding Algorithm of (23, 12, 7) Golay code
Require: [G]12×23 . The Generator matrix of Golay code
Require: [H]T23×11 . The parity check transpose matrix of Golay code
Require: [DR]1×12 . Generate random data vector
1: Generate [DR]1×12
2: [C1]1×23 ← [DR]1×12 × [G]12×23
3: [E1]1×23 ← [M ]1×11 . Generate E1 from M
4: [C2]1×23 ← [C1]1×23 + [E1]1×23
5: return [C2]1×23
Now, we illustrate how to calculate the error pattern [E1]1×23 of weight between 0 and
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3. The error vector E1 is related to the Message [M ]1×11. So, the mapping between
each error pattern and syndromes is one-to-one because the Golay code is a perfect code.
Therefore the error vector can be calculated by setting Si = Mi(i = 0, 1, ..., 2047),
E1 can be calculated from S1 = E1HT = M , where HT represents the transpose of the
parity check matrix. As there are only 2048 syndromes, it is straightforward to generate
a look up table linking S1 to E1. Bob calculates Mˆ the estimate of the message as follows:
Mˆ = C2 ×HT = [C1 + E1]×HT = [DR×G+ E1]×HT
Mˆ = DR×G×HT + E1 ×HT
Since G and H are orthogonal (G×HT = 0), then Mˆ = E1 ×HT = S1 = M .
From the last equation, M and HT are known. Therefore the error vector E1 can be
computed.
Second Stage [McEliece cryptosystem technique based on BKLC(33, 23, 5)]
The block diagram of McEliece cryptosystem technique based on BKLC(33, 23, 5) is
shown in Fig. 3.5. Key generation and message encryption are described below:
[C2]1×23 C3 = C2 × β = C2 ×RSGP
[C3]1×33





Figure 3.5: Block Diagram of McEliece cryptosystem technique based on
BKLC(33, 23, 5)
1) Key generation: Bob selects a BKLC(33, 23, 5) which can correct 2 errors. The
process of generating the public and private keys are summarized in Algorithm 8.
From Algorithm 8, R can be produced by row additions and column swaps of α that
led to obtain a reduced echelon form of α, i.e. R.α = [Ik | Q] where Ik is the (23 × 23)
identity matrix and Q is (k × (n− k)) parity check matrix.
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Algorithm 8 Key Generation of BKLC(33, 23, 5)
Require: [G]23×33 . Generator matrix of BKLC(33, 23, 5)
Require: [S]23×23 . Select randomly a Scrambler matrix
Require: [P ]33×33 . Select randomly a Permutation matrix
1: Generate [S]23×23 . Generate non-singular matrix
Ensure: |S| 6= 0 . The determinant of S not equal 0
2: Generate [P ]33×33
3: [α]23×33 ← SGP
4: [R][α]← [I23 | Q] . Determine [R]23×23
Ensure: [R] 6= [S]−1
5: [β]23×33 ← RSGP
6: return [β]23×33
The public key, which will be known to everyone, is [β]23×33 = RSGP . While S, G,
P and R form the private key kept by Bob. It is assumed in the following that Eve has
knowledge of the private key.
2) Message encryption: The following steps show completion of the encryption process
by Alice, where the output of the first stage [C2]1×23 is used as input to the second stage:
Algorithm 9 Message Encryption of BKLC(33, 23, 5)
Require: C2, β
1: [C3]1×33 ← [C2]1×23 × [β]23×33
2: [C]1×33 ← [C3]1×33 + [E2]1×33 . Alice adds error vector E2 of weight 2
3: return [C]1×33
3.3.2 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Bob receives the transmitted vector [C]1×33 via the main channel that is error-free. He
recovers the original message M as shown in Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Require: C,P−1, HT . Bob using P−1 and HT of BKLC(33, 23, 5)
1: S1 ← C × P−1 ×HT . Bob computes [S1]1×33
2: S1 ← E2 × P−1 ×HT . Bob computes E2
3: C3 ← C + E2 . Bob corrects the error E2 in C to get C3 of 33-bit
4: C2 ← C3 . Bob obtain C2 from C3 by get only the first 23-bit
5: S2 ← C2 ×HT . HT of (23, 12, 7)Golay code
6: Mˆ ← S2,M = Mˆ . Bob recovers an estimate of the message Mˆ
7: return Mˆ
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From Algorithm 10(step 3), we can prove that S1 = E2 × P−1 ×HT as follows:
S1 = C × P−1 ×HT = (C3 + E2)× P−1 ×HT
S1 = (C2 ×RSGP )× P−1 ×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT
S1 = C2 ×RSG×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT
But G×HT = 0.
So, S1 = E2 × P−1 ×HT .
Also, we can give an explanation about the mechanism that is used by Bob to obtain
[C2]1×23 from [C3]1×33 by getting the first 23-bit only as follows:
[C3]1×33 = [C2]1×23 × [β]23×33
[C3]1×33 = [C2]1×23 × [I23×23 | Q23×10]
This means the first 23-bit of vector C3 represents C2 exactly.
3.3.3 Eavesdropper’s Decoder










Figure 3.6: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and Decoder of Eavesdropper
Eve receives a corrupted vector D instead of the transmitted vector [C]1×33 as a result
of passing through the BSC which adds additional errors [EBSC ]1×33 as follows:
[D]1×33 = [C]1×33 + [EBSC ]1×33.
Where [EBSC ]1×33 is a random binary error vector which depends on the probability of
error pe of BSC. Assume Eve uses the same type of decoder that has been used by Bob,
Algorithm 11 explains how gets the estimated message Mˆ from the corrupted vector D.
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Algorithm 11 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: D,P−1, HT . Eve using P−1 and HT of BKLC(33, 23, 5)
1: S3 ← D × P−1 ×HT . Eve computes [S3]1×33
2: S3 ← Eˆ × P−1 ×HT . Eve computes Eˆ
3: Cˆ3 ← D + Eˆ, Cˆ3 6= C3 . Eve corrects the error Eˆ to get Cˆ3 of 33-bit
4: Cˆ2 ← Cˆ3 . Eve obtain Cˆ2 from Cˆ3 by get only the first 23-bit
5: S4 ← Cˆ2 ×HT . HT of (23, 12, 7)Golay code
6: Mˆ ← S4,M 6= Mˆ . Eve recovers an estimate of the message Mˆ
7: return Mˆ
From Algorithm 11(step 3), we can prove that S3 = Eˆ × P−1 ×HT as follows:
S3 = D × P−1 ×HT = (C + EBSC)× P−1 ×HT
S3 = (C3 + E2 + EBSC)× P−1 ×HT
S3 = (C2 ×RSGP )× P−1 ×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT + EBSC × P−1 ×HT
S3 = C2 ×RSG×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT + EBSC × P−1 ×HT
But G×HT = 0.
So, S3 = E2 × P−1 ×HT + EBSC × P−1 ×HT
S3 = (EBSC + E2)× P−1 ×HT = Eˆ × P−1 ×HT .
Mˆ represents the estimated message of 11-bit length and it is equal to Mˆ = M + E .
The error signal E which represents the difference between the original message M and
the estimated message Mˆ , which gives us imagine that Eve will receive an equivocation,
that means that the percentage of the original information leakage will be less.
3.4 Proposed Coding scheme for the Wiretap Channel
[Model-2]
The first model has been improved in order to increase the equivocation rate of the
eavesdropper. The model design in Fig. 3.7 includes two Best Known Linear Codes.
The first stage employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Go-
lay code and the second stage employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on
BKLC(58, 46, 5).
In this model, the transmitted message is encoded firstly by a syndrome coding scheme
based on the (23,12,7) binary Golay code. The total numbers of syndromes generated
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from first stage is equal to 211 = 2048 syndromes, each syndrome has a length of 23-bits.
Then each two syndromes are concatenated together to create 1024 vectors; each one
has a length 46-bit.
The aim of concatenating two syndromes that are produced from the first stage is be-
cause the second stage has employed BKLC(58, 46, 5), so the length of the public key
must be equal to 46.
The second model has also been implemented using C++ with the support of NTL






























D = BSC(C, pe)
Figure 3.7: Block Diagram of Proposed Coding scheme for the Wiretap Channel[Model-2]
3.4.1 Encoding Algorithm
First Stage [ Syndrome coding scheme based on (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code]
Alice will start the encryption process in order to generate 2048 vectors, C2, each vector
having a length of 23-bit. The encryption process of the first stage in the second model
is identical to that in the first model as shown in section 3.3.1 (First Stage).
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Second Stage [McEliece cryptosystem technique based on BKLC(58, 46, 5)]
The Block Diagram of McEliece cryptosystem technique based on BKLC(58, 46, 5) is
shown in Fig. 3.8. The key generation and message encryption are described below:
[C5]1×46 C3 = C5 × β = C5 ×RSGP
[C3]1×58





Figure 3.8: Block Diagram of McEliece cryptosystem technique based on
BKLC(58, 46, 5)
1) Key generation: Bob selects a BKLC(58, 46, 5) which can correct 2 errors. The
process of generating the public and private keys are summarized in Algorithm 12.
Algorithm 12 Key Generation of BKLC(58, 46, 5)
Require: [G]46×58 . Generator matrix of BKLC(58, 46, 5)
Require: [S]46×46 . Select randomly a Scrambler matrix
Require: [P ]58×58 . Select randomly a Permutation matrix
1: Generate [S]46×46 . Generate non-singular matrix
Ensure: |S| 6= 0 . The determinant of S not equal 0
2: Generate [P ]58×58
3: [α]46×58 ← SGP
4: [R][α]← [I46 | Q] . Determine [R]46×46
Ensure: [R] 6= [S]−1
5: [β]46×58 ← RSGP
6: return [β]46×58
From Algorithm 12, R can be produces by row additions and column swap of α that
led to obtain a reduced echelon form of α, i.e. R.α = [Ik | Q] where Ik is the (46 × 46)
identity matrix and Q is (k × (n− k)) parity check matrix.
The public key, which will be known to everyone, is [β]46×46 = RSGP . While S, G, P
and R form the private key kept by Bob. It is assumed in the following that Eve has
knowledge of the private key.
74
Chapter: 3 Section: 3.4
2) Message encryption: The following steps show completion of the encryption process
by Alice, which takes the output of the first stage that contains 2048 vectors, [C2]1×23.
Then each two vectors are concatenated in order to generate 1024 new vectors, [C5]1×46,
and they are sent as the input of the second stage:
Algorithm 13 Message Encryption of BKLC(58, 46, 5)
Require: C5, β
1: [C3]1×58 ← [C5]1×46 × [β]46×58
2: [C]1×58 ← [C3]1×58 + [E2]1×58 . Alice adds error vector E2 of weight 2
3: return [C]1×58
3.4.2 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Bob receives the transmitted vector [C]1×58 via the main channel that is error-free. He
recovers the original message M as shown in Algorithm 14.
Algorithm 14 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Require: C,P−1, HT . Bob using P−1 and HT of BKLC(58, 46, 5)
1: S1 ← C × P−1 ×HT . Bob computes [S1]1×58
2: S1 ← E2 × P−1 ×HT . Bob computes E2
3: C3 ← C + E2 . Bob corrects the error E2 in C to get C3 of 58-bit
4: C5 ← C3 . Bob obtain C5 from C3 by get only the first 46-bit
5: C2 ← C5 . Bob separates [C5]1×46 into two vectors [C2]1×23
6: S2 ← C2 ×HT . HT of (23, 12, 7)Golay code
7: Mˆ ← S2,M = Mˆ . Bob recovers an estimate of the message Mˆ
8: return Mˆ
From Algorithm 14(step 3), we can prove that S1 = E2 × P−1 ×HT as follows:
S1 = C × P−1 ×HT = (C3 + E2)× P−1 ×HT
S1 = (C5 ×RSGP )× P−1 ×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT
S1 = C5 ×RSG×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT
But G×HT = 0. So, S1 = E2 × P−1 ×HT .
Also, we can give an explanation about the mechanism that used by Bob to obtain
[C5]1×46 from [C3]1×58 by getting the first 46-bit only as follows:
[C3]1×58 = [C5]1×46 × [β]46×58
[C3]1×58 = [C5]1×46 × [I46×46 | Q46×12]
This means, the first 46-bit of vector C3 represents C5 exactly.
75
Chapter: 3 Section: 3.4
3.4.3 Eavesdropper’s Decoder










Figure 3.9: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and Decoder of Eavesdropper
Eve receives a corrupted vector D instead of the transmitted vector [C]1×58 as a result
of passing through the BSC which adds additional errors [EBSC ]1×58 as follows:
[D]1×58 = [C]1×58 + [EBSC ]1×58.
Where [EBSC ]1×58 is a random binary error vector which depends on the probability of
error pe of BSC. Assuming Eve uses the same type of decoder that has been used by
Bob, Algorithm 15 explains how to get the estimated message Mˆ from the corrupted
vector D.
Algorithm 15 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: D,P−1, HT . Eve using P−1 and HT of BKLC(58, 46, 5)
1: S3 ← D × P−1 ×HT . Eve computes [S3]1×58
2: S3 ← Eˆ × P−1 ×HT . Eve computes Eˆ
3: Cˆ3 ← D + Eˆ, Cˆ3 6= C3 . Eve corrects the error Eˆ to get Cˆ3 of 58-bit
4: Cˆ5 ← Cˆ3 . Eve obtain Cˆ5 from Cˆ3 by get only the first 46-bit
5: Cˆ2 ← Cˆ5 . Bob separates [Cˆ5]1×46 into two vectors [Cˆ2]1×23
6: S4 ← Cˆ2 ×HT . HT of (23, 12, 7)Golay code
7: Mˆ ← S4,M 6= Mˆ . Eve recovers an estimate of the message Mˆ
8: return Mˆ
From Algorithm 15(step 3), we can prove that S3 = Eˆ × P−1 ×HT as follows:
S3 = D × P−1 ×HT = (C + EBSC)× P−1 ×HT
S3 = (C3 + E2 + EBSC)× P−1 ×HT
S3 = (C5 ×RSGP )× P−1 ×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT + EBSC × P−1 ×HT
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S3 = C5 ×RSG×HT + E2 × P−1 ×HT + EBSC × P−1 ×HT
But G×HT = 0.
So, S3 = E2 × P−1 ×HT + EBSC × P−1 ×HT
S3 = (EBSC + E2)× P−1 ×HT = Eˆ × P−1 ×HT .
Mˆ represents the estimated message of 11-bit length and it is equal to Mˆ = M + E .
The error signal E which represents the difference between the original message M and
the estimated message Mˆ , which gives us imagine that Eve will receive an equivocation,
which means that the percentage of the original information leakage will be less.
3.5 Computation Results of the Two Models
The equivocation rate and the information leakage have been calculated for the proposed
coding scheme for two models(Model-1 and Model-2). Both models employ two encod-
ing stages; the first stage of models employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the
(23, 12, 7) binary Golay code while the second stage of models employs the McEliece cryp-
tosystem technique based on BKLCs. Model-1 employs BKLC(33, 23, 5) while Model-2
employs BKLC(58, 46, 5).
In addition, the equivocation rates and the information leakage of the proposed models
have been compared with the results obtained by Zhang et al. [62]. Zhang et al. cal-
culated the equivocation rates for various codes, such as the (23, 12, 7) Golay code, the
extended (24, 12, 7) Golay code and a bunch of the BCH codes in the specific wiretap
channel for the syndrome coding scheme. The results have shown that the (23, 12, 7)
Golay code had the best performance. Therefore, the results obtained from two schemes
in [62] that are based on (23, 12, 7) Golay code have been compared with the results
obtained from the proposed models (Model-1 and Model-2).
The first scheme used the conventional syndrome-coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7)
Golay code, referred to as Golay scheme-1. In [62], Zhang et al. proposed a modi-
fied syndrome-coding scheme, which impels the probability distribution of error (E) to
be closer to a uniform distribution, so the information leakage to the eavesdropper will
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be less. The second scheme used the modified syndrome-coding scheme based on the
(23, 12, 7)Golay code, referred to as Golay scheme-2.
The results of this chapter have been published in [63].
3.5.1 Joint Entropy
The amount of information in the original message M and estimated message Mˆ has
been calculated as follows:





p(M, Mˆ)× log2 p(M, Mˆ) (3.2)
where p(M, Mˆ) is the joint probability of M and Mˆ . Fig. 3.10 shows the joint entropy
H(M, Mˆ) vs. pe.
Figure 3.10: The Joint Entropy H(M, Mˆ) vs. pe
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3.5.2 Equivocation
The amount of information lost in the channel during the transition process from Alice
to Eve(i.e. the uncertainty of Eve) has been calculated as follows [7]:
H(M | Mˆ) = H(M, Mˆ)−H(Mˆ) (3.3)
where H(M, Mˆ) is the joint Entropy of M and Mˆ . Fig. 4.4 shows the Normalised
equivocation H(M |Mˆ)
m
as a function of probability of error pe, (m = n− k) represents the
number of parity bits of the code. This figure shows that the equivocation rate of the
Model-2 has increased significantly compared with the Model-1 in the critical values of
the probability of error (0 < pe ≤ 0.1).
Figure 3.11: The Normalised Equivocation H(M | Mˆ) vs. pe
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3.5.3 Channel Capacity
The amount of information that can be received by Eve from Alice via the channel has
been calculated as follows [6]:
I(M ; Mˆ) = H(M) +H(Mˆ)−H(M, Mˆ) (3.4)
where H(M, Mˆ) is the joint Entropy of M and Mˆ . Fig. 3.12 shows the Normalised
information I(M ; Mˆ) vs. pe. This graph gives us the impression of the amount of
reduction in the information leakage to the eavesdropper that obtained from Model-2
compared to Model-1.
Figure 3.12: The Channel Capacity I(M ; Mˆ) vs. pe
Fig. 3.13 shows the Normalised equivocation for an insecure system on BSC(only binary
symmetric channel) and a secure system on BSC of the design models as a function
of probability of error pe. It is clear that the equivocation rate of the secure system is
better than insecure system and it can be seen that the difference level in equivocation
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rate reaches a maximum when (0 < pe ≤ 0.1).
Figure 3.13: Normalised Equivocation for an insecure system on BSC and secure system
on BSC vs. pe
3.5.4 Normalised Equivocation Difference
The Normalised Equivocation Difference between the secure system on BSC of the
design models and insecure system on BSC as a function of probability of error pe can
be expressed as:
Normalised Equivocation Difference = Eq(secure system) − Eq(insecure system) (3.5)
This value gives us an idea about the increase occurring in equivocation rate in the secure
system on BSC compared to insecure system on BSC. Fig. 3.14 shows that the Model-2
increases the normalised equivocation difference value compared to Model-1.
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Figure 3.14: Normalised Equivocation Difference between the secure system on BSC
and insecure system on BSC vs. pe
3.5.5 Equivocation Gain
The equivocation gain of the secure system on BSC of the design models and insecure





A huge improvement in equivocation gain has been achieved between secure and insecure
system when the probability of error (0 < pe ≤ 0.1) as shown in Fig. 3.15.
82
Chapter: 3 Section: 3.5
Figure 3.15: Equivocation gain of the secure system on BSC and insecure system on
BSC vs. pe
Figures 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 shows the Normalised equivocation, Channel capac-
ity, normalised equivocation difference and the equivocation gain for the four schemes,
two of the new models are proposed in sections 3.3 and 3.4 (Model-1 and Model-2) and
two for the models designed by Zhang et al. [62].
Analysis shows that the new models (Model-1 and Model-2) increases the equivocation
rate hugely compared to other schemes. In addition, the results obtained from the new
models (Model-1 and Model-2) showed that the information leakage to the eavesdropper
has been reduced by a large margin compared to previously published schemes.
Table 3.1 shows the Normalised equivocation and Information Leakage for the four
schemes at some specific values of pe.
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Figure 3.16: Normalised Equivocation vs. pe
Figure 3.17: Channel Capacity vs. pe
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Figure 3.18: Normalised Equivocation Difference vs. pe
Figure 3.19: Equivocation Gain vs. pe
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pe Schemes Normalised Information
Equivocation Leakage
Golay scheme-1 0.2950 0.7050
0.02 Golay scheme-2 0.4175 0.5825
Model-1 0.4671 0.5329
Model-2 0.6474 0.3526
Golay scheme-1 0.4987 0.5013
0.04 Golay scheme-2 0.6509 0.3491
Model-1 0.6940 0.3060
Model-2 0.8475 0.1525
Golay scheme-1 0.6558 0.3442
0.06 Golay scheme-2 0.7929 0.2071
Model-1 0.8195 0.1805
Model-2 0.9264 0.0736
Golay scheme-1 0.7739 0.2261
0.08 Golay scheme-2 0.8795 0.1205
Model-1 0.8923 0.1077
Model-2 0.9625 0.0375
Golay scheme-1 0.8587 0.1413
0.1 Golay scheme-2 0.9317 0.0683
Model-1 0.9358 0.0642
Model-2 0.9806 0.0194
Table 3.1: Normalised equivocation and Information Leakage for all schemes
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3.6 Summary
This chapter can be summarized as follows:
• A McEliece cryptosystem algorithms (key generation, Encryption algorithm and
Decryption algorithm) have been presented.
• A new coding scheme [Model-1] which including two encoding stages for the wiretap
channel has been presented by using BKLC(33, 23, 5) code.
• A new coding scheme [Model-2] which including two encoding stages for the wiretap
channel has been presented by using BKLC(58, 46, 5) code which based on the
concatenation two syndromes that are produced from the first stage together.
• The results show that the performance of [Model-2] is significantly better than
[Model-1] which is attributable to the longer code used in the second model.
• It has been found from the results that both new models (Model-1 and Model-
2) considerably reduce the information leakage to the eavesdropper compared to
previously published schemes.
• The results of this chapter have been published in [63].
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Implementation and Construction of
Best Known Equivocation Codes for
Syndrome Coding
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes and implements three schemes for constructing the best known
equivocation codes for syndrome coding in the wiretap channel. These schemes are based
on a recursive method for evaluation of the probability mass function of the syndromes
of a code which depends only on the columns of the parity check matrix and the proba-
bility of error of the binary symmetric channel. Therefore, the construction technique of
the best known equivocation codes(BEqC) for syndrome coding depends on the parity
check matrix only without the need for a syndrome look up table.
The wiretap channel used in the syndrome coding scheme is shown in Fig. 4.1, where
the main channel (between Alice and Bob) is an error-free channel and the eavesdropper
channel is a Binary Symmetric Channel(BSC) with a probability of error (pe).
The first scheme generates new best known equivocation(BEqC) codes with 15 parity
bits. The design results for m = 15 show that these new best known equivocation
codes(BEqC) have better equivocation rate compared to all previously published best
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Figure 4.1: Wiretap channel Model
error correcting codes, the best known codes(BKC) compiled by Grassl [2].
In the second scheme, a new code design technique which produces best known equiv-
ocation codes(BEqC) with highest minimum distance for syndrome coding has been
presented. Code examples for a given number of parity bits of the code (m = 7, 11, 12)
also are presented. The design results show that these new best known equivocation
codes(BEqC) have better equivocation rate compared to all previously published best
error correcting codes having the same parameters.
Finally, a code design technique has been presented to produce best known equivocation
codes by extending the binary linear [n, k] code to a [n+ 2, k + 2] code. Analysis shows
that the best known equivocation codes produced by adding two columns to the parity
check matrix give better equivocation rates compared to those that are produced by the
addition of one column in two phases.
Parts of this chapter are published in the following conferences:
• S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“New Best Equivocation
Codes for Syndrome Coding”, IEEE Conference, International Con-
ference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence
(ICTC), Busan, South Korea, October 2014.
• S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“Construction of Best Equiv-
ocation Codes with Highest Minimum Distance for Syndrome Coding”,
IEEE International Conference on Communication, IEEE ICC 2015 -
Workshop on Wireless Physical Layer Security, London, UK, June 2015.
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• S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson,“Extension of the Parity
Check Matrix to Construct the Best Equivocation Codes for Syndrome
Coding”, IEEE Conference, Global Information Infrastructure and Net-
working Symposium (GIIS), Montreal, QC, Canada, September 2014.
4.2 The systematic packed integer form of parity check
matrix
Any binary linear [n, k, d] code is defined by its (k×n) generator matrixG or by its (m×n)
parity check matrix H. The best equivocation codes are constructed by representing the
parity check matrix of the code in the systematic packed integer form. H can be defined
by representing each column of H by an integer, bi, in the range 0 to (2n−k − 1). The
parity check matrix of a code of length n is defined by n integers, referred to as packed
integers and can be placed in any order, so all the corresponding codes will be equivalent.
The parity check matrix produces a reduced echelon form by row additions and column
swaps, the first m columns of H is an identity matrix and the remaining n−m columns
depend on code design as shown below:
H =

1 0 . . . 0 am0 . . . a(n−1)0
0 1 . . . 0 am1 . . . a(n−1)1
...




0 0 . . . 1 am(m−1) . . . a(n−1)(m−1)

in which 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, m ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and aij takes a value of 0 or 1. Each column can




The packed integers correspond directly to syndrome values in that a single bit error
in a transmitted codeword result in a syndrome equal to the packed integer of column
corresponding to the bit error position. As the codes are linear any combination of bit
error produces a syndrome equal to modulo 2 sum of the packed integers corresponding
to each column of the parity check matrix (H) in wich a bit error occurred.
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Then the systematic packed integer form of parity check matrix can be represented as:
H = [1, 2, . . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1] (4.1)
where the firstm integers represent the identity matrix and the other integers have values
between 3 and 2m−1. Usually no integers are repeated ensuring d ≥ 3 and higher values
of d are ensured by the constraint that no integer is a modulo 2 sum of any other d− 2,
or smaller, number of integers.
4.3 Syndrome Coding Scheme
Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel [1] is :
Cs = −pe × log2(pe)− (1− pe)× log2(1− pe) (4.2)
which is the highest transmission rate that can be obtained while maintaining perfect se-
crecy. In this model, Alice (transmitter) wants to transmit a sequence of independent and
uniformly distributed m-bit binary messages to Bob (legitimate receiver), M [1], ...M [r].
This sequence of messages is encoded into n-bit words C[1], ...C[r]. Bob receives the
same sequence of n-bit words C[1], ...C[r] and Eve receives the sequence of n-bit words
D[1], ...D[r] where
D(i) = C(i) + EBSC(i), i = 1, ..., r
and EBSC(i) represents a n-bit error vector generated by the binary symmetric channel
and r is the block length.
The syndrome coding scheme uses a [n, k, d] linear block code which guarantees to cor-
rect all error patterns of weight t, where t = b(d− 1)/2c. All 2m syndromes are used to
send messages where m = n − k and not just the syndromes corresponding to weight t
or less error patterns. For any linear block code there exist 2m distinct minimum weight
error patterns, the coset leaders, in which each pattern produces a distinct syndrome of
the total 2m syndromes. Therefore, these error patterns can be represented in a table of
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2m syndromes. In the traditional syndrome coding, the look up table for error patterns
and syndromes is known by Alice, Bob and Eve.
For long codes a syndrome table is impractical, but it is shown below that this look
up table is unnecessary and that the parity check matrix H of the code is sufficient
taking into consideration the structure of H in systematic format. A block diagram for
syndrome coding for a [n, k, d] linear block code is shown in Fig. 4.2.







C2(i) = C1(i) + E(i)
[C2(i)]1×n[E(i)]1×n
Figure 4.2: Block diagram of syndrome coding scheme for [n, k, d] linear block code
Encoding Algorithm
Alice starts the encryption process in order to generate a n-bit vector C2(i) from each
m-bit message M(i) at time i such that C2(i)×HT = M(i) as shown in Algorithm 16.
Algorithm 16 Encoding Algorithm of [n, k, d] linear code
Require: [G]k×n . The Generator matrix of [n, k, d] code
Require: [DR(i)]1×k . Generate random uniformly distributed vector
1: Generate [DR(i)]1×k
2: [C1(i)]1×n ← [DR(i)]1×k × [G]k×n
3: [E(i)]1×n ← [M(i)|0...0] . Generate n-bit zero padded message
4: [C2(i)]1×n ← [C1(i)]1×n + [E(i)]1×n
5: return [C2(i)]1×n
It should be noted that these encoding algorithm differs from the classical method in
that a look up table is not required. The message, n − k bits is directly added to the
n− k parity bits of the codeword.
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Now, we show how to calculate the error pattern [E(i)]1×n. Since the syndrome of
any codeword is zero, any codeword added to an error pattern will produce the same
syndrome. Hence Alice may produce the required syndrome by generating an n-bit zero
padded message vector E(i), which consists of the original messageM(i) which is m-bits
long followed by k 0’s.
Decoding Algorithm
1. Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Bob receives the transmitted vector [C2(i)]1×n via the main channel that is error-
free. He recovers the original message M(i) by using the parity check matrix of
the code as shown in Algorithm 17.
Algorithm 17 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Require: [C2(i)]1×n . The transmitted vector from Alice
Require: [H](n−k)×n . The parity check matrix of [n, k, d] code
1: Generate [H]Tn×(n−k) . The parity check transpose matrix of [n, k, d] code
2: S(i)← C2(i)×HT . Bob computes [S(i)]1×m
3: [Mˆ(i)]← S(i), [M(i)] = [Mˆ(i)] . Bob recovers the original message [M(i)]1×m
4: return [M(i)]1×m
From Algorithm 17, we can prove that C2(i)×HT = M(i) as follows:
S(i) = C2(i)×HT −→ S(i) = (C1(i) + E(i))×HT
S(i) = C1(i)×HT + E(i)×HT
S(i) = DR(i)×G×HT + E(i)×HT
Since G and H are orthogonal (G×HT = 0), then
S(i) = E(i)×HT = M(i).
The syndrome formed from E(i) × HT , because of the k leading zeros of E(i) is
simply M(i) multiplied by the identity sub-matrix of HT which produces M(i).
This reduces the complexity by 91% (for example using the (23, 12, 7) binary Go-
lay code) compared with the traditional syndrome coding which requires an error
pattern-syndrome look up table to be stored. The complexity of achieving the
syndrome coding scheme (Encoding and Decoding Algorithms) can be measured
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Where T1 represents the time required for execution of the traditional syndrome
coding(requires look up table) and T2 represents the time required for execution of
the new syndrome coding(look up table is unnecessary).
All simulations have been done using a PC machine using Ubuntu 12.04 LTS op-
erating system:










Figure 4.3: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and Eavesdropper’s Decoder
The block diagram of the BSC channel and eavesdropper’s decoder is shown in
Fig. 4.3. Eve receives a corrupted vector D(i) instead of the transmitted vec-
tor C2(i) as a result of passing through the BSC which adds additional errors
[EBSC ]1×n: [D(i)]1×n = [C2(i)]1×n + [EBSC(i)]1×n,
Where [EBSC(i)]1×n is a random binary error vector which depends on the crossover
probability pe of BSC. Assuming Eve uses the same type of decoder that has been
used by Bob, the following steps explains how she gets the estimated message ˆM(i)
from the corrupted vector D(i):
Algorithm 18 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: D(i), HT . Eve using HT of [n, k, d] code
1: SEve(i)← D(i)×HT . Eve computes [SEve(i)]1×m
2: Mˆ(i)← SEve(i), M(i) 6= Mˆ(i) . Eve recovers an estimate of the message Mˆ(i)
3: return [Mˆ(i)]1×m
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From Algorithm 18, Eve estimates Mˆ(i) as follows:
SEve(i) = D(i)×HT
SEve(i) = [C2(i) + EBSC(i)]×HT
SEve(i) = C2(i)×HT + EBSC(i)×HT
SEve(i) = [C1(i) + E(i)]×HT + EBSC(i)×HT
SEve(i) = E(i)×HT + EBSC(i)×HT = Mˆ(i)
Mˆ(i) = SEve(i) = M(i) + Se(i)
4.4 Evaluation of the equivocation rate achieved by
syndrome coding
The secrecy realised by syndrome coding is measured by the eavesdropper decoder output
equivocation, H(M(i)|Mˆ(i)):
H(M(i)|Mˆ(i)) = H(M(i), Mˆ(i))−H(Mˆ(i))
= H(M(i)) +H(Mˆ(i)|M(i))−H(Mˆ(i))
= H(M(i))−H(M(i) + Se(i)) +H(M(i) + Se(i)|M(i))
= m−m+ 0 +H(Se(i)|M(i)) (4.4)




p(Se(i))× log2 p(Se(i)) (4.6)
where H(Se(i)) is the entropy of Se(i). The simplifications in equations 4.4 and 4.5 are
due to M(i) being uniformly distributed and independent of Se(i). The equivocation is
calculated after deriving the probability mass function of the syndromes due to errors
from the BSC, p(Se(i)) and is a function of the code being used through the parity check
matrix of the code.
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4.5 Exhaustive evaluation of new best known equivo-
cation codes for syndrome coding with the example
case of 15 parity bits
A code design technique to extend the binary linear [n, k] code to a [n + 1, k + 1] code
to produce best known equivocation codes(BEqC) for syndrome coding in wiretap chan-
nel is presented, which have better secrecy than the best error correcting codes. Code
examples are given for the case where the number of parity bits of the code is equal to
15(m = 15) where m = n− k.
The code construction method for obtaining good equivocation codes is based on exten-
sions of the parity check matrix of a set of good equivocation codes of shorter length. It is
also shown that syndrome coding can be implemented without the traditional syndrome
look up table, enabling any length codes to be used. An efficient recursive method to
calculate the equivocation rate of any linear, binary code when used in syndrome coding
for the binary symmetric channel(BSC) is also presented.
The design results show that the best known equivocation codes(BEqC) that are pro-
duced have better equivocation rates for the syndrome coding compared to all previ-
ously published codes, including the best known codes(BKC) compiled and published
by Grassl [2].
4.5.1 Recursive Evaluation of the syndrome probability distri-
bution
The code construction technique that produces codes with a good equivocation rate is
based on the realisation that the syndrome probability mass function (pmf) of a new
extended code is a function of the probability mass function of the original code and
good equivocation codes produce good extended codes. For Eve, there are 2n possible
error patterns, e(i), occur for each transmitted n-bit vector. These error patterns occur
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with probability:
p(e(i)) = pe
w(i) × (1− pe)n−w(i) (4.7)
where w(i) is the weight of e(i). Each error pattern results in one of the 2m syndromes
being produced.
Se(i)) = e(i)×HT (4.8)
As the code is linear, for each syndrome, Sj, there are 2k error patterns that produce the





p(e(i))× δ(Se(i)− Sj) (4.9)





This method for evaluating the equivocation works well for short codes (n < 40), but for
the long codes it is impracticable because it involves the evaluation of 2n error patterns.
Due to the limitation of this method, the probability distribution of the syndromes may
be determined recursively, this method enables the reduction of the number of terms
from 2n to 2m as shown in the following theorem. A worked example of this procedure
is given in page 100.
Theorem 1. The probability mass function (pmf) of Sj for j=0 to 2m-1 can be defined
as p(Sj) = β(j) where β(j) are coefficients of the probability generating function using
the Z transform, denoted as pz(S) and pz(S) only depends on the columns of the parity







((1− pe) + pe × Zbi) (4.11)
where bi are the integers representations of the columns of H and exponent sums of
powers of Z are added modulo 2.
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Proof. Any error pattern may be represented as a sum of single bit error events:
e(i) = [e1 e2 . . . en]
e(i) = [e1 0 . . . 0] + [0 e2 . . . 0] + · · ·+ [0 0 . . . en]
where ei=1 with probability pe and ei=0 with probability 1 − pe. The linearity of the
syndrome coding scheme means that the syndrome resulting from any error pattern is
the linear sum of the syndromes for each bit error position:
Se(i) = e(i)×HT = [e1 e2 . . . en]×HT (4.12)
Se(i) = b1δ(e1 − 1)⊕ b2δ(e2 − 1) · · · ⊕ bnδ(en − 1) (4.13)
where ⊕ denotes the modulo 2 sum. Since the probabilities of e1, e2, . . . , en are inde-
pendent, the probability of Se(i) is the product of the probabilities of n separate error
events. By adding the coefficients of the same powers of Z results in the coefficients, βj,
the number of terms can be reduced from 2n to 2m. A classical result in statistics is that
the pmf of a sum of random variables is given by the convolution of the pmfs of each
variable. The Z transform carries out this convolution.
If the columns of H of the shortened code of length r are taken from i = 0 to r − 1




[(1− pe) + pe × Zbi ] (4.14)
pz(Sr) = [(1− pe) + pe × Zb0 ]× [(1− pe) + pe × Zb1 ] · · · × [(1− pe) + pe × Zbr−1 ]
pz(Sr) = (1− pe)2 + pe(1− pe)× Zb1 + pe(1− pe)× Zb0 + pe2 × Zb0⊕b1 + . . .
Now, we can extend the length of the original code from r to r+1 by adding one column
to its parity check matrix H, so the pmf generating function of the extended code r+ 1




[(1− pe) + pe × Zbi ] = pz(Sr)[(1− pe) + pe × Zbr ] (4.15)
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Denoting the β(j) coefficients of the original code of length r, as βr(j) then equation






and for extended code r + 1















Adding together the coefficients of the same powers of Z in the coefficients, βr(j) to






From equation 4.18, it is clear that the syndrome pmf of the new code of length r +
1 is equal to the syndrome pmf of the original code of length r weighted by 1 − pe
plus a permuted syndrome pmf of the original code of length r, weighted by pe. The
permutation arises from the results of the modulo 2 additions j ⊕ br. Therefore the
syndrome pmf of the code can be calculated recursively, starting with the generating
function pz(S1), determining pz(S2) then pz(S3) through to pz(Sn).
The syndrome pmf of each [n, k, d] code of length r is stored and the syndrome pmf for
each extended code of length r + 1 is determined using the equation 4.18 which makes
for a fast algorithm. This leads to the conclusion that codes with good equivocation will
produce good equivocation codes when extended in length.
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Worked example
The parity check matrix of the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code is:
H =

1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1

Which in systematic packed integer representation is: H=[1,2,4,3,5,6,7]
n = 7 , k = 4 , m = n− k = 3
The probability mass function (pmf) of the syndrome (Sj) for j = 0 to 2m − 1 of the
[7, 4, 3] Hamming code can be obtained recursively, starting with the generating function
pz(S0) determining pz(S1) then pz(S2) through to pz(S6) as follows:


















As previously mentioned, the permutation arises from the results of the modulo 2 addi-
tions j ⊕ bi.
j ⊕ b1 = j ⊕ 2 , 0⊕ 2 = 2 , 1⊕ 2 = 3
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• • • • • • •
j ⊕ b3 = j ⊕ 3 , 0 ⊕ 3 = 3 , 1 ⊕ 3 = 2 , 2 ⊕ 3 = 1 , 3 ⊕ 3 = 0 , 4 ⊕ 3 = 7 , 5 ⊕ 3 = 6 ,
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• • • • • • •
j ⊕ b4 = j ⊕ 5 , 0 ⊕ 5 = 5 , 1 ⊕ 5 = 4 , 2 ⊕ 5 = 7 , 3 ⊕ 5 = 6 , 4 ⊕ 5 = 1 , 5 ⊕ 5 = 0 ,
6⊕ 5 = 3 , 7⊕ 5 = 2
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• • • • • • •
j ⊕ b6 = j ⊕ 7 , 0 ⊕ 7 = 7 , 1 ⊕ 7 = 6 , 2 ⊕ 7 = 5 , 3 ⊕ 7 = 4 , 4 ⊕ 7 = 3 , 5 ⊕ 7 = 2 ,
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Where: β6(0) = (1− pe)7 + 7p3e(1− pe)4 + 7p4e(1− pe)3 + p7e
β6(1) = pe(1− pe)6 + 3p2e(1− pe)5 + 4p3e(1− pe)4 + 4p4e(1− pe)3 + 3p5e(1− pe)2 + p6e(1− pe)
β6(7) = β6(6) = β6(5) = β6(4) = β6(3) = β6(2) = β6(1)
The normalised equivocation rate(Eqv. rate) of the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code can be cal-













= −[(β6(0)× log β6(0)log 2 ) + (β6(1)× log β6(1)log 2 ) + · · · + (β6(7)× log β6(7)log 2 )]/3
Eqv. rate= −[(β6(0)× log β6(0)log 2 ) + 7× (β6(1)× log β6(1)log 2 )]/3
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Table 4.1 shows the normalised equivocation rate(Eqv. rate) of the [7, 4, 3] Hamming









Table 4.1: Equivocation rate of the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code
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4.5.2 Code design technique
To produce a best known equivocation code the pmf of the syndromes should be as
uniform as possible. Since the eavesdropper channel is a binary symmetric channel, for
low values of pe the equivocation is dominated by error patterns of low weight. To produce
best known equivocation codes, we must take into account the following observations:
1. If the error pattern has low weight, then the probability of the error events is high.
If each error pattern produces different syndrome sums, then this makes the pmf
of the syndromes become more uniform.
2. By using the systematic format of the parity check matrix H, the packed integers
of any information bit cannot have a weight less than d − 1, where d is the min-
imum Hamming distance of the code. Otherwise the codeword formed from that
information bit alone will have weight less than d.
3. If any column of the parity check matrix H is repeated, a weight 2 error event will
produce a zero syndrome, that leads to a non uniform pmf of the syndrome.
Algorithm 19 shows how to extend an [n, k] code into [n + 1, k + 1] code by adding the
best column to the original parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code.
The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follows:
1. Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code [n, k] from equation 4.16.
2. Represent the parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code in the systematic packed
integer form: H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3. Extend H with one integer (br) by generating randomly all possible integers be-
tween 3 and 2m−1 with the constraint that there are no repeated integers included
in the original H. This ensures that the minimum Hamming distance of each ex-
tended code is at least 3.
4. Eliminate all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivocation rate for the binary
symmetric eavesdropper channel for a given pe for each remaining code.
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5. Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in descending order, and
select a best codes subset. These codes are used as the initial input for the next
extension round.
Algorithm 19 Code Design Technique 1
Require: pz(Sr) . Syndrome pmf of [n, k]code
Require: H . Systematic format of H of [n, k]code
Require: b[i] . Integer sequence(columns) of H
Require: (n, k,m, pe) . Code parameters and error probability of BSC
Require: Cin . Initial inequivalent codes of the highest equivocation rate
1: Generate (br) . Generating randomly integers between 3 and 2m − 1
Ensure: (br) 6= b[i] . Ensure no repeated columns










βr+1(j)× log2(βr+1(j)) . Calculate the equivocation rate of
[n+ 1, k + 1] code
6: Eqv. rate← Eqv./m . Calculate the normalised equivocation rate
7: return (br), Eqv. rate, Cout . Extended inequivalent codes, which are ranked by
equivocation rate in descending order
4.5.3 Results
By using the code design technique above, the best known equivocation codes have been
determined for m = 15. The codes are listed in Appendix A in the packed integer
format, which provide at least 70% secrecy. The minimum Hamming distance (d) and
the equivocation rate(Eqv. rate) for a BSC error probability of pe = 0.05 is given for each
code. The equivocation rates of the corresponding best error correcting codes previously
published, the (BKC) codes compiled by Grassl [2] with the same n and m are also
given in in Appendix A (in parentheses).
The results show that significant improvements have been achieved on the equivocation
rate for the best known equivocation codes compared with best known codes.
Fig. 4.4 shows the equivocation rate(Eqv. rate) as a function of probability of error pe
of best equivocation and best known codes for n = 82 at different values of pe. It shows
108
Chapter: 4 Section: 4.5
Figure 4.4: Equivocation rate Eqv.rate vs. pe of best known equivocation (BEqC) and
best known (BKC) codes for n = 82
that the equivocation rate of (BEqCs) has been increased by a large margin compared
with (BKCs) not only for pe = 0.05 but also for other values of pe. These results has
been published in [64].
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4.6 Implementation and Construction of best known
equivocation codes with highest minimum Ham-
ming distance for syndrome coding
Several researchers have analysed the syndrome coding scheme as a function of the code
used in order to increase the communication security, Zhang et al. [51] produced some
best known equivocation codes for the syndrome coding scheme. The best known equiv-
ocation codes have been determined for a given number of parity bits m, of the code as
follows:
(m = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26).
Al-Hassan et al. [64] also determined the new best known equivocation code for syndrome
coding when the parity bit of the code is equal (m = 15). Usually, the best known equiv-
ocation codes obtained in [51, 64] have a respectable minimum Hamming distance, but
are sometimes not as good as the best known code with the same parameters. An [n, k]
linear code C is said to be a best known code (BKC) if C has the highest minimum
distance among all known [n, k] linear codes, the tables of (BKCs) have been published
by Grassl [2] in the form of tables of lower and upper bounds of (dmin).
In this section, a new code design technique which produces best known equivocation
codes(BEqC) with highest minimum Hamming distance(dminH) for syndrome coding is
presented. The producing codes have better secrecy than the best known error correcting
codes(BKC).
The best known equivocation codes of highest minimum Hamming distance have been
determined by using a combination of a code design technique based on extensions of the
parity check matrix from an optimal set of good equivocation codes of highest minimum
distance coupled with a technique of determining the highest minimum distance (dminH)
of these extended codes. The equivocation rate for the binary symmetric channel(BSC)
and any linear code has been calculated by using the recursive evaluation of the syn-
drome probability distribution which are described in the section 4.5.1.
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Candidate codes are constructed with a given dminH by constraining the dependen-
cies of columns of the codes parity check matrix. The candidate codes are then ranked
according to equivocation rate.
Code examples are presented for a given number of parity bits of the code (m = 7, 11, 12),
that demonstrate the equivocation rate of these best known equivocation codes (BEqC)
exceeds by a large margin the equivocation rate of the equivalent best known error cor-
recting codes(BKC), published by Grassl [2].
4.6.1 Calculation of the minimum distance of a linear code
The Minimum distance of a linear code is an important parameter that provides the
capability of detecting and correcting errors by the code. In the past, many researchers
have studied the minimum distance (dmin) of linear codes. Some results on calculating
distance were presented in [65,66].
If C is an [n, k, d] linear code with parity check matrix H, then the minimum distance
(dmin) of C is equal to the smallest number of columns ofH which are linearly dependent.
That is, all combinations of (dmin−1) columns are linearly independent, so there is some
set of (dmin) columns which are linearly dependent [13,17].
There are three cases of dmin :
1. If H has a column of all zeros, then dmin = 1.
2. If H has two identical columns, then dmin ≤ 2.
3. For binary codes, if all columns are distinct and non-zero, then dmin ≥ 3.
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Worked example
The parity check matrix of the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code is:
H =

1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1

Which in systematic packed integer representation is: H=[1,2,4,3,5,6,7]
All columns of the parity check matrix are distinct and non-zero, therefore it is expected
that dmin ≥ 3.
Now, the process starts to check whether all three columns of H are linearly dependent
or not by adding any three columns within H. If the result of the addition process of any
three columns is equal to zero then dmin = 3. If the result of addition process not equal
to zero, the process starts again to check all four columns of H are linearly dependent or
not and this process will continue until to be obtained the smallest number of columns
of H which are linearly dependent.
It is clear from the form of the parity check matrix that the first, second and forth
columns are linearly dependent, so dmin = 3.
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4.6.2 Code design technique
To produce a best known equivocation code the pmf of the syndromes should be as
uniform as possible. The following code design algorithm shows how to extend an [n, k]
code into [n+1, k+1] by adding the best column to the original parity check matrix H of
the [n, k] code. We must take into consideration that the value of the minimum distance
(dmin) of the [n + 1, k + 1] code should be equal to the minimum distance (dminH) of
the [n+ 1, k+ 1] BKC code because the best known [n, k] code (BKC) has the highest
minimum distance among all known [n, k] linear codes.
Algorithm 20 Code Design Technique 2
Require: pz(Sr) . Syndrome pmf of [n, k]code
Require: H . Systematic format of H of [n, k]code
Require: dminH . Highest dmin of [n+ 1, k + 1] BKC code
Require: b[i] . Integer sequence(columns) of H
Require: (n, k,m, pe) . Code parameters and error probability of BSC
Require: Cin . Initial inequivalent codes of the highest equivocation rate
1: Generate (br) . Generating randomly integers between 3 and 2m − 1
Ensure: (br) 6= b[i] . Ensure no repeated columns
Require: dmin . dmin of [n+ 1, k + 1] code
Ensure: dmin = dminH










βr+1(j)× log2(βr+1(j)) . Calculate the equivocation rate of
[n+ 1, k + 1] code
6: Eqv. rate← Eqv./m . Calculate the normalised equivocation rate
7: return (br), dmin, Eqv. rate, Cout . Extended inequivalent codes of highest dmin,
which are ranked by equivocation rate in descending order
The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follows:
1. Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code [n, k] from equation 4.16.
2. Represent the parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code in the systematic packed
integer form: H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3. Extend H with one integer (br) by generating randomly all possible integers be-
tween 3 and 2m−1 with the constraint that there are no repeated integers included
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in the original H. This ensures that the minimum Hamming distance of each ex-
tended code is at least 3.
4. Calculate the highest minimum distance(dminH) of the [n + 1, k + 1] BKC code
from Magma Software.
5. Calculate the minimum distance (dmin) of the extended code [n + 1, k + 1] and
ensure that dmin = dminH .
6. Eliminate all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivocation rate for the binary
symmetric eavesdropper channel for a given pe for each remaining code.
7. Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in descending order, and
select a best codes subset. These codes are used as the initial input for the next
extension round.
4.6.3 Results
Following the Algorithm above, the best known equivocation codes(BEqC) of the highest
minimum distance have been determined in the form of the equivocation rate for various
values of n and for a given number of parity bits of the code m = 7, 11, 12.
The codes are listed in Appendix B in the packed integer format. The highest mini-
mum Hamming distance (d) and the normalised equivocation rate (Eqv.rate) for a BSC
error probability of pe = 0.05 is given for each code. The equivocation rates of the corre-
sponding best error correcting codes previously published, the (BKC) codes compiled by
Grassl [2] with the same n, m and d are also given in Appendix B (in parentheses). The
results show that significant improvements have been achieved on the equivocation rate
for the best known equivocation codes(BEqC) compared with best known codes(BKC).
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the comparison in the normalised equivocation rate (Eqv.rate)
and minimum Hamming distance (d) between the best known equivocation codes (BEqC)
(Scheme-3) determined by the Algorithm 20 described in this section with the best
known correcting codes BKC (Scheme-1) compiled by Grassl [2] and the best known
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equivocation codes (Scheme-2) listed in an on-line database by Zhang [52] for some
representative codes. It shows that significant improvements in equivocation rate are
obtained for (scheme-3) compared with (scheme-1) and (scheme-2) for all codes
having the same parameters (m,n, d). This results has been published in [67].
Table 4.2: Equivocation rate and minimum distance in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05,
m = 7
m n Eqv.rate(Scheme-1) d1 Eqv.rate(Scheme-2) d2 Eqv.rate(Scheme-3) d3
7 35 0.872739 4 0.907273 3 0.904253 4
7 36 0.888646 4 0.914603 3 0.912049 4
7 37 0.901769 4 0.921343 3 0.919097 4
7 38 0.912693 4 0.927635 3 0.925583 4
7 39 0.921923 4 0.933472 3 0.931601 4
7 40 0.929789 4 0.938810 3 0.937142 4
7 41 0.936808 4 0.943771 3 0.94223 4
7 42 0.942873 4 0.947890 3 0.946878 4
7 43 0.948166 4 0.951763 3 0.951182 4
7 44 0.952803 4 0.955391 3 0.955172 4
7 45 0.956930 4 0.958694 3 0.958863 4
7 46 0.960586 4 0.961848 3 0.962228 4
7 47 0.963848 4 0.964899 3 0.965345 4
7 48 0.966766 4 0.967706 3 0.968205 4
7 49 0.969876 4 0.970311 3 0.970856 4
7 50 0.972635 4 0.972711 3 0.973272 4
7 51 0.975095 4 0.974942 3 0.975516 4
7 52 0.977298 4 0.976991 3 0.977571 4
7 53 0.979291 4 0.979291 4 0.979454 4
7 54 0.981087 4 0.981087 4 0.981189 4
7 55 0.982712 4 0.982713 4 0.982787 4
7 56 0.984185 4 0.984186 4 0.984253 4
7 57 0.985569 4 0.985569 4 0.985599 4
7 58 0.986824 4 0.986824 4 0.986835 4
7 59 0.987968 4 0.987968 4 0.98972 4
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Table 4.3: Equivocation rate and minimum distance in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05,
m = 11
m n Eqv.rate(Scheme-1) d1 Eqv.rate(Scheme-2) d2 Eqv.rate(Scheme-3) d3
11 28 0.675605 6 0.676537 5 0.676027 6
11 29 0.693319 6 0.693783 5 0.693663 6
11 30 0.710225 6 0.710315 5 0.710469 6
11 37 0.803255 5 0.806696 4 0.807675 5
11 38 0.815439 5 0.817966 4 0.818806 5
11 39 0.826902 5 0.828624 4 0.829343 5
11 40 0.837627 5 0.838712 4 0.839390 5
11 41 0.847670 5 0.848307 4 0.848951 5
11 48 0.710488 4 0.902358 4 0.903225 4
11 49 0.713286 4 0.908427 4 0.909219 4
11 50 0.715762 4 0.914199 4 0.914902 4
11 51 0.717951 4 0.919611 4 0.920284 4
11 52 0.719886 4 0.924695 4 0.925399 4
11 53 0.721705 4 0.929476 4 0.930200 4
11 54 0.723311 4 0.933982 4 0.934726 4
11 55 0.724755 4 0.938224 4 0.938998 4
11 56 0.726067 4 0.942226 4 0.943023 4
11 57 0.727336 4 0.945978 4 0.946818 4
11 58 0.728485 4 0.949509 4 0.950376 4
11 59 0.729528 4 0.952823 4 0.953600 4
11 60 0.730463 4 0.955931 4 0.956635 4
11 61 0.731332 4 0.958863 4 0.959491 4
11 62 0.732129 4 0.961617 4 0.962176 4
11 63 0.732861 4 0.964190 4 0.964696 4
11 64 0.733520 4 0.966606 4 0.967081 4
11 65 0.734121 4 0.968862 4 0.969326 4
11 66 0.749506 4 0.970987 4 0.971429 4
11 67 0.760622 4 0.972972 4 0.973399 4
11 68 0.761144 4 0.974832 4 0.975245 4
11 69 0.769587 4 0.976573 4 0.976930 4
11 70 0.770032 4 0.978196 4 0.978503 4
11 71 0.770448 4 0.979715 4 0.979978 4
11 72 0.776960 4 0.981130 4 0.981360 4
11 73 0.782101 4 0.982457 4 0.982653 4
11 74 0.786203 4 0.983696 4 0.983861 4
11 75 0.789478 4 0.984852 4 0.984993 4
11 76 0.792140 4 0.985929 4 0.986053 4
11 77 0.794298 4 0.986936 4 0.987039 4
11 78 0.796060 4 0.987877 4 0.987964 4
11 79 0.797503 4 0.988754 4 0.988826 4
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Table 4.4: Equivocation rate and minimum distance in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05,
m = 12
m n Eqv.rate(Scheme-1) d1 Eqv.rate(Scheme-2) d2 Eqv.rate(Scheme-3) d3
12 35 0.743336 6 0.747104 5 0.746769 6
12 36 0.758019 6 0.760427 5 0.759141 6
12 37 0.771753 6 0.773184 5 0.772606 6
12 38 0.784715 6 0.785441 5 0.785354 6
12 39 0.796947 6 0.797169 5 0.797463 6
12 40 0.808546 6 0.808547 6 0.808919 6
12 41 0.819566 6 0.819566 6 0.819852 6
12 42 0.830044 6 0.830043 6 0.830230 6
12 43 0.839988 6 0.839985 6 0.840081 6
12 44 0.849432 6 0.849432 6 0.849494 6
12 45 0.858420 6 0.858419 6 0.858427 6
12 55 0.922141 5 0.922450 4 0.922271 5
12 56 0.927042 5 0.927198 4 0.927142 5
12 57 0.931666 5 0.931678 4 0.931739 5
12 58 0.936021 5 0.936020 5 0.936072 5
12 59 0.940113 5 0.940112 5 0.940148 5
12 60 0.943958 5 0.943961 5 0.943986 5
12 61 0.947587 5 0.947587 5 0.947601 5
12 62 0.950994 5 0.950995 5 0.951003 5
12 63 0.954203 5 0.954205 5 0.954207 5
12 64 0.957222 5 0.957220 5 0.957222 5
12 65 0.960062 5 0.960062 5 0.960062 5
12 66 0.710374 4 0.962073 4 0.962563 4
12 67 0.720589 4 0.964528 4 0.964938 4
12 68 0.721090 4 0.966833 4 0.967183 4
12 69 0.728861 4 0.969001 4 0.969306 4
12 70 0.729329 4 0.971041 4 0.971306 4
12 71 0.729730 4 0.972963 4 0.973186 4
12 72 0.730124 4 0.974773 4 0.974954 4
12 73 0.736062 4 0.976457 4 0.976619 4
12 74 0.740797 4 0.978034 4 0.978181 4
12 75 0.744526 4 0.979512 4 0.979648 4
12 76 0.747576 4 0.980897 4 0.981018 4
12 77 0.749986 4 0.982193 4 0.982305 4
12 78 0.751983 4 0.983409 4 0.983510 4
12 79 0.753583 4 0.984547 4 0.984637 4
12 80 0.754920 4 0.985609 4 0.985695 4
117
Chapter: 4 Section: 4.7
4.7 Construction of best known equivocation codes from
shorter best equivocation codes by adding two columns
to the parity check matrix
Section 4.5 presented a method of extending the parity check matrix of the linear [n, k]
code by one best column. In this section, two best columns have been added to the parity
check matrix of the linear [n, k] code. The results obtained show that the equivocation
rate has been increased when the original best codes have been extended by adding two
columns compared to those codes that are produced by the addition of one column in
two phases.
4.7.1 Evaluation the probability mass function of the extended
[n+ 2, k + 2] code
According to section 4.5.1, the length of the original code can be extended from r to
r+2 by adding two columns on its parity check matrix. The equation 4.15 was extended




[(1− pe) + pe × Zbi ] (4.21)
pz(Sr+2) = pz(sr)[(1− pe) + pe × Zbr ][(1− pe) + pe × Zbr+1 ]
= (1−pe)2pz(Sr)+pe(1−pe)Zbr+1pz(Sr)+pe(1−pe)Zbrpz(Sr)+pe2Z(br⊕br+1)pz(Sr)















Adding together the cofficients of the same powers of Z in the coefficients, βr(j) to obtain
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This leads to the conclusion that the syndrome pmf of the code can be obtained re-
cursively, starting with the generating function pz(S1), determining pz(S2) then pz(S3)
through to pz(Sn). The syndrome pmf of each [n, k, d] code of length r is stored and
the syndrome pmf for each extended code of length r + 2 is determined using the last
equation which makes for a fast algorithm. It is also apparent that good equivocation
codes will also produce good equivocation codes when extended in length.
4.7.2 Code design technique
The goal of this technique is to increase the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper as
much as possible, i.e. the pmf of the syndromes should be as uniform as possible.
Algorithm 21 shows how to extend an [n, k] code into [n+ 2, k+ 2] by adding two best
columns to the original parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code.
Algorithm 21 Code Design Technique 3
Require: pz(Sr) . Syndrome pmf of [n, k]code
Require: H . Systematic format of H of [n, k]code
Require: b[i] . Integer sequence(columns) of H
Require: (n, k,m, pe) . Code parameters and error probability of BSC
Require: Cin . Initial inequivalent codes of the highest equivocation rate
1: Generate (br, br+1) . Generating randomly integers between 3 and 2m − 1
Ensure: (br, br+1) 6= b[i] . Ensure no repeated columns
2: pz1(Sr)← (1− pe)2pz(Sr)



















βr+2(j)× log2(βr+2(j)) . Calculate the equivocation rate of
[n+ 2, k + 2] code
8: Eqv. rate← Eqv./m . Calculate the normalised equivocation rate
9: return (br, br+1), Eqv. rate, Cout . Extended inequivalent codes, which are ranked
by equivocation rate in descending order
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The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follow:
1. Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code [n, k] from equation 4.16.
2. Represent the parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code in the systematic packed
integer form: H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3. Store the integer sequence of H in b[i], where 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
4. Extend H with two integers (br, br+1) by generating randomly all possible integers
between 3 and 2m − 1 with the constraint that there are no repeated integers
included in the original H. This ensures that the minimum Hamming distance of
each extended code is at least 3.
5. Select a fixed value of br, vary the value of br+1 for all possible values, eliminate
all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivocation rate for the binary symmetric
eavesdropper channel for a given pe for each remaining code.
6. Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in descending order, and
select a best codes subset. These codes are used as the initial input for the next
extension round.
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4.7.3 Results
By using the code design technique above, the best known equivocation codes have been
determined. As example, the (33, 23, 5) code has been extended to (35, 25, 4) code by
adding two columns to the parity check matrix of the original code. The H of (33, 23, 5)
code can be represented by the following integer sequence:
[H] = [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 77, 191, 232, 341, 382, 411, 495, 505, 607, 629, 643, 664,
682, 763, 764, 815, 822, 860, 919, 971, 977, 997, 1010]
By following the code design technique, the maximum equivocation rate has been ob-
tained when adding the following columns (217,928). At pe = 0.05, the equivocation
rate for (33, 23, 5) code is equal to Eqv. rate = 0.792695 while for (35, 25, 4) is Eqv.
rate = 0.816794.
We have also extended the code by adding two columns but in two phases. For the same
example, firstly the (33, 23, 5) code has been extended to (34, 24, 4) code by adding one
column. At pe = 0.05, the maximum equivocation rate has been obtained when adding
(89) to the original (33, 23, 5) code and is equal to (Eqv. rate = 0.805024). After that,
the second column has been added to extend (34, 24, 4) code to (35, 25, 4) code. The
maximum equivocation rate has been obtained when adding(150) to the (34, 24, 4) code
and the equivocation rate for (35, 25, 4) code becomes (Eqv. rate = 0.816769). This
leads to say that the process of adding two columns give better results than adding one
column in two phases.
By comparing the equivocation values obtained in this example with the corresponding
best known codes (BKC) obtained by Grassl [2], we can note that the results obtained
by the code design technique described in this section are better. For (34, 24, 4) code, we
obtained Eqv. rate = 0.805024 while Eqv. rate = 0.667461 for Grassl and for (35, 25, 4)
code, we obtained Eqv. rate = 0.816794 while Eqv. rate = 0.681773 for Grassl.
This results has been published in [68].
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4.8 Summary
This chapter can be summarized as follows:
• The code design technique for obtaining best known equivocation codes(BEqC) by
extending the binary linear [n, k] code to a [n + 1, k + 1] and [n + 2, k + 2] codes
for syndrome coding have been presented.
• A method of implementing syndrome coding without the need for a syndrome look
up table has been presented.
• An efficient recursive method for the evaluation of the probability mass function
of the syndromes of a code which depends only on the columns of the parity check
matrix and the probability of the binary symmetric channel also has been presented.
• It has been shown that the best known equivocation codes with highest minimum
distance can be determined by using a combination of the code design technique
based on extension of the parity check matrix of a set of good equivocation codes
coupled with technique of determining the highest minimum distance of these codes.
• The best known equivocation codes(BEqC) of the highest minimum distance for
the syndrome coding have been determined for a given number of parity bits of the
code (m = 7, 11, 12) and they are listed in Appendix .
• The results of this chapter have been published in [64], [67] and [68].
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Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate the communication security of the wiretap
channel when the main channel is a noiseless channel and the eavesdropper channel is a
binary symmetric channel (BSC). In this channel, the equivocation rate of the eaves-
dropper has been calculated when the legitimate receivers employ the syndrome coding
scheme.
The first stage of the investigation focused on the secrecy coding for the wiretap channel
using best known codes (BKC). The equivocation and channel capacity in the BSC
wiretap channel have been investigated using two models with different BKC ′s which
were shown to increase the equivocation rate to the eavesdropper. Two models using
BKC have been proposed using computer implementations, with software written us-
ing C++ with the support of NTL library and each model uses two encoding stages.
In the first model (Model-1), the first stage employs a syndrome coding scheme based
on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code and the second stage employs the McEliece cryp-
tosystem technique based on the BKC(33, 23, 5) code. In the second model (Model-2),
the first stage employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay
code and the second stage employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on the
BKC(58, 46, 5) code.
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The results show that the performance of Model-2 is significantly better than Model-1
which is attributable to the longer code used in the second model. In addition, the re-
sults show that both proposed models considerably reduce the information leakage to the
eavesdropper compared to previously published schemes. Also, the normalised equivoca-
tion difference and the equivocation gain were calculated with reference to an uncoded
system. Significant improvements were obtained from Model-2 compared with Model-1.
In addition, the performance of the proposed models is better than the performance of
previously published schemes in terms of the normalised equivocation difference and the
equivocation gain.
The second stage of the investigation focused on the construction of best equivocation
codes (BEqC) for syndrome coding scheme. These have been divided into three paths
of investigation:
1. Exhaustive evaluation of new best equivocation codes for syndrome coding with
the example case of 15 parity bits.
2. Implementation and construction of best equivocation codes with highest minimum
Hamming distance for syndrome coding.
3. Construction of best equivocation codes from shorter best equivocation codes by
adding two columns to the parity check matrix.
Codes designed for error correction can be used in syndrome coding but the optimum
performance can be realised with codes precisely designed for syndrome coding. The
information rate of a syndrome coding scheme using an (n, k, d) linear code is (n−k
n
) and
all possible binary vectors of length n may be transmitted, whilst the information rate
of an error correcting coding is ( k
n
) but only codewords are transmitted.
One main objective has been to present a design technique for producing the best known
equivocation codes (BEqC) for the syndrome coding scheme as measured by an informa-
tion theoretic secrecy metric, the equivocation rate. For this purpose, three schemes for
constructing BEqC codes for syndrome coding in the wiretap channel have been imple-
mented which are based on an efficient recursive method for determining the probability
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mass function of the syndromes of a code from the parity check matrix of the code with
columns represented as packed integers. This method depends only on the columns of
the parity check matrix of the code and the probability of error (pe) of the binary sym-
metric channel without the need for a syndrome look-up table.
In the first path of the investigation (first scheme), a code design technique has been
presented to produce a new BEqC codes with 15 parity bits(m = 15). The best known
equivocation codes for the syndrome coding scheme that achieve at least 70% secrecy to
an eavesdropper using the BSC with an error probability of 0.05 are presented in Ap-
pendix A. The results obtained show that the equivocation rate of the new best known
equivocation codes exceeds by a large margin the equivocation rate of the equivalent best
error correcting codes (BKC), compiled and published by Grassl [2]. The most surpris-
ing result is that, in general, the best known codes rarely coincide with the best known
equivocation codes. Usually, the best known equivocation codes have a respectable min-
imum Hamming distance (dmin), but are sometimes not as good as the best known codes
with the same parameters. In addition to constructing new best known equivocation
codes which have maximum equivocation rate [51, 64], it is useful to constrain the min-
imum Hamming distance of the codes since this is a key parameter which indicates the
code capability in detection and correction errors. Therefore, it is a surprising result in
coding theory that there are new best known equivocation codes (BEqC) in which the
minimum distance (dmin) is maximal.
This leads to the second path of the investigation (second scheme), where it is shown that
the best known equivocation codes with highest minimum distance can be determined
by using a combination of the code design technique based on extension of the parity
check matrix of a set of good equivocation codes coupled with technique of determining
the highest minimum distance of these codes. The best known equivocation codes for
the syndrome coding scheme for a given number of parity bits of the code (m = 7, 11, 12)
are listed in Appendix B in a packed integer format. The highest minimum Hamming
distance (d) and the normalised equivocation rate (Eqv.rate) for a BSC error probabil-
ity of pe=0.05 is given for each code. Also the equivocation rates of the corresponding
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best error correcting codes previously published, the (BKC) codes listed by Grassl [2]
with the same n,m and d are given in Appendix B (in parentheses).
The results obtained show that the equivocation rate of the new best known equivoca-
tion codes is significantly better than all previously published codes, including the best
known codes (BKC).
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 shows the comparison between three previously published re-
sults [2, 51, 67]. In these tables, all cases are presented which have different minimum
distances and some representative codes which have the same minimum distances for the
following three schemes:
1. The best known correcting codes (BKC) (Scheme-1) listed by Grassl [2].
2. The best known equivocation codes (Scheme-2) listed by Zhang et al. [51, 52].
3. The best known equivocation codes (BEqC) (Scheme-3) determined by the re-
search described in this thesis [67].
From Table 4.2, it can be observed that the equivocation rate of Scheme-2 is better
than Scheme-1 and Scheme-3 for n = 35 up to n = 44 as a result of the small minimum
distance (d2 = 3) while the highest minimum distance obtained from other schemes is
(d1 = d3 = 4). It is also interesting to note that the equivocation rate of Scheme-3 is
better than Scheme-1 and Scheme-2 for n = 45 up to n = 52 for which the minimum
distance of Scheme-3 is higher than the minimum distance of Scheme-2. Also it shown
that the equivocation rate of Scheme-3 is better than other schemes for all other cases
at which (d1 = d2 = d3).
From Table 4.3, the equivocation rate of Scheme-2 is better than Scheme-1 and
Scheme-3 only for (n = 28, 29) as a result of the small minimum distance (d2 = 5)
while the highest minimum distance obtained from other schemes is (d1 = d3 = 6).
The most surprising result is that the equivocation rate of Scheme-3 is better than
Scheme-1 and Scheme-2 for n = 30 up to n = 89 including the cases at which the
minimum distance of Scheme-3 is higher than the minimum distance of Scheme-2.
Finally, it was shown also from Table 4.4 there are some codes of Scheme-2 that have
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equivocation rate better than Scheme-1 and Scheme-3, possibly because the minimum
Hamming distance is less dominant.
In general, Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show that significant improvements in equivocation
rate are obtained for Scheme-3 compared with Scheme-1 for all codes having the same
parameters (m,n, d) . Also, it is shown that Scheme-3 has better equivocation rates
compared with Scheme-2 for all codes having the same parameters (m,n, d) and most
codes for which the minimum distance of Scheme-3 is higher than the minimum dis-
tance of Scheme-2.
In the final path of the investigation (third scheme), a code design technique has been
presented which is based on the extension of the parity check matrix of a good (BEqC)
, [n, k] code by selecting the two best columns that extend the binary linear code [n, k]
to [n+ 2, k + 2] code and which produce best known equivocation codes. The presented
results show that the best equivocation codes obtained by adding two columns gives
better performance compared with those codes that are obtained by adding one column
in two phases but the price for this improvement is that powerful computer resources are
required.
In summary, a total of 207 new best known equivocation codes with the highest mini-
mum Hamming distance have been determined and presented.
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5.2 Future Work
• It is proposed that the model design presented in Fig. 3.1 be modified in the
following directions to investigate the secrecy coding for the wiretap channel:
1. The second stage of the model employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique
using BKLC. It will be interesting to investigate the effect of another Public
key cryptosystem such as RSA and NTRU cryptosystems in the model. A
comparison of the equivocation rates of these different cryptosystems would
form a useful benchmark.
2. The model includes an inner code and outer code, the first stage employs a syn-
drome coding scheme based on the outer code ((23, 12, 7) binary Golay code)
and the second stage employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on
the inner code (BKLC). In chapter 4, the best equivocation codes(BEqC)
with highest minimum distance have been listed in Appendix A. It would
also be interesting to investigate the equivocation and channel capacity in the
BSC wiretap channel by selecting any two code combinations of (BEqC). It
will be necessary to select the appropriate combinations of (BEqC) codes in
the proposed model so that the length(n) of the outer code is equal to the
dimension(k) of the inner code.
• In this thesis, the best known equivocation codes(BEqC) for the syndrome coding
scheme have been calculated using a code design technique of extending the parity
check matrix of the linear [n, k] code by one best column as shown in section 4.5 and
by adding two best columns as shown in section 4.7. It will be useful to generalise
the code design technique to include the addition of best columns for greater than 3
columns coupled with parallel computer processing with appropriate sophisticated
software.
• Investigation of the other channel models instead of the binary symmetric channel
(BSC) for the eavesdropper channel and then to determine the best known equiv-
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ocation codes for these new channels. There are several channels that could be
used:
1. Additive White Gaussian Noise(AWGN) channel.
2. Binary Erasure Channel(BEC).
3. Arbitrarily Varying Channel(AV C).
• It would be useful to investigate and analyse the effect of using circulant codes on
the equivocation performance of the eavesdropper. Information is encoded using
an circulant and transmitted. The eavesdropper and the legitimate user have to
decode using the inverse circulant, which well amplify any channel errors. The
equivocation rate may be investigated as a function of the circulant polynomial.
In the case of double circulant codes, this method permits correction to full error-
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Abstract—A special case of wiretap channel is studied and
analysed when the main channel is an error free channel
and the eavesdropper channel is a binary symmetric channel.
The goal of this work is to maximise the equivocation on the
eavesdropper side by using a combination of the technique of the
McEliece cryptosystem using Best Known Linear Codes(BKLC)
coupled with syndrome coding. It is shown that as a result the
communication security is improved. In this paper, two Best
known linear codes are analysed which increase the equivocation
on the eavesdropper side. Two encoding stages are employed.
The ﬁrst stage employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the
(23,12,7) binary Golay code and the second stage employs the
McEliece cryptosystem technique using BKLC. Analysis shows
that the arrangement reduces the information leakage to the
eavesdropper compared to previously published schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was proposed by Wyner [1], is one of
the channels that take the security of transmitted information
into account. The wiretap channel contains one sender and two
receivers, one of them is the legitimate user and the second is
the eavesdropper. The special case of wiretap channel model
is shown in Fig. 1. In this model, Alice(transmitter) wants
to send a secret message M to Bob(legitimate receiver) in
the presence of an eavesdropper(Eve). The model assumes
the main channel between Alice and Bob is an error-free
channel and the eavesdropper channel is a Binary Symmetric
Channel(BSC) with crossover probability p (0 < p ≤ 12 ).
The goal is to maximise the equivocation on the the eaves-
dropper side. Wyner shows that in order to increase the
equivocation of the eavesdropper as much as possible, the
transmission rate of the channel should be reduced. Cohen and
Zemor [2] have been clariﬁed that to transmit the information
through a wiretap channel, there is a method to select a
syndrome function in order to minimise both the length of
the transmitted vector and the information leakage to the
eavesdropper when using the syndrome coding scheme for
the wiretap channel. In her yet to be published PhD thesis
[3], Zhang analysed the equivocation of the syndrome-coding
scheme in the BSC wiretap channel, and has proposed a
modiﬁed syndrome-coding scheme to reduce the information
leakage in the channel when it has a small probability of
error. Zhang showed that the equivocation rate has been











Fig. 1: Wiretap channel Model
extended (24,12,7) Golay code and a number of different BCH
codes when compared with the conventional syndrome coding
scheme.
In this paper, two models using Best Known Linear Codes
(BKLC) are proposed to increase the equivocation in the
eavesdropper side and as a result the communication secu-
rity is improved. In the ﬁrst model, referred to as Model-
1 the transmitted message is ﬁrst encoded by a syndrome
coding scheme based on the (23,12,7) binary Golay code
and secondly using the McEliece technique based on the
BKLC(33,23,5) code. In the second model, referred to as
Model-2 the ﬁrst stage employs a syndrome coding method
based on the (23,12,7) binary Golay code and the second stage
employs the McEliece cryptosystem technique based on the
BKLC(58,46,5), by concatenating two Golay coded vectors
and using this as the input to the second stage. Analysis shows
that the second model increases the equivocation rate of the
eavesdropper compared to the ﬁrst model. In addition, the
results obtained show that the information leakage has been
reduced by a large margin compared to previously published
schemes.
II. PROPOSED CODING SCHEME FOR THE
WIRETAP CHANNEL
The model design in Fig. 2 includes an inner code and
an outer code. Best results are obtained when the outer code
employs a syndrome coding scheme based on the (23,12,7) bi-
nary Golay code and the the inner code employs the McEliece
cryptosystem technique based on Best Known Linear Codes.
A. Encoding Algorithm
1) First Stage[Syndrome Coding using Golay code
(23,12,7)]: The Block Diagram of Syndrome Coding using




















D = BSC(C, pe)






C2 = C1 + E1
[C2]1×n1
[DR]1×k1 [E1]1×n1
Fig. 3: Block Diagram of Syndrome Coding using Golay
code (23,12,7)
procedure shows how Alice starts the encryption process in
order to generate a 23-bit vector [C2]1×n1 :
Algorithm 1 Encoding Algorithm of Golay code (23,12,7)
Require: [G]k1×n1  The Generator Matrix of Golay Code
Require: [DR]1×k1  Generate random data vector
1: Generate [DR]1×k1
2: [C1]1×n1 ← [DR]1×k1 .[G]k1×n1
3: [E1]1×n1 ← [M ]1×(n1−k1)  Generate E1 from M
4: [C2]1×n1 ← [C1]1×n1 + [E1]1×n1
5: return [C2]1×n1
Now, we illustrate how to calculate the error pattern
[E1]1×23 of weight between 0 and 3. The error vector E1
is related to the Message [M ]1×11. So, the mapping between
each error pattern and syndromes is one-to-one because the
Golay code is a perfect code. Therefore; the error vector
can be calculated by setting Si = Mi(i = 0, 1, ..., 2047),
E1 can be calculated from S1 = E1HT = M , where HT
represent the transpose of parity check matrix. As there are
only 2048 syndromes, it is straightforward to generate a look
up table linking S1 to E1. Bob calculates Mˆ the estimate of
the message as follows:
Mˆ = C2H
T = [C1 + E1]H
T = [DR.G+ E1]H
T
Mˆ = DR.GHT + E1H
T
Since G and H are orthogonal (G.HT =0), then
Mˆ = E1.H
T = S1 = M .
2) Second Stage[McEliece cryptosystem technique based
on BKLC(n, k, 2t + 1)]: The Block Diagram of McEliece
cryptosystem technique based on BKLC(n, k, 2t + 1) is
shown in Fig. 4. The key generation and message encryption
are described below:
1) Key generation: Bob select a BKLC(n, k, 2t+ 1) which
can correct t errors. The process of generating the public and
[C2]1×n1 C3 = C2.β = C2.RSGP
[C3]1×n





Fig. 4: Block Diagram of McEliece cryptosystem technique
based on BKLC(n, k, 2t+ 1)
private keys are summarized as follows:
Algorithm 2 Key Generation of BKLC(n,k,2t+1)
Require: [G]k×n Generator Matrix of BKLC(n, k, 2t+ 1)
Require: [S]k×k  Select Randomly a Scrambler Matrix
Require: [P ]n×n  Select Randomly a Permutation Matrix
1: Generate [S]k×k  Generate non-singular Matrix
Ensure: |S| = 0  The determinant of S not equal 0
2: Generate [P ]n×n
3: [α]k×n ← SGP
4: [R][α] ← [Ik | Q]  Determine [R]k×k
Ensure: [R] = [S]−1
5: [β]k×n ← RSGP
6: return [β]k×n
From Algorithm 2, R can be produces by row additions and
column swap of α that led to obtain a reduced echelon form
of α, i.e. R.α = [Ik | Q] where Ik is the (k × k) identity
matrix and Q is (k× (n−k)) parity check matrix. The public
key, which will be known to everyone, is [β]k×n = RSGP .
While S, G, P and R form the private key kept by Bob [4].
It is assumed in the following that Eve has knowledge of the
private key.
2) Message encryption: The following steps show completion
of the encryption process by Alice, where the output of the
ﬁrst stage [C2]1×n1 is used as input to the second stage:
Algorithm 3 Message Encryption of BKLC(n,k,2t+1)
Require: C2, β
1: [C3]1×n ← [C2]1×n1 .[β]k×n
2: [C]1×n ← [C3]1×n + [E2]1×n  Alice adds error vector
E2 of weight t
3: return [C]1×n
B. Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Bob receives the transmitted vector [C]1×n via the main
channel that is error-free. He recovers the original message M
as shown in Algorithm 4. From Algorithm 4(step 3), we can
prove that S1 = E2P−1HT as follows:
S1 = CP
−1HT = (C3 + E2)P−1HT





But G.HT = 0. So, S1 = E2P−1HT .
Algorithm 4 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Require: C,P−1, HT  Bob using P−1 and HT of
BKLC(n, k, 2t+ 1)
1: S1 ← CP−1HT  Bob computes [S1]1×n
2: S1 ← E2P−1HT  Bob computes E2
3: C3 ← C + E2  Bob corrects the error E2 in C to get
C3 of n-bit
4: C2 ← C3  Bob obtain C2 from C3 by get only the ﬁrst
n1-bit
5: S2 ← C2HT  HT of Golay(23,12,7)code




The block diagram of the BSC channel and Decoder of
the eavesdropper, Eve is shown in Fig. 5. Eve receives a
corrupted vector D instead of the transmitted vector [C]1×n
as a result of passing through the BSC which adds additional
errors [EBSC ]1×n as follows: [D]1×n = [C]1×n+[EBSC ]1×n,
Where [EBSC ]1×n is a random binary error vector which
depends on the crossover probability pe of BSC. Assume Eve
uses the same type of decoder that has been used by Bob, the
following steps explains how gets the estimated message Mˆ
from the corrupted vector D:
Algorithm 5 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: D,P−1, HT  Eve using P−1 and HT of
BKLC(n, k, 2t+ 1)
1: S3 ← DP−1HT  Eve computes [S3]1×n
2: S3 ← EˆP−1HT  Eve computes Eˆ
3: Cˆ3 ← C + Eˆ, Cˆ3 = C3  Eve corrects the error Eˆ to get
Cˆ3 of n-bit
4: Cˆ2 ← Cˆ3  Eve obtain Cˆ2 from Cˆ3 by get only the ﬁrst
n1-bit
5: S4 ← Cˆ2HT  HT of Golay(23,12,7)code
6: Mˆ ← S4,M = Mˆ  Eve recovers an estimate of the
message Mˆ
7: return Mˆ




−1HT = (C + EBSC)P−1HT
S3 = (C3 + E2 + EBSC)P
−1HT
S3 = (C2.RSGP )P




But G.HT = 0. So, S3 = E2P−1HT + EBSCP−1HT
S3 = (EBSC + E2)P
−1HT = EˆP−1HT .
Mˆ represents the estimated message of 11-bit length and it is
equal to Mˆ = M+E . The error signal E which represents the
difference between the original message M and the estimated
message Mˆ , which gives us imagine that Eve will receive
an equivocation, that mean the percentage of the original





C D = C + EBSC D[1 × n]
Decoder
Mˆ [1 × 11]
Eve
Fig. 5: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and Decoder of
Eavesdropper
III. CALCULATION RESULTS OF THE TWO
MODELS
The Equivocation rate and the information leakage have
been calculated for the proposed coding scheme for two
models (Model-1 and Model-2). Both models employs two
encoding stages, the ﬁrst stage of models employs a syn-
drome coding scheme based on the (23,12,7) binary Golay
code. The second stage of Models employs the McEliece
cryptosystem technique based on BKLC’s. Model-1 employs
BKLC(33,23,5) while Model-2 employs BKLC(58,46,5).
A. Channel Capacity
The amount of information that can be received by Eve
from Alice via the channel has been calculated as follows
[5]: I(M ; Mˆ) = H(M) +H(Mˆ)−H(M, Mˆ)
where H(M, Mˆ) is the joint Entropy of M and Mˆ . Fig. 6
shows the Normalised information I(M ; Mˆ) vs. pe.
B. Equivocation
The amount of information lost in the channel during the
transition process from Alice to Eve(i.e. the uncertainty of
Eve) has been calculated as follows [6]:
H(M | Mˆ) = H(M, Mˆ)−H(Mˆ)
where H(M, Mˆ) is the joint Entropy of M and Mˆ . Fig. 7
shows the Normalised equivocation H(M |Mˆ)M as a function
of probability of error pe. Fig. 8 shows the Normalised
equivocation for unsecure system on BSC and secure system
on BSC of the design models as a function of probability of
error pe. Fig. 9 shows the Normalised equivocation Difference
between the secure system on BSC of the design models and
unsecure system on BSC as a function of probability of error
pe.
Norm. Eq. Diff.(bits) = Eq(secure system)−Eq(unsecure system)
Where Eq(secure system) = H(M, Mˆ) and
Eq(unsecure system) = −pe log2 pe − (1− pe) log2(1− pe)
Fig. 10 shows the equivocation gain of the secure system on
BSC of the design models and unsecure system on BSC as
a function of probability of error pe. A huge improvement in





Fig. 6: The Channel Capacity I(M ; Mˆ) vs. pe
Figures 14, 15, 16 and 17 shows the Normalised equivocation,
Channel capacity, the normalised equivocation difference and
the equivocation gain for the four schemes, two of the models
that have been designed in this paper and two for the models
designed by Zhang in [3]. Zhang calculated the equivocation
rates for various codes. The results have shown that the
(23,12,7) Golay code had the best performance. Therefore,
the results obtained from two shcemes in [3] that based on
(23,12,7) Golay code have been compared with the results
obtained from the proposed models in this paper. The ﬁrst
scheme used the conventional syndrome-coding scheme based
on the (23,12,7)Golay code, reffered to as Golay scheme1. The
second scheme used the modiﬁed syndrome-coding scheme
based on the (23,12,7)Golay code, reffered to as Golay
scheme2. Table I shows the Normalised equivocation and
Information Leakage for the four schemes at some speciﬁc
values of pe.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the equivocation and channel capacity in
the BSC wiretap channel have been investigated using two
models with different BKLC’s which were shown to increase
the equivocation to the eavesdropper. The results show that
the performance of the second model is signiﬁcantly better
than the ﬁrst model which is attributable to the longer code
used in the second model. In addition, the results show that
both proposed models considerably reduce the information
leakage to the eavesdropper compared to previously published
schemes. Also, the normalised equivocation difference and
the equivocation gain were calculated with reference to an
uncoded system. Signiﬁcant improvements were obtained from
Model-2 compared with Model-1. In addition, the performance
of the proposed models is better than the performance of
previously published schemes in terms of the normalised
equivocation difference and the equivocation gain.
Fig. 7: The Normalised Equivocation H(M | Mˆ) vs. pe
Fig. 8: Normalised Equivocation(Log. Scale) for unsecure
system on BSC and secure system on BSC vs. pe
Fig. 9: Normalised Equivocation Difference between the
secure system on BSC and unsecure system on BSC vs. pe
Fig. 10: Equivocation gain of the secure system on BSC
and unsecure system on BSC vs. pe
Fig. 11: Normalised Equivocation vs. pe
Fig. 12: Channel Capacity(Normalised Information) vs. pe
Fig. 13: Normalised Equivocation Difference vs. pe
Fig. 14: Equivocation Gain vs. pe
pe Schemes Normalised Eq. Information Leakage
Golay scheme-1 0.2950 0.7050
0.02 Golay scheme-2 0.4175 0.5825
Model-1 0.4671 0.5329
Model-2 0.6474 0.3526
Golay scheme-1 0.4987 0.5013
0.04 Golay scheme-2 0.6509 0.3491
Model-1 0.6940 0.3060
Model-2 0.8475 0.1525
Golay scheme-1 0.6558 0.3442
0.06 Golay scheme-2 0.7929 0.2071
Model-1 0.8195 0.1805
Model-2 0.9264 0.0736
Golay scheme-1 0.7739 0.2261
0.08 Golay scheme-2 0.8795 0.1205
Model-1 0.8923 0.1077
Model-2 0.9625 0.0375
Golay scheme-1 0.8587 0.1413
0.1 Golay scheme-2 0.9317 0.0683
Model-1 0.9358 0.0642
Model-2 0.9806 0.0194
TABLE I: Normalised equivocation and Information Leakage
for the four schemes
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Abstract—In this paper we present a code design technique
which produces codes for syndrome coding which have better
secrecy than the best error correcting codes. Code examples are
given for the case where the number of parity bits of the code
is equal to 15. The code design technique presented is based on
extensions of the parity check matrix of a set of good equivocation
codes of shorter length. It is also shown that syndrome coding
can be implemented without the traditional syndrome look
up table, enabling any length codes to be used. An efficient
recursive method to calculate the equivocation rate for the binary
symmetric channel (BSC) and any linear binary code is also
presented. The design results show that the best equivocation
codes (BEC) that are produced have better equivocation rate
for the syndrome coding scheme compared to all previously
published codes, including the best known codes (BKC).
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was proposed by Wyner [1], and is
a physical layer model that takes the security of transmitted
information into account. In this model, Alice (transmitter),
wishes to send a secret message M to Bob (legitimate receiver)
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The wiretap channel
model is shown in Fig. 1, where the main channel (between
Alice and Bob) is an error-free channel and the eavesdropper
channel is a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with a probabil-
ity of error (pe) [2]. Secrecy is measured by the equivocation
rate.
Wyner showed that the equivocation rate approaches unity to
the eavesdropper if codes are used that have length extending
to infinity, if the syndrome space is chosen to be smaller than
the Shannon entropy of the binary symmetric channel (BSC).
Chen and Vinck [3] also investigated the binary symmetric
wiretap channel, and they showed that the secrecy capacity
can be obtained by using random linear codes with syndrome
coding.
The syndrome coding scheme, whose basic idea is to convey
information in the syndromes of a code so as to increase
the communication security has been studied by several re-
searchers. For example, Rouayheb and Soljanin [4] showed
that network security can be achieved by using syndrome
coding as an additional layer to a network code. Al-Hassan,
Ahmed and Tomlinson [5] showed that the equivocation rate
can be maximised on the eavesdropper side by using a com-
bination of the technique of the McEliece cryptosystem using
Best Known Codes (BKC) coupled with syndrome coding.
Cohen and Zemor [6] analysed the information leakage of











Fig. 1: Wiretap channel Model
method to select a syndrome function in order to minimise
both the length of the transmitted vector and the information
leakage to the eavesdropper. Code design for error correcting
codes is an important and long standing topic in coding theory.
Good codes can be designed by extending the parity check
matrix of good codes as shown in [7], [8].
In this paper, we present an efficient recursive method for eval-
uating the equivocation rate of any linear, binary code when
used in syndrome coding for the Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC). In addition, we present a code design technique to
extend the binary linear [n, k] code to a [n + 1, k + 1] code
to produce best equivocation codes. We present examples for
the code where the number of parity bits of the code is equal
to 15 (m = 15) where m = n − k. The code construction
method for obtaining good equivocation codes is based on the
observation that the syndrome probability mass function of a
code extended in length is a function of the probability mass
function of the original code, and good equivocation codes
produce good extended codes. The design results for m = 15
show that these new best equivocation codes (BEC) have better
equivocation rate compared to all previously published best
error correcting codes, the best known codes (BKC) listed by
Grassl [9].
II. SYNDROME CODING SCHEME
Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel [1] is :
Cs = −pe. log2(pe)− (1− pe). log2(1− pe) (1)
which is the highest transmission rate that can be obtained
while maintaining perfect secrecy. In this model, Alice (trans-
mitter) wants to transmit a sequence of independent and uni-
formly distributed m-bit binary messages to Bob (legitimate
receiver),M [1], ...M [r]. This sequence of messages is encoded
into n-bit words C[1], ...C[r]. Bob receives the same sequence
of n-bit words C[1], ...C[r] and Eve receives the sequence of
n-bit words D[1], ...D[r] where
ICTC 2014 1570005509
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Fig. 2: Block Diagram of Syndrome Coding scheme for
(n, k, d) linear block code
D(i) = C(i) + EBSC(i), i = 1, ..., r
and EBSC(i) represents a n-bit error vector generated by
the binary symmetric channel, r is the block length. The
syndrome coding scheme uses a (n, k, d) linear block code
which guarantees to correct all error patterns of weight t,
where t = (d − 1)/2. All 2m syndromes are used to send
messages where m = n − k and not just the syndromes
corresponding to weight t or less error patterns. For any linear
block code there exist 2m distinct minimum weight error
patterns, the coset leaders, in which each pattern produces a
distinct syndrome of the total 2m syndromes. Therefore, these
error patterns can be represented in a table of 2m syndromes.
In the traditional syndrome coding, the look up table for error
patterns and syndromes is known by Alice, Bob and Eve.
For long codes a syndrome table is impractical, but it is shown
below that this look up table is unnecessary, and that the
parity check matrix H of the code is sufficient taking into
consideration the structure of H in systematic format. A block
diagram for syndrome coding for a (n, k, d) linear block code
is shown in Fig. 2.
A. Encoding Algorithm
Alice starts the encryption process in order to generate a
n-bit vector C2(i) from each m-bit message M(i) at time i
such that C2(i)×HT = M(i) as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Encoding Algorithm
Require: [G]k×n  The Generator Matrix of (n,k,d) Code
Require: [DR(i)]1×k  random, uniformly distributed vector
1: Generate [DR(i)]1×k
2: [C1(i)]1×n ← [DR(i)]1×k.[G]k×n
3: [E(i)]1×n ← [M(i)|0...0]  Generate n-bit zero padded
message
4: [C2(i)]1×n ← [C1(i)]1×n + [E(i)]1×n
5: return [C2(i)]1×n
Now, we show how to calculate the error pattern [E(i)]1×n.
Since the syndrome of any codeword is zero, any codeword
added to an error pattern will produce the same syndrome.
Hence Alice may produce the required syndrome by generat-
ing an n-bit zero padded message vector E(i), which consists
of the original message M(i) which is m-bits long followed
by k 0’s where m = n− k.
B. Decoding Algorithm
1) Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder: Bob receives the trans-









Fig. 3: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and
Eavesdropper’s Decoder
free. He recovers the original message M(i) by using the
parity check matrix of the code as shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Require: C2(i), HT  Bob using HT of (n, k, d) code
1: S(i)← C2(i).HT  Bob computes [S(i)]1×n
2: ˆM(i)← S(i),M(i) = ˆM(i)  Bob recovers the original
message M(i)
3: return M(i)
From Algorithm 2, we can prove that C2(i)×HT = M(i)
as follows:
S(i) = C2(i)×HT −→ S(i) = (C1(i) + E(i))×HT
S(i) = C1(i)×HT + E(i)×HT
S(i) = DR(i)×G×HT + E(i)×HT , but G.HT = 0.
So, S(i) = E(i)×HT = M(i).
The syndrome formed from E(i) × HT , because of the k
leading zeros of E(i) is simplyM(i) multiplied by the identity
sub-matrix of HT which produces M(i).
2) Eavesdropper’s Decoder: The block diagram of the
BSC channel and eavesdropper’s decoder is shown in
Fig. 3. Eve receives a corrupted vector D(i) instead of the
transmitted vector [C2(i)] as a result of passing through the
BSC which adds additional errors [EBSC ]1×n:
[D(i)]1×n = [C2(i)]1×n + [EBSC(i)]1×n, Where
[EBSC(i)]1×n is a random binary error vector which
depends on the crossover probability pe of BSC. Assuming
Eve uses the same type of decoder that has been used by
Bob, the following steps explains how she gets the estimated
message ˆM(i) from the corrupted vector D(i):
Algorithm 3 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: D(i), HT  Eve using HT of (n, k, d) code
1: SEve(i)← D(i).HT  Eve computes [SEve(i)]1×n
2: ˆM(i)← SEve(i),M(i) = ˆM(i)  Eve recovers an































































From Algorithm 3, Eve estimates ˆM(i) as follows:
SEve(i) = D(i)×HT
SEve(i) = [C2(i) + EBSC(i)]×HT
SEve(i) = C2(i)×HT + EBSC(i)×HT
SEve(i) = [C1(i) + E(i)]×HT + EBSC(i)×HT
SEve(i) = E(i)×HT + EBSC(i)×HT = ˆM(i)
ˆM(i) = SEve(i) = M(i) + Se(i)
III. CALCULATION OF THE SECRECY ACHIEVED BY
SYNDROME CODING
The secrecy realised by syndrome coding is measured by the
eavesdropper decoder output equivocation, H(M(i)|Mˆ(i)):
H(M(i)|Mˆ(i)) = H(M(i), Mˆ(i))−H(Mˆ(i))
= H(M(i))−H(Mˆ(i)) +H(Mˆ(i)|M(i))
= H(M(i))−H(M(i) + Se(i))+
H(M(i) + Se(i)|M(i))





p(Se(i)). log2 p(Se(i)) (4)
where H(Se(i)) is the entropy of Se(i). The simplifications
in equations (2) and (3) are due to M(i) being uniformly
distributed and independent of Se(i). The equivocation is
calculated after deriving the probability mass function of the
syndromes due to errors from the BSC, p(Se(i)) and is a
function of the code being used through the parity check
matrix of the code.
A. Code Representation
Any binary linear (n, k, d) code is defined by its (k × n)
generator matrix G or by its (m × n) parity check matrix
H . The best equivocation codes are constructed by designing
the parity check matrix of the code. H can be defined by
representing each column of H by an integer, bi, in the range
0 to (2n−k − 1). The binary parity check matrix of a code of
length n is defined by n.k binary integers, the first m columns




1 0 . . . 0 am0 . . . a(n−1)0
0 1 . . . 0 am1 . . . a(n−1)1
...




0 0 . . . 1 am(m−1) . . . a(n−1)(m−1)

in which 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, m ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and ai,j takes a
value of 0 or 1. Each column can be represented as a packed




j . Then the systematic format
of H can be represented as following:
H = [1,2,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
where the first m integers represent the identity matrix and
the other integers have values between 3 and 2m− 1. Usually
no integers are repeated ensuring d ≥ 3 and higher values of
d are ensured by constraining no integer is a modulo 2 sum
of any other d− 2, or smaller, number of integers.
B. Evaluation of the syndrome probability distribution
The code construction technique that produces codes with
good equivocation is based on the realisation that the syndrome
probability mass function (pmf) of a new extended code is a
function of the probability mass function of the original code
and good equivocation codes produce good extended codes.
For Eve, there are 2n possible error patterns, e(i), occur for
each transmitted vector C(i)1×n. These error patterns occur
with probability:
p(e(i)) = pew(i).(1− pe)n−w(i) (5)
where w(i) is the weight of e(i). Each error pattern results in
one of the 2m syndromes being produced.
Se(i)) = e(i)×HT (6)
As the code is linear, for each syndrome there are 2k error
patterns that produce the same syndrome and the probability











This method for evaluating the equivocation works well for
short codes (n < 40), but for the long codes it is impracticable
because it involves the evaluation of 2n error patterns. Due to
the limitation of this method, the probability distribution of the
syndromes may be determined recursively, this method leads
to reduce the number of terms from 2n to 2m as shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem : The probability mass function (pmf) of Sj for j=0
to 2m-1 can be defined as p(Sj) = β(j) where β(j) are
coefficients of the probability generating function using the
Z transform, denoted as pz(S) and pz(S) only depends on
the columns of the parity check matrix H and the probability







((1− pe) + pe.Zbi) (9)
where bi are the integers representations of the columns of
H and exponent sums of powers of Z are added modulo 2.
Proof: Any error pattern may be represented as a sum of single
bit error events: e(i) = [e1 e2 . . . en]
e(i) = [e1 0 . . . 0] + [0 e2 . . . 0] + · · ·+ [0 0 . . . en]
where ei=1 with probability pe and ei=0 with probability 1−
pe. The linearity of the syndrome coding scheme means that
the syndrome resulting from any error pattern is the linear sum
of the syndromes for each bit error position:
Se(i) = e(i)×HT = [e1 e2 . . . en]×HT (10)






























































Since the probabilities of e1, e2, . . . , en are independent, the
probability of Se(i) is the product of the probabilities of n
separate error events. By adding the coefficients of the same
powers of Z results in the coefficients, βj , the number of
terms to be reduced from 2n to 2m. If the columns of H
of the shortened code of length r are taken from i = 0 to
r − 1 and the pmf generating function of the shortened code




[(1− pe) + pe.Zbi ] (12)
pz(Sr) = [(1− pe) + pe.Zb0 ].[(1− pe) + pe.Zb1 ] . . .
.[(1− pe) + pe.Zbr−1 ]
= (1− pe)2 + pe(1− pe).Zb1 + pe(1− pe).Zb0+
pe2.Zb0⊕b1 + . . .
Now, we can extend the length of the original code from r to
r+1 by adding one column to its parity check matrix H , the





[(1−pe)+pe.Zbi ] = pz(Sr)[(1−pe)+pe.Zbr ]
(13)
Denoting the β(j) coefficients of the original code of length






and for extended code r + 1
















Adding together the coefficients of the same powers of Z in







From equation (16), it is clear that the syndrome pmf of the
new code of length r+1 is equal to the syndrome pmf of the
original code of length r weighted by 1− pe plus a permuted
syndrome pmf of the original code of length r, weighted by
pe. The permutation arises from the results of the modulo 2
additions j⊕br. This leads to the conclusion that the syndrome
pmf of the code can be obtained recursively, starting with the
generating function pz(S1), determining pz(S2) then pz(S3)
through to pz(Sn). The syndrome pmf of each (n,k,d) code
of length r is stored and the syndrome pmf for each extended
code of length r + 1 is determined using the equation (16)
which makes for a fast algorithm. It is also apparent that good
equivocation codes will also produce good equivocation codes
when extended in length.
IV. CODE DESIGN TECHNIQUE
To produce a best equivocation codes the pmf of the
syndromes should be as uniform as possible. Since the eaves-
dropper channel is a binary symmetric channel, for low values
of pe the equivocation is dominated by error patterns of low
weight. To produce best equivocation codes, we must take into
account the following observations:
1) If the error pattern has low weight, then the probability
of the error events is high. If each error pattern produces
different syndrome sums, then this makes the pmf of the
syndromes become more uniform.
2) By using the systematic format of the parity check
matrix H , the packed integers of any information bit
cannot have a weight less than d − 1, where d is the
minimum Hamming distance of the code. Otherwise the
codeword formed from that information bit alone will
have weight less than d.
3) If any column of the parity check matrix H is repeated,
a weight 2 error event will produce a zero syndrome,
that leads to a non uniform pmf of the syndrome.
The following code design algorithm shows how to extend an
[n, k] code into [n + 1, k + 1] by adding the best column to
the original parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code.
Algorithm 4 Code Design Technique
Require: pz(Sr)  syndrome pmf of (n, k)code
Require: H  systematic format of H of (n, k)code
Require: b[i]  integer sequence(columns) of H
Require: (n, k,m, pe)  code parameters and error
probability of BSC
Require: Cin  initial inequivalent codes of the highest
equivocation rate
1: Generate (br)  generating between 3 and 2m − 1
Ensure: (br) = b[i]  ensure no repeated columns






4: pz(Sr+1)← pz1(Sr) + pz2(Sr)  apply equations (16)
and (17)
5: Eq ← −
2m−1∑
j=0
βr+1(j).Log2(βr+1(j))  calculate the
equivocation of [n+ 1, k + 1] code
6: EqN ← Eq/m  calculate the Normalised equivocation
7: return (br), EqN,Cout  extended inequivalent codes,






























































The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follows:
1) Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code (n, k)
from equation(14).
2) Represent the parity check matrix H of the (n, k) code
in the systematic format:
H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3) Extend H with one integer (br) by generating randomly
all possible integers between 3 and 2m − 1 with the
constraint that there are no repeated integers included in
the originalH . This ensures that the minimum Hamming
distance of each extended code is at least 3.
4) Eliminate all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivoca-
tion rate for each remaining code by using equation(4).
5) Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in
descending order, and select a best codes subset. These
codes are used as the initial input for the next extension
round.
V. RESULTS
By using the code design technique above, the best
equivocation codes have been determined for m = 15. As
a result of the large number of codes we only present here
in Table 1 codes which provide at least 80% secrecy. The
minimum Hamming distance (d) and the equivocation rate
(Eq.) for a BSC error probability of pe = 0.05 is given for
each code. The equivocation rates of the corresponding best
error correcting codes previously published, the (BKC) codes
listed by Grassl [9] with the same n and m are also given
in Table 1 (in parentheses). The results show that significant
improvements have been achieved on the equivocation rate
for the best equivocation codes compared with best known
codes.
Fig. 4 shows the equivocation rate Eq. as a function of
probability of error pe of best equivocation and best known
codes for n = 82 at different values of pe. It shows that the
equivocation rate of BECs has been increased by a large
margin compared with BKCs not only for pe = 0.05 but also
for other values of pe.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a code design technique for
obtaining best equivocation codes and also presented a method
of implementing syndrome coding without the need for a
syndrome look up table. The best equivocation codes for the
syndrome coding scheme that achieve at least 80% secrecy to
an eavesdropper using the BSC with an error probability of
0.05 are presented in Table 1. In addition, a recursive method
for the evaluation of the probability mass function of the
syndromes of a code which depends only on the columns of the
parity check matrix and the probability of error of the binary
symmetric channel has been presented. The results obtained
show that the equivocation rate of the new best equivocation
codes exceeds by a large margin the equivocation rates of the
best error correcting codes, previously published.
Fig. 4: Equivocation rate Eq. vs. pe of best equivocation
(BEC) and best known (BKC) codes for n = 82
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TABLE I: Best Equivocation Codes that achieve at least 80%
secrecy in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05
m n d Eq. Packed integer parity check matrix
15 48 5 0.804141
(0.744035)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 826 1024 2048 3879 4096 7163 7913 8192 9215 9632 10552 16384 16975 17378 17779 18843 19664 21136 21973 22578 23393 24092 24495
25144 26321 26409 26640 26663 27411 28092 28622 29302 29977 31397 31871 32395 32607
15 49 5 0.813668
(0.772691)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 5541 7031 7160 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 16384 16975 17378 17579 18413 18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 23259
23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 27411 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 50 5 0.822836
(0.780014)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 5541 7031 7160 7913 8192 9215 9683 10365 13987 16384 16975 17378 17579 18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 22294
23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 25850 26321 26409 27411 28092 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 51 5 0.831624
(0.787048)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 14876 16384 16975 17378 17799 18164 18843 20207 20569
21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 52 5 0.840045
(0.793774)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 151 256 512 1024 1349 2048 3879 4096 4938 7913 8192 9215 12183 15202 16207 16384 16975 17378 17957 18843 19400 20477 20900 21021 21530
21973 22762 23393 24092 24260 25438 26077 26321 26409 27411 28092 28622 29302 29873 31199 31397 31871 32620
15 53 5 0.848118
(0.800219)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4797 5541 7031 7160 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 18180 18293 18843 18960 19350
19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 27411 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 54 5 0.855849
(0.806378)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3691 3879 4096 5541 6315 7031 7160 7489 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 16384 16653 16975 17378 17579 18843 18960 19350 19955
21973 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 27411 27517 28092 28133 28622 28816 30717 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 55 5 0.863253
(0.812037)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378 17799
18164 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 56 5 0.870337
(0.817515)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378
17799 18164 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 57 5 0.877108
(0.822674)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378
17799 18164 18358 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 58 5 0.883542
(0.827531)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378
17799 18164 18358 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 23724 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 59 5 0.889691
(0.832243)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4664 4797 5541 6674 7031 7160 7870 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 18180 18293 18843
18960 19350 19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 26993 27411 27570 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153 32484
15 60 5 0.895581
(0.836659)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4664 4797 5541 6674 7031 7160 7870 7913 8192 9215 10420 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 18180 18293
18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 26993 27411 27570 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153 32484
15 61 5 0.901181
(0.84071)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4664 4797 5541 6674 7031 7160 7870 7913 8192 9215 10420 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 17795 18180
18293 18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 26993 27411 27570 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
32484
15 62 5 0.906529
(0.84471)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10638 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975
17378 17758 17799 18164 18358 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 23724 23855 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29163 29302 30283 31397 31651
31871 32754
15 63 5 0.911620
(0.848502)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876 15254 16384 16604
16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651
31871 32754
15 64 5 0.916471
(0.852014)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876 15254
16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397
31651 31871 32754
15 65 5 0.921080
(0.855343)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876 15254 16384
16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20280 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961
31397 31651 31871 32754
15 66 5 0.925470
(0.858469)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283
30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 67 5 0.929650
(0.861375)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21522 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302
30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 68 5 0.933609
(0.873716)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10574 10627 11106 12422 12617
14876 15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21554 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622
29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 69 5 0.937373
(0.883069)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17602 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21522 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27211 27258 27411 27683 28092
28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 70 5 0.940950
(0.890594)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683
28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 71 5 0.944327
(0.896977)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 13924
14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411
27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 72 5 0.947533
(0.902252)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 2697 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617
14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411
27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32007 32754
15 73 5 0.950577
(0.906807)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422 12617
14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968 26239 26321 26409
27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 74 5 0.953458
(0.910715)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968 26239 26321
26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 75 5 0.956184
(0.914168)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968 26239 26321
26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 76 5 0.958767
(0.91624)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 2697 3145 3726 3879 4030 4096 4109 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 10636 11106
12422 12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 18889 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321
26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32007 32754
15 77 4 0.961205
(0.919134)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 13285 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 20682 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968
26239 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 78 5 0.963517
(0.92183)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 13285 13685 13924 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048
25968 26239 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 79 5 0.963696
(0.924199)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 2697 3145 3726 3879 4030 4096 4109 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7254 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 10636
11106 12422 12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16578 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 18889 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326
25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32007 32616 32754
15 80 5 0.967762
(0.926307)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5052 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 13285 13685 14876 15254 15540 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048
25358 25968 26239 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 81 5 0.969716
(0.928241)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3429 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 8797 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 15644 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18267 18324 18700 18843 18955 20207 20569 21824 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326
25048 25968 26321 26409 26764 27258 27411 27683 27992 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31703 31871 32754
15 82 5 0.971556
(0.92999)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3429 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 8797 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 15644 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18267 18324 18700 18843 18955 20207 20569 21824 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326
25048 25968 26321 26409 26764 27258 27411 27683 27992 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31703 31871 32709 32754
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Abstract—In this paper, we present a code design technique
that produces the best equivocation codes(BEqC) for the syn-
drome coding scheme. This technique is based on the extension
of the parity check matrix of a good (BEqC), [n, k] code by
selecting the two best columns that extend the length of the code.
The goal of this construction is to improve the communication
security by increasing the equivocation rate. An efficient recursive
method which derives the syndrome probability distribution for
a particular code is presented to determine the equivocation rate
for the Binary Symmetric Channel(BSC). Analysis show that the
(BEqC) that is produced by adding two columns gives better
equivocation rate compared to those codes that are produced by
the addition of one column in two phases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was proposed by Wyner [1], is a
physical layer model that take the security of transmitted
information into account. The special case of wiretap channel
model is shown in Fig. 1, when the main channel is an
error-free channel and the eavesdropper channel is a Binary
Symmetric Channel(BSC). In this model, Alice(transmitter),
wishes to send a secret message M to Bob(legitimate receiver)
in the presence of an eavesdropper(Eve). Chen and Vinck
[2] investigated the binary symmetric wiretap channel, and
they show that the secrecy capacity can be obtained by using
random linear codes. Salah, Zaki and Martin [3] showed that
the equivocation rate has been maximised on the eavesdropper
side by using a combination of the technique of the McEliece
cryptosystem using Best Known Linear Codes(BKLC) coupled
with syndrome coding. Zhang, Tomlinson and Ahmed [4]
showed that the best equivocation codes for syndrome coding
scheme can be obtained by extending the parity check matrix
of the code with one integer. Good codes can be designed by
extending the parity check matrix, as shown in [5], [6].
In this paper, we present an efficient recursive method for
evaluating the equivocation rate of any linear, binary code
when used in syndrome coding for the Binary Symmetric
Channel(BSC). In addition, we present a code design tech-
nique to extend the binary linear [n, k] code to [n+ 2, k + 2]
code to produce best equivocation codes. The code construc-
tion method for obtaining good equivocation codes is based
on the observing that the syndrome probability mass function
of a code extended in length is a function of the probability
mass function of the original code, and good equivocation











Fig. 1: Wiretap channel Model
show that the equivocation rate has been increased by using
this technique compared to previously published scheme that
obtained by Grassl [7].
II. CODE REPRESENTATION
Any binary linear (n, k, d) code is defined by its (k × n)
generator matrix G or by its (m× n) parity check matrix H .
In this work, the best equivocation codes are constructed from
the parity check matrix of the code. The systematic format of
H can be obtained by represented each column of H by an
integer, bi, in the range 0 to (2n−k − 1). The parity check
matrix of a code of length n is defined by n integers, the first
m columns of H is an identity matrix as shown below:
H =

1 0 . . . 0 am0 . . . a(n−1)0
0 1 . . . 0 am1 . . . a(n−1)1
...




0 0 . . . 1 am(m−1) . . . a(n−1)(m−1)

in which 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, m ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and ai,j takes a
value of 0 or 1. Each column can be represented as a packed




j . Then the systematic format
of H can be represented as following:
H = [1,2,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
where the first m integers represent the identity matrix and the
other integers are generated randomly between 3 and 2m − 1
while not to be repeated any integers that is contained within
H .
III. EVALUATION OF THE SYNDROME
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
The code construction technique for obtaining codes with
good equivocation is based on the monitoring that the syn-
drome probability mass function(pmf) of a new extended code
                978-1-4799-5490-2/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE
is a function of the probability mass function of the original
code and good equivocation codes produce good extended
codes. There are 2n possible error patterns, e(i), occur in each
transmitted vector C(i)1×n. These error patterns occurs with
probability:
p(e(i)) = pew(i).(1− pe)n−w(i) (1)
where w(i) is the weight of e(i). Each error pattern results
in one of the 2m syndromes being produced.
Se(i)) = e(i)×HT (2)
As the code is linear, for each syndrome there are 2k error
patterns that produce the same syndrome and the probability











This method for evaluating the equivocation works well for
short codes(n < 40), but for the long codes it is impracticable
because it involves the evaluation of 2n error patterns. And due
to the limitation of this method, the probability distribution of
the syndromes may be determined recursively, this method
leads to reduce the number of terms from 2n to 2m as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem : The probability mass function (pmf) of Sj for j=0
to 2m-1 can be defined as p(Sj) = β(j) where β(j) are
coefficients of the probability generating function using the
Z transform, denoted as pz(S) and pz(S) only depends on
the columns of the parity check matrix H and the probability







((1− pe) + pe.Zbi) (5)
where bi are the integers representations of the columns of
H and exponent sums of powers of Z are added modulo 2.
If the columns of H of the shortened code of length r are
taken from i = 0 to r− 1 and the pmf generating function of




[(1− pe) + pe.Zbi ] (6)
Now, we can extend the length of the original code from
r to r + 1 by adding one column on its parity check matrix





[(1−pe)+pe.Zbi ] = pz(Sr)[(1−pe)+pe.Zbr ]
(7)
Denoting the β(j) coefficients of the original code of length






















In this paper, we extend the length of the original code from
r to r+2 by adding two columns on its parity check matrix H .
We can evaluate the pmf generating function of the extended




[(1− pe) + pe.Zbi ] (11)














Adding together the coefficients of the same powers of Z in the







This leads to the conclusion that the syndrome pmf of the
code can be obtained recursively, starting with the generating
function pz(S1), determining pz(S2) then pz(S3) through to
pz(Sn). The syndrome pmf of each (n,k,d) code of length r is
stored and the syndrome pmf for each extended code of length
r+2 is determined using the last equation which makes for a
fast algorithm. It is also apparent that good equivocation codes
will also produce good equivocation codes when extended in
length.
IV. CODE DESIGN TECHNIQUE
The goal of this work is to increase the equivocation of
the eavesdropper as much as possible, i.e. the pmf of the
syndromes should be as uniform as possible. The following
steps shows how to extend an [n, k] into [n+ 2, k + 2] code:
1) Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code (n, k)
from equation(8).
2) Represent the parity check matrix H of the (n, k) code
in the systematic format:
H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3) Store the integer sequence of H in b[i], where 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
4) Extend H with two integers (br, br+1) by generating
randomly all possible integers between 3 and 2m−1 with
the constraint that there are no repeated integers included
in the original H . This ensures that the minimum
Hamming distance of each extended code is at least 3.
5) Calculate the syndrome pmf of the extended code (n+
2, k + 2) from equation(12).
6) Select a fixed value of br and varying the value of
br+1 for all possible values, and for each case evaluate





p(Se(i)). log2 p(Se(i)) (13)
The equivocation is calculated after deriving the proba-
bility mass function of the syndromes due to errors from
BSC, p(Se(i)) and is a function of the code being used
through the parity check matrix of the code. Repeat this
process for all possible values of (br, br+1).
7) Choose the values of (br, br+1) that give the maximum
equivocation.
V. RESULTS
By using the code design technique above, the best equivo-
cation codes have been determined. The minimum Hamming
distance dmin and equivocation rate Eq for a BSC error prob-
ability pe is given for each code. As example, the (33,23,5)
code has been extended to (35,25,4) code by adding two
columns to the parity check matrix of the original code. The H
matrix of (33,23,5) code can be represented by the following
integer sequence:
[H] = [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 77, 191, 232, 341,
382, 411, 495, 505, 607, 629, 643, 664, 682, 763, 764,
815, 822, 860, 919, 971, 977, 997, 1010]
By following the code design technique, the maximum equiv-
ocation rate has been obtained when adding the following
columns(217,928). At pe = 0.05, the equivocation rate for
(33, 23, 5) code is equal to 0.792695 while for (35, 25, 4) is
0.816794. We have also extended the code by adding two
columns but in two phases. For the same example, firstly
the (33,23,5) code has been extended to (34,24,4) code by
adding one column. The maximum equivocation rate has been
obtained when adding (89) to the original(33,23,5)code and
at pe = 0.05, the equivocation rate for (34, 24, 5) code is
0.805024. After that, the second column has been added to
extend (34, 24, 4) code to (35, 25, 4) code, The maximum
equivocation rate has been obtained when adding(150) to the
(34, 24, 4) code and at pe = 0.05, the equivocation rate for
(35, 25, 4) code is 0.816769. This leads us to say that the
process of adding two columns give better results than adding
one column in two phases. By comparing the equivocation
values obtained in this example with the corresponding best
known codes obtained by Grassl [7], we can note that the
results obtained in our technique are better. For (34, 24, 4)
code, we obtained Eq. = 0.805024 while Eq. = 0.667461 for
Fig. 2: The Normalised Equivocation H(M | Mˆ) vs. pe
Grassl and for (35, 25, 4) code, we obtained Eq. = 0.816794
while Eq. = 0.681773 for Grassl. Another example, the
(41, 26, 5) code has been extended to (43, 28, 5) code at
pe = 0.05. For (41, 26, 5) code, we obtained Eq. = 0.726213
while Eq. = 0.685428 for Grassl, for (42, 27, 5) code, we
obtained Eq. = 0.738604 while Eq. = 0.695063 for Grassl
and for (43, 28, 5) code, we obtained Eq. = 0.750549 while
Eq. = 0.704144 for Grassl.
Fig. 2 shows the Normalised equivocation H(M(i)|Mˆ(i))m
as a function of probability of error pe for the
(33, 23, 5), (34, 24, 4) and (35, 25, 4) codes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new code design technique for
obtaining best equivocation codes. Also, a recursive method
for evaluation the probability mass function of the syndromes
of a code which depends only on the columns of the parity
check matrix and the probability of error of the binary sym-
metric channel has been presented. In addition, we show that
the best equivocation codes obtained by adding two columns
gives better equivocation rate compared with those codes that
are obtained by adding one column in two phases. The results
obtained show that the equivocation rate has been increased
by a large margin compared to previously published schemes.
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Abstract—In this paper we present a new code design technique
which produces best equivocation codes (BEqC) with highest
minimum distance for syndrome coding which have better secrecy
than the best known error correcting codes (BKC). The best
equivocation codes of highest minimum distance have been
determined by using a combination of a code design technique
based on extensions of the parity check matrix from an optimal
set of good equivocation codes of highest minimum distance
coupled with a technique of determining the highest minimum
distance (dmin) of these extended codes. Code examples are
presented that demonstrate that the equivocation rate of these
best equivocation codes (BEqC) exceeds by a large margin the
best known error correcting codes having the same parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the wiretap channel was first introduced by
Wyner [1], and is a basic physical layer model that captures
the essence of communication security. In this model, Alice
(transmitter), wishes to send confidential information to Bob
(legitimate receiver) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve).
Wyner also proposed a syndrome coding scheme for the case
[2], shown in Fig. 1, where the main channel is noiseless
and the eavesdropper channel is a Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC) with a given probability of error (pe).
Thangaraj et al. [3] showed how capacity achieving codes
can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap
channel, he also considered the binary erasure channel and
the binary symmetric channel as special cases for the wiretap
channel. Chen and Vinck [4] also investigated the binary
symmetric wiretap channel, and they showed that the secrecy
capacity can be obtained by using random linear codes with
syndrome coding.
Several researchers have analysed the syndrome coding
scheme as a function of the code used in order to increase the
communication security, Zhang et al. [5] produced some best
equivocation codes for the syndrome coding scheme. The best
equivocation codes have been determined for a given number
of parity bits m, of the code as follows:
(m = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26).
Al-Hassan et al. [6] also determined the new best equivocation
code for syndrome coding when the parity bit of the code
is equal (m = 15). In general, the best equivocation codes
obtained in [5], [6] have a respectable minimum Hamming
distance, but are sometimes not as good as the best known











Figure 1: Wiretap channel Model
said to be a best known code (BKC) if C has the highest
minimum distance among all known [n, k] linear codes, the
tables of (BKC) have been published by Grassl [7] in
the form of tables of lower and upper bounds of (dmin).
Rouayheb and Soljanin [8] showed that network security can
be achieved by using syndrome coding as an additional layer
to a network code. Al-Hassan et al. [9] showed that the
equivocation rate can be maximised on the eavesdropper side
by using a combination of the technique of the McEliece
cryptosystem using Best Known Codes (BKC) coupled with
syndrome coding. The Minimum distance of a linear code is an
important parameter that provides the capability of detecting
and correcting errors by the code. In the past, many researchers
have studied the minimum distance (dmin) of linear codes.
Some results on calculating distance were presented in [10],
[11].
In this paper, an efficient recursive method to calculate the
equivocation rate for the binary symmetric channel (BSC)
and any linear binary code is presented. We also present a
code design technique which is used to extend the binary
linear [n, k] code of highest minimum distance (dmin) to
a [n + 1, k + 1] code in order to produce best equivocation
codes (BEqC) with highest minimum distance. The main
objective of this paper is to present a design technique for
producing the best equivocation codes (BEqC) of highest
minimum distance for the syndrome coding scheme by using
a combination of the best equivocation code design technique
coupled with the technique of the determination of the highest
minimum distance (dmin). We also present examples for a
given number of parity bits of the code (m = 7, 11, 12).
The design results show that these new best equivocation
codes (BEqC) have better equivocation rate compared to all
previously published best error correcting codes, namely the
best known codes (BKC) listed by Grassl [7].
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II. CODE REPRESENTATION
Any binary linear (n, k, d) code is defined by its (k × n)
generator matrix G or by its (m × n) parity check matrix
H . The best equivocation codes are constructed by designing
the parity check matrix of the code. H can be defined by
representing each column of H by an integer, bi, in the range
0 to (2n−k − 1). The binary parity check matrix of a code of
length n is defined by n.k binary integers, the first m columns




1 0 . . . 0 am0 . . . a(n−1)0
0 1 . . . 0 am1 . . . a(n−1)1
...




0 0 . . . 1 am(m−1) . . . a(n−1)(m−1)

in which 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, m ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and ai,j takes a
value of 0 or 1. Each column can be represented as a packed
integer defined as bi =
m−1∑
j=0
aij × 2j . Then the systematic
format of H can be represented as following:
H = [1,2,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
where the first m integers represent the identity matrix and the
other integers have values between 3 and 2m − 1. Usually no
integers are repeated ensuring dmin ≥ 3 and higher values of
(dmin) are ensured by constraining no integer is a modulo 2
sum of any other (dmin− 2), or smaller, number of integers.
III. CALCULATION OF THE MINIMUM DISTANCE AND THE
EQUIVOCATION RATE ACHIEVED BY SYNDROME CODING
A. Finding minimum distance from parity check matrix
Theorem 1: If C is an (n, k, d) linear code with parity
check matrix H , then the minimum distance (dmin) of C
is equal to the smallest number of columns of H which are
linearly dependent. That is, all combinations of (dmin − 1)
columns are linearly independent, so there is some set of
(dmin) columns which are linearly dependent.
Proof: Let the columns of the parity check matrix H be
denoted by b0, b1, ..., bn−1. A vector c = [c0 c1 ... cn−1] is
a codeword iff c×HT = 0
[c0 c1 ... cn−1]×HT = c0b0+c1b1+...+cn−1bn−1 = 0 (1)
If c = [c0 c1 ... cn−1] is a codeword of smallest weight
dmin = w(C), then Equation (1) holds, and we deduce that
the dmin columns of H corresponding to the dmin nonzero
elements ci are linearly dependent.
There are three cases of dmin :
1) If H has a column of all zeros, then dmin = 1.
2) If H has two identical columns, then dmin ≤ 2.
3) For binary codes, if all columns are distinct and non-
zero, then dmin ≥ 3.
B. Evaluation of the equivocation rate achieved by syndrome
coding
The secrecy realised by syndrome coding is measured by the
eavesdropper decoder output equivocation, H(M(i)|Mˆ(i)):
H(M(i)|Mˆ(i)) = H(M(i), Mˆ(i))−H(Mˆ(i))
= H(M(i))−H(Mˆ(i)) +H(Mˆ(i)|M(i))
= H(M(i))−H(M(i) + Se(i))+
H(M(i) + Se(i)|M(i))





p(Se(i))× log2 p(Se(i)) (4)
where H(Se(i)) is the entropy of Se(i). The simplifications
in equations (2) and (3) are due to M(i) being uniformly
distributed and independent of Se(i). The equivocation is
calculated after deriving the probability mass function of the
syndromes due to errors from the BSC, p(Se(i)) and is a
function of the code being used through the parity check
matrix of the code.
IV. RECURSIVE EVALUATION OF THE SYNDROME
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
The code construction technique that produces codes with
good equivocation is based on the realisation that the syndrome
probability mass function (pmf) of a new extended code is a
function of the probability mass function of the original code
and good equivocation codes produce good extended codes.
Theorem 2: The probability mass function (pmf) of Sj for
j=0 to 2m-1 can be defined as p(Sj) = β(j) where β(j) are
coefficients of the probability generating function using the Z
transform, denoted as pz(S) and pz(S) only depends on the
columns of the parity check matrix H and the probability error







((1− pe) + pe × Zbi) (5)
where bi are the integers representations of the columns of
H and exponent sums of powers of Z are added modulo 2.
Proof: Any error pattern may be represented as a sum of
single bit error events: e(i) = [e1 e2 . . . en]
e(i) = [e1 0 . . . 0] + [0 e2 . . . 0] + · · ·+ [0 0 . . . en]
where ei=1 with probability pe and ei=0 with probability 1−
pe. The linearity of the syndrome coding scheme means that
the syndrome resulting from any error pattern is the linear sum
of the syndromes for each bit error position:
Se(i) = e(i)×HT = [e1 e2 . . . en]×HT (6)
Se(i) = b1δ(e1 − 1)⊕ b2δ(e2 − 1) · · · ⊕ bnδ(en − 1) (7)
Since the probabilities of e1, e2, . . . , en are independent, the
probability of Se(i) is the product of the probabilities of n
separate error events. By adding the coefficients of the same
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powers of Z results in the coefficients, βj , the number of terms
to be reduced from 2n to 2m.
If the columns of H of the shortened code of length r are
taken from i = 0 to r− 1 and the pmf generating function of




[(1− pe) + pe × Zbi ] (8)
pz(Sr) = [(1− pe) + pe ×Zb0 ]× [(1− pe) + pe ×Zb1 ] . . .
×[(1− pe) + pe × Zbr−1 ]
= (1−pe)2+pe(1−pe)×Zb1 +pe(1−pe)×Zb0+
pe
2 × Zb0⊕b1 + . . .
Now, we can extend the length of the original code from r to
r+1 by adding one column to its parity check matrix H , the





[(1−pe)+pe×Zbi ] = pz(Sr)[(1−pe)+pe×Zbr ]
(9)
Denoting the β(j) coefficients of the original code of length






and for extended code r + 1
















Adding together the coefficients of the same powers of Z in







From equation (12), it is clear that the syndrome pmf of the
new code of length r+1 is equal to the syndrome pmf of the
original code of length r weighted by 1− pe plus a permuted
syndrome pmf of the original code of length r, weighted by
pe. The permutation arises from the results of the modulo 2
additions j⊕br. This leads to the conclusion that the syndrome
pmf of the code can be obtained recursively, starting with the
generating function pz(S1), determining pz(S2) then pz(S3)
through to pz(Sn). The syndrome pmf of each (n,k,d) code
of length r is stored and the syndrome pmf for each extended
code of length r + 1 is determined using the equation (12)
which makes for a fast algorithm. It is also apparent that good
equivocation codes will also produce good equivocation codes
when extended in length.
V. CODE DESIGN TECHNIQUE
To produce a best equivocation codes the pmf of the
syndromes should be as uniform as possible. The following
code design algorithm shows how to extend an [n, k] code
into [n + 1, k + 1] by adding the best column to the original
parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code. We must taking into
consideration that the value of the minimum distance (dmin)
of the [n + 1, k + 1] code should be equal to the minimum
distance (dminH) of the [n + 1, k + 1] BKC code because
the best known [n, k] code (BKC) has the highest minimum
distance among all known [n, k] linear codes.
Algorithm 1 Code Design Technique
Require: pz(Sr) . syndrome pmf of (n, k)code
Require: H . systematic format of H of (n, k)code
Require: dminH . highest dmin of (n+ 1, k + 1) BKC
code
Require: b[i] . integer sequence(columns) of H
Require: (n, k,m, pe) . code parameters and error
probability of BSC
Require: Cin . initial inequivalent codes of the highest
equivocation rate
1: Generate (br) . generating between 3 and 2m − 1
Ensure: (br) 6= b[i] . ensure no repeated columns
Require: dmin . dmin of (n+ 1, k + 1) code
Ensure: dmin = dminH






4: pz(Sr+1)← pz1(Sr) + pz2(Sr) . apply equations (12)
and (13)
5: Eq ← −
2m−1∑
j=0
βr+1(j)× log2(βr+1(j)) . calculate the
equivocation of [n+ 1, k + 1] code
6: EqN ← Eq/m . calculate the Normalised equivocation
7: return (br), dmin,EqN,Cout . extended
inequivalent codes of highest dmin, which are ranked by
equivocation in descending order
The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follows:
1) Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code (n, k)
from equation(10).
2) Represent the parity check matrix H of the (n, k) code
in the systematic format:
H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3) Extend H with one integer (br) by generating randomly
all possible integers between 3 and 2m − 1 with the
constraint that there are no repeated integers included in
the original H . This ensures that the minimum Hamming
distance of each extended code is at least 3.
4) Calculate the highest minimum distance (dminH) of the
(n+ 1, k + 1) BKC code from Magma Software.
5) Calculate the minimum distance (dmin) of the extended
code (n+ 1, k + 1) and ensure that dmin = dminH .
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6) Eliminate all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivoca-
tion rate for each remaining code by using equation(4).
7) Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in
descending order, and select a best codes subset. These
codes are used as the initial input for the next extension
round.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we present the best equivocation codes
of the highest minimum distance, which are obtained by
the code design technique, in the form of the equivocation
rate for various values of n and for a given number of
parity bits of the code m = 7, 11, 12. In Table 1, we have
compare the equivocation rate of our results (scheme-3) with
the best known correcting codes BKC (scheme-1) listed by
Grassl [7] and the best equivocation codes (scheme-2) listed
by Zhang [5] for some representative codes. It shows that
significant improvements in equivocation rate were obtained
from our results(scheme-3) compared with Grassl (scheme-1)
and Zhang (scheme-2) results. As a result of the large number
of codes we only present here in Table 2 (for m = 7) and Table
4 (for m = 11) codes which provide at least 90% secrecy and
in Table 3 (for m = 12) codes which provide at least 96%
secrecy. The highest minimum Hamming distance (dmin) and
the equivocation rate (Eq.) for a BSC error probability of
pe = 0.05 is given for each code. The equivocation rates
of the corresponding best error correcting codes previously
published, the (BKC) codes listed by Grassl [7] with the same
n and m are also given in Tables (2,3,4) (in parentheses).
The results show that significant improvements have been
achieved on the equivocation rate for the best equivocation
codes compared with best known codes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that the best equivocation
codes with highest minimum distance can be determined by
using a combination of the code design technique based on
extension of the parity check matrix of a set of good equivo-
cation codes coupled with technique of determining the highest
minimum distance of these codes. The best equivocation codes
for the syndrome coding scheme for a given number of parity
bits of the code (m = 7, 11, 12) that achieve at least 90% and
96% secrecy to an eavesdropper using the BSC with an error
probability of 0.05 are presented in Tables (2,3,4). In addition,
it has been shown that syndrome coding can be implemented
without the traditional syndrome look up table by using a
recursive method for the evaluation of the probability mass
function of the syndromes of a code which depends only on the
columns of the parity check matrix and the probability of error
of the binary symmetric channel. The results obtained show
that the equivocation rate of the new best equivocation codes
is significantly better than all previously published codes,
including the best known codes (BKC).
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Table II: Best Equivocation Codes that achieve at least 90% secrecy in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05
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(0.888646)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 64 67 74 82 84 88 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 37 4 0.919097
(0.901769)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 38 4 0.925583
(0.912693)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 97 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 39 4 0.931601
(0.921923)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 40 4 0.937142
(0.929789)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 118 122 127
7 41 4 0.942230
(0.936808)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 118 122 127
7 42 4 0.946878
(0.942873)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 118 122 127
7 43 4 0.951182
(0.948166)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 64 67 70 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 110 115 118 122 127
7 44 4 0.955172
(0.952803)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 122 127
7 45 4 0.958863
(0.956930)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 62 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 122 127
7 46 4 0.962228
(0.960586)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 62 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 122 127
7 47 4 0.965345
(0.963848)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 62 64 67 70 76 79 84 87 91 93 94 98 103 107 109 110 115 117 121 122 124 127
7 48 4 0.968205
(0.966766)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 52 55 56 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 87 88 93 94 97 98 100 104 110 112 115 121 122 124
7 49 4 0.970856
(0.969876)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44 47 49 59 61 62 64 67 70 73 76 79 84 87 91 93 94 98 103 107 109 110 115 117 121 122 124 127
7 50 4 0.973272
(0.972635)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 59 62 64 67 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 51 4 0.975516
(0.975095)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 56 59 62 64 67 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 52 4 0.977571
(0.977298)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 52 59 62 64 67 73 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100 103 104 107 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 53 4 0.979454
(0.979291)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 52 59 62 64 67 73 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100 103 104 107 115 117 118 121 122 124 127
7 54 4 0.981189
(0.981087)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 50 52 56 59 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 55 4 0.982787
(0.982712)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 50 52 56 59 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 124
127
7 56 4 0.984253
(0.984185)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 62 64 67 69 73 74 76 81 82 84 87 88 91 93 97 98 100 103 104 110 112 115 117 122
124 127
7 57 4 0.985599
(0.985569)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 61 62 64 67 69 70 73 74 76 81 82 84 88 91 93 97 98 100 103 104 110 112 115 117
122 124 127
7 58 4 0.986835
(0.986824)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 81 82 84 87 88 91 93 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121
122 124 127
7 59 4 0.987972
(0.987968)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42 44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 61 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 81 82 84 87 88 91 93 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118
121 122 124 127
Table III: Best Equivocation Codes that achieve at least 96% secrecy in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05
m n dmin Eq. Packed integer parity check matrix
12 66 4 0.962563
(0.710374)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897
1926 1962 2054 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 67 4 0.964938
(0.720589)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 292 309 345 549 618 657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897
1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3804 3852 3877 3924
12 68 4 0.967183
(0.721090)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657 687 690 717 783 933 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897
1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924 4086
12 69 4 0.969306
(0.728861)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897
1926 1962 2001 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2585 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3746 3770 3794 3799 3852 3877 3924
12 70 4 0.971306
(0.729329)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1168 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885
1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3305 3306 3442 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 71 4 0.973186
(0.729730)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1168 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885
1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3305 3306 3442 3607 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 72 4 0.974954
(0.730124)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718
1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877
3924
12 73 4 0.976619
(0.736062)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852
3877 3924
12 74 4 0.978181
(0.740797)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653
1718 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794
3852 3877 3924
12 75 4 0.979648
(0.744526)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 818 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1718 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770
3794 3852 3877 3924
12 76 4 0.981018
(0.747576)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 818 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727
3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 77 4 0.982305
(0.749986)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 818 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721
3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 78 4 0.983510
(0.751983)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721
3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 79 4 0.984637
(0.753583)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721
3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 80 4 0.985695
(0.754920)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674
3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 81 4 0.986682
(0.756032)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1653 1654 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540
3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 82 4 0.987605
(0.756923)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1653 1654 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2803 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442
3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 83 4 0.988468
(0.757672)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1543 1566 1653 1654 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306
3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
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Table IV: Best Equivocation Codes that achieve at least 90% secrecy in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05
m n dmin Eq. Packed integer parity check matrix
11 48 4 0.903225
(0.710484)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1434 1475
1480 1590 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 49 4 0.909219
(0.713286)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475 1480
1590 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 50 4 0.914902
(0.715762)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1054 1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475
1480 1590 1710 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2045
11 51 4 0.920284
(0.717951)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403
1475 1480 1590 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 52 4 0.925399
(0.719886)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1128 1295 1315 1353 1361 1382 1403
1469 1475 1480 1590 1645 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2047
11 53 4 0.930200
(0.721705)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1295 1312 1315 1361 1382 1403 1434
1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 54 4 0.934726
(0.723311)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458
1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952
11 55 4 0.938998
(0.724755)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458
1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 56 4 0.943023
(0.726067)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403
1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 57 4 0.946818
(0.727336)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382
1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 58 4 0.950376
(0.728485)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361
1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 59 4 0.953600
(0.729528)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361
1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1635 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 60 4 0.956635
(0.730463)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 277 364 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306
1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 61 4 0.959491
(0.731332)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 277 364 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295
1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 62 4 0.962176
(0.732129)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 765 778 836 873 886 948 962 969 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1301
1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1808 1817 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 63 4 0.964696
(0.732861)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 251 256 381 389 418 443 444 474 481 494 512 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171
1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 64 4 0.967081
(0.733520)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 269 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171
1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1635 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 65 4 0.969326
(0.734121)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389 418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111
1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 66 4 0.971429
(0.749506)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 269 381 389 418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111
1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1635 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 67 4 0.973399
(0.760622)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 778 836 873 886 888 938 948 962 969 975 988 1024 1073 1111
1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 68 4 0.975245
(0.761144)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 111 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389 418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029
1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 69 4 0.976930
(0.769587)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 111 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389 418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029
1073 1111 1141 1171 1221 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 70 4 0.978503
(0.770032)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 778 836 873 886 888 899 938 948 962 969 975 988 1024 1073
1111 1136 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1661 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 71 4 0.979978
(0.770448)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 111 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389 418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029
1073 1111 1141 1171 1221 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1389 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1682 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 72 4 0.981360
(0.776960)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024
1067 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1542 1590 1663 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 73 4 0.982653
(0.782101)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 591 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016
1024 1067 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1542 1590 1663 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 74 4 0.983861
(0.786203)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 591 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016
1024 1067 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1542 1590 1626 1663 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 75 4 0.984993
(0.789478)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024
1061 1067 1073 1111 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 76 4 0.986053
(0.792140)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024
1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990
2038
11 77 4 0.987039
(0.794298)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 786 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016
1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952
1990 2038
11 78 4 0.987964
(0.796060)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016
1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1269 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934
1952 1990 2038
11 79 4 0.988826
(0.797503)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988
1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1269 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898
1934 1952 1990 2038
11 80 4 0.989632
(0.798687)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 654 669 708 762 765 775 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1304 1312 1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874
1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 81 4 0.990381
(0.799679)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 708 762 765 775 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969
975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1304 1312 1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837
1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 82 4 0.991082
(0.800500)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861 873 886 899 948
962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1803 1808
1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 83 4 0.991733
(0.801182)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861 873 886 899 948
962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1803
1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 84 4 0.992339
(0.801750)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708 762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886
899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1803
1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 85 4 0.992904
(0.802230)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708 762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886
899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798
1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 86 4 0.993428
(0.802631)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708 762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886
899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1034 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733
1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 87 4 0.993915
(0.802969)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708 762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886
899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1357 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733
1766 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 88 4 0.994369
(0.803261)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 212 216 237 247 256 296 302 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861
873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590
1689 1733 1787 1798 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 89 4 0.994791
(0.803510)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 212 216 237 247 249 256 296 302 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861
873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1304 1312 1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480
1590 1689 1733 1787 1798 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
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Best Known Equivocation Codes of the
Highest Minimum Distance
Table B.1: BEqC and BKC(in parentheses) Table
m n d Eqv.rate Packed integer parity check matrix
7 8 8 0.327237
(0.327237)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 127
7 9 6 0.367001
(0.367000)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 115 124
7 10 5 0.405261
(0.404808)
1 2 4 8 16 32 63 64 115 124
7 11 5 0.443011
(0.443011)
1 2 4 8 16 32 63 64 85 115 124
7 12 4 0.478897
(0.461720)
1 2 4 8 16 26 32 63 64 85 115 124
7 13 4 0.512617
(0.491069)
1 2 4 8 16 32 63 64 79 85 86 115 124
7 14 4 0.545891
(0.518182)
1 2 4 8 16 32 63 64 79 83 90 107 118 125
7 15 4 0.575360
(0.543464)
1 2 4 7 8 16 32 63 64 79 83 90 107 118 125
7 16 4 0.604499
(0.566880)
1 2 4 8 16 21 26 32 41 63 64 79 83 99 100 125
7 17 4 0.631806
(0.588469)
1 2 4 7 8 16 32 42 51 63 64 79 83 90 107 118 125
7 18 4 0.658043
(0.618943)
1 2 4 7 8 16 30 32 42 51 63 64 79 83 90 107 118 125
7 19 4 0.682022
(0.644628)
1 2 4 8 16 27 28 32 41 46 63 64 74 87 89 109 115 122 124
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m n d Eqv.rate Packed integer parity check matrix
7 20 4 0.704918
(0.662960)
1 2 4 8 16 27 28 32 41 46 63 64 74 79 87 89 109 115 122 124
7 21 4 0.725116
(0.684509)
1 2 4 8 14 16 21 32 35 41 58 63 64 74 79 83 88 100 107 118
125
7 22 4 0.745065
(0.703436)
1 2 4 7 8 11 16 26 32 41 53 63 64 74 83 93 94 101 111 112 121
124
7 23 4 0.763451
(0.720320)
1 2 4 7 8 11 16 26 32 41 53 63 64 74 83 93 94 101 111 112 118
121 124
7 24 4 0.781028
(0.735442)
1 2 4 8 11 14 16 26 29 32 47 51 57 62 64 74 83 85 92 103 104
112 118 127
7 25 4 0.797310
(0.749785)
1 2 4 7 8 16 30 32 46 51 53 58 63 64 70 75 83 93 97 100 106
111 112 118 123
7 26 4 0.812459
(0.762700)
1 2 4 8 11 14 16 26 29 32 47 51 57 62 64 74 77 83 85 92 100
103 104 112 118 127
7 27 4 0.826914
(0.774429)
1 2 4 8 11 14 16 26 29 32 47 51 57 62 64 74 77 83 85 92 97
100 103 104 112 118 127
7 28 4 0.840506
(0.785083)
1 2 4 8 11 14 16 26 29 32 38 47 51 57 62 64 74 77 83 85 92 97
100 103 104 112 118 127
7 29 4 0.851506
(0.794959)
1 2 4 8 11 14 16 26 29 32 38 47 51 57 62 64 74 77 83 85 92 97
100 103 104 110 112 118 127
7 30 4 0.854176
(0.803969)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 73 79 119 123 125
7 31 4 0.867182
(0.812237)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 69 73 79 119 123 125
7 32 4 0.879097
(0.819818)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 69 73 79 114 119 123 125
7 33 4 0.886455
(0.826760)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 74 82 88 98 100 103 115 127
7 34 4 0.895741
(0.852821)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 74 82 84 88 98 100 115 122 127
7 35 4 0.904253
(0.872739)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 74 82 84 88 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 36 4 0.912049
(0.888646)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 67 74 82 84 88 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 37 4 0.919097
(0.901769)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 38 4 0.925583
(0.912693)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 97 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 39 4 0.931601
(0.921923)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 122 127
7 40 4 0.937142
(0.929789)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 118 122 127
7 41 4 0.942230
(0.936808)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 64 67 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 118 122
127
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7 42 4 0.946878
(0.942873)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 115 118
122 127
7 43 4 0.951182
(0.948166)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 64 67 70 74 76 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 110 115
118 122 127
7 44 4 0.955172
(0.952803)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 104 115
117 118 122 127
7 45 4 0.958863
(0.956930)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 62 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 88 91 97 98 100 103 104 115
117 118 122 127
7 46 4 0.962228
(0.960586)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 62 64 67 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 97 98 100 103 104
115 117 118 122 127
7 47 4 0.965345
(0.963848)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 62 64 67 70 76 79 84 87 91 93 94 98 103 107 109 110
115 117 121 122 124 127
7 48 4 0.968205
(0.966766)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 52 55 56 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 87 88 93 94 97 98 100 104
110 112 115 121 122 124
7 49 4 0.970856
(0.969876)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 42 44
47 49 59 61 62 64 67 70 73 76 79 84 87 91 93 94 98 103 107
109 110 115 117 121 122 124 127
7 50 4 0.973272
(0.972635)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 59 62 64 67 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98 100
103 104 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 51 4 0.975516
(0.975095)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 56 59 62 64 67 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98
100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 52 4 0.977571
(0.977298)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 52 59 62 64 67 73 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98
100 103 104 107 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 53 4 0.979454
(0.979291)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 52 59 62 64 67 73 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91 94 97 98
100 103 104 107 115 117 118 121 122 124 127
7 54 4 0.981189
(0.981087)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 50 52 56 59 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91
94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 127
7 55 4 0.982787
(0.982712)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 50 52 56 59 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 82 84 87 88 91
94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 124 127
7 56 4 0.984253
(0.984185)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 62 64 67 69 73 74 76 81 82 84 87 88
91 93 97 98 100 103 104 110 112 115 117 122 124 127
(Continues on next page)
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7 57 4 0.985599
(0.985569)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 61 62 64 67 69 70 73 74 76 81 82 84
88 91 93 97 98 100 103 104 110 112 115 117 122 124 127
7 58 4 0.986835
(0.986824)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 81 82 84 87
88 91 93 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 124 127
7 59 4 0.987972
(0.987968)
1 2 4 7 8 11 13 14 16 19 21 22 25 26 28 31 32 35 37 38 41 42
44 47 49 50 52 55 56 59 61 62 64 67 69 70 74 76 79 81 82 84
87 88 91 93 94 97 98 100 103 104 115 117 118 121 122 124 127
11 12 12 0.312421
(0.312421)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2047
11 13 8 0.338382
(0.338381)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 415 512 1024 1786
11 14 8 0.364203
(0.364202)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 415 512 875 1024 1710
11 15 8 0.389947
(0.389947)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 415 512 875 1024 1143 1710
11 16 8 0.415516
(0.415515)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 415 512 875 1024 1143 1710 2002
11 17 7 0.440378
(0.440234)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 237 256 415 512 875 1024 1143 1710 2002
11 18 7 0.465075
(0.465038)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 237 256 415 512 606 875 1024 1143 1710
2002
11 19 7 0.489476
(0.489476)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 415 512 875 972 1024 1325 1629
1710 2039
11 20 7 0.513477
(0.513476)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 415 512 875 1024 1227 1325 1528
1629 1710 2039
11 21 7 0.537014
(0.537014)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 415 512 697 875 1024 1227 1325
1528 1629 1710 2039
11 22 7 0.560019
(0.560019)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 415 512 697 875 972 1024 1227
1325 1528 1629 1710 2039
11 23 7 0.582470
(0.582470)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 415 512 697 875 972 1024 1227
1325 1528 1629 1710 1818 2039
11 24 6 0.596254
(0.592625)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 110 128 179 256 445 491 512 527 731 749 793
803 890 908 982 1024 2033
11 25 6 0.618532
(0.617354)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 506 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1441 1645 1881
11 26 6 0.638561
(0.637822)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 506 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1441 1645 1729 1881
11 27 6 0.657674
(0.657212)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 506 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1130 1441 1595 1645 1881
11 28 6 0.676027
(0.675605)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 506 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1130 1441 1595 1645 1832 1881
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11 29 6 0.693663
(0.693319)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 506 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1130 1441 1595 1645 1718 1832 1881
11 30 6 0.710469
(0.710225)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 506 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1081 1390 1441 1645 1797 1832 1881 1979
11 31 6 0.726603
(0.726505)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 506 512 638 671 682 847
935 979 1001 1012 1024 1123 1144 1243 1485 1718 1797 1881
1888
11 32 6 0.742144
(0.742073)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1123 1144 1243 1322 1468 1485 1718 1881
1888 2030
11 33 6 0.757049
(0.757028)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 512 638 671 682 847 935
979 1001 1012 1024 1123 1144 1243 1322 1468 1485 1718 1797
1881 1888 2030
11 34 6 0.771280
(0.771280)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 506 512 638 671 682 847
935 979 1001 1012 1024 1123 1144 1243 1322 1468 1485 1718
1797 1881 1888 2030
11 35 5 0.783901
(0.775716)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 506 512 638 671 682 847
935 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1123 1144 1243 1322 1468 1485
1718 1797 1881 1888 2030
11 36 5 0.796047
(0.790051)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 506 512 638 671 682 847
935 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1123 1144 1243 1322 1468 1485
1512 1718 1797 1881 1888 2030
11 37 5 0.807675
(0.803255)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 420 456 506 512 638 671
682 847 935 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1123 1144 1243 1322
1468 1485 1718 1797 1881 1888 2030
11 38 5 0.818806
(0.815439)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 420 506 512 638 671 682
711 847 935 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1106 1123 1144 1243
1322 1468 1485 1718 1797 1881 1888 2030
11 39 5 0.829343
(0.826902)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 402 420 506 512 638
671 682 822 847 935 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1123 1144 1243
1322 1468 1485 1718 1797 1853 1881 1888 2030
11 40 5 0.839390
(0.837627)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 420 506 512 638 671
682 822 847 935 945 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1123 1144 1243
1322 1468 1485 1601 1718 1797 1853 1881 1888 2030
11 41 5 0.848951
(0.847670)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 253 256 319 341 420 506 512 549 638 671
682 822 847 935 945 979 1001 1012 1024 1100 1123 1144 1243
1322 1468 1485 1601 1718 1797 1853 1881 1888 2030
11 42 5 0.857378
(0.857105)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494
512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1111
1361 1382 1403 1480 1590 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 43 5 0.866258
(0.866055)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 418 443 474 481 494
512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073
1111 1295 1361 1382 1403 1475 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
(Continues on next page)
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11 44 5 0.874565
(0.874446)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494
512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073
1111 1315 1361 1382 1403 1480 1590 1837 1874 1898 1934
1952
11 45 5 0.882433
(0.882366)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494
512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073
1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1480 1590 1837 1874 1898
1934 1952
11 46 5 0.889855
(0.889847)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481 494
512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1073
1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475 1480 1590 1837 1874
1898 1934 1952
11 47 5 0.896909
(0.896905)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475 1480 1590 1837
1874 1898 1934 1952
11 48 4 0.903225
(0.710484)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1434 1475 1480 1590
1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 49 4 0.909219
(0.713286)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475 1480 1590 1733
1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 50 4 0.914902
(0.715762)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1054 1073 1111 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475 1480 1590
1710 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2045
11 51 4 0.920284
(0.717951)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1315 1361 1382 1403 1475 1480
1590 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
11 52 4 0.925399
(0.719886)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1128 1295 1315 1353 1361 1382 1403 1469 1475
1480 1590 1645 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2047
11 53 4 0.930200
(0.721705)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1295 1312 1315 1361 1382 1403 1434 1475 1480
1590 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 54 4 0.934726
(0.723311)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480
1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952
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11 55 4 0.938998
(0.724755)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561
1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 56 4 0.943023
(0.726067)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475
1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951
1952 2045
11 57 4 0.946818
(0.727336)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458
1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934
1951 1952 2045
11 58 4 0.950376
(0.728485)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403
1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898
1934 1951 1952 2045
11 59 4 0.953600
(0.729528)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 381 389 418 443 474 481
494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975 988 1024
1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403
1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1635 1699 1796 1837 1874
1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 60 4 0.956635
(0.730463)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 277 364 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 948 962 975
988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382
1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874
1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 61 4 0.959491
(0.731332)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 277 364 381 389 418 443
474 481 494 512 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 899 948 962 975
988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382
1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874
1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 62 4 0.962176
(0.732129)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443 474
481 494 512 595 669 762 765 778 836 873 886 948 962 969 975
988 1024 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361
1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1808 1817
1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 63 4 0.964696
(0.732861)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 237 247 251 256 381 389 418 443 444
474 481 494 512 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862 873 886 948
962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315
1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1699 1796
1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
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11 64 4 0.967081
(0.733520)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 269 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 762 778 836 873 886 899 948
962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295 1306 1315
1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590 1635 1699
1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 65 4 0.969326
(0.734121)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389 418
443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836 862
873 886 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295
1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590
1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 66 4 0.971429
(0.749506)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 269 381 389
418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 762 778 836 873
886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141 1171 1295
1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561 1578 1590
1635 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 67 4 0.973399
(0.760622)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443
474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 778 836 873 886
888 938 948 962 969 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1150 1213 1295
1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480
1590 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 68 4 0.975245
(0.761144)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 111 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389
418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836
862 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141
1171 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561
1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 69 4 0.976930
(0.769587)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 111 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389
418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836
862 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141
1171 1221 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1403 1458 1475 1480 1561
1578 1590 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934 1951 1952 2045
11 70 4 0.978503
(0.770032)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443
474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 778 836 873 886
888 899 938 948 962 969 975 988 1024 1073 1111 1136 1150
1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449
1475 1480 1590 1661 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934
1952 2038
11 71 4 0.979978
(0.770448)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 74 111 128 209 222 237 247 251 256 381 389
418 443 444 474 481 494 512 538 595 669 683 762 778 818 836
862 873 886 899 948 962 975 988 1024 1029 1073 1111 1141
1171 1221 1295 1306 1315 1361 1382 1389 1403 1458 1475
1480 1561 1578 1590 1682 1699 1796 1837 1874 1898 1934
1951 1952 2045
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11 72 4 0.981360
(0.776960)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443
474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861
873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1067 1073 1111
1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434
1449 1475 1480 1542 1590 1663 1689 1733 1808 1837 1874
1898 1934 1952 2038
11 73 4 0.982653
(0.782101)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 575 591 595 654 669 708 762 765 778
836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1067 1073
1111 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403
1434 1449 1475 1480 1542 1590 1663 1689 1733 1808 1837
1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 74 4 0.983861
(0.786203)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 575 591 595 654 669 708 762 765 778
836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1067 1073
1111 1150 1213 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403
1434 1449 1475 1480 1542 1590 1626 1663 1689 1733 1808
1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 2038
11 75 4 0.984993
(0.789478)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443
474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861
873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073
1111 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382
1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808 1837
1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 76 4 0.986053
(0.792140)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418 443
474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 836 861
873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073
1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361
1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1808
1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 77 4 0.987039
(0.794298)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 575 595 654 669 708 762 765 778 786
836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067
1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334
1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798
1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 78 4 0.987964
(0.796060)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 654 669 708 762 765 778
836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061 1067
1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1269 1295 1301 1312 1315
1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733
1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
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11 79 4 0.988826
(0.797503)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 654 669 708 762 765
778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061
1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1269 1295 1301 1312
1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689
1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1883 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 80 4 0.989632
(0.798687)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 654 669 708 762 765 775
778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024 1061
1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1304 1312
1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590
1689 1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 81 4 0.990381
(0.799679)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 381 389 418
443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 708 762 765
775 778 836 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975 988 1016 1024
1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295 1301 1304 1312
1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689
1733 1798 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 82 4 0.991082
(0.800500)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389
418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669
708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295
1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480
1590 1689 1733 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
1990 2038
11 83 4 0.991733
(0.801182)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389
418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669
708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223
1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475
1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934
1952 1990 2038
11 84 4 0.992339
(0.801750)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418
439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708
762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223 1295
1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475 1480
1590 1689 1733 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934 1952
1990 2038
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11 85 4 0.992904
(0.802230)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418
439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708
762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223
1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449 1475
1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898 1934
1952 1990 2038
11 86 4 0.993428
(0.802631)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418
439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708
762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1031 1034 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213
1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449
1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874 1898
1934 1952 1990 2038
11 87 4 0.993915
(0.802969)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 111 128 209 237 247 256 296 355 381 389 418
439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654 669 694 708
762 765 775 778 786 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962 969 975
988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150 1213 1223
1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1357 1361 1382 1403 1434 1449
1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1766 1798 1803 1808 1837 1874
1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 88 4 0.994369
(0.803261)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 212 216 237 247 256 296 302
381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596 654
669 694 708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962
969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150
1213 1223 1295 1301 1312 1315 1334 1353 1361 1382 1403
1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1787 1798 1808 1837
1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
11 89 4 0.994791
(0.803510)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 101 111 128 209 212 216 237 247 249 256 296
302 381 389 418 439 443 474 481 494 512 538 575 578 595 596
654 669 708 762 765 775 778 836 846 861 873 886 899 948 962
969 975 988 1016 1024 1031 1061 1067 1073 1111 1116 1150
1213 1223 1295 1301 1304 1312 1315 1334 1353 1361 1382
1403 1434 1449 1475 1480 1590 1689 1733 1787 1798 1808
1837 1874 1898 1934 1952 1990 2038
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12 13 13 0.310250
(0.310250)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4095
12 14 9 0.334077
(0.334074)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 1533 2907
12 15 8 0.357807
(0.357728)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 951 1757 2159
12 16 8 0.381489
(0.381317)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 1723 1996 2492 2907
12 17 8 0.405042
(0.404863)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 415 743 1513 2414
3891
12 18 8 0.428189
(0.429189)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 446 847 3032 3434
3839 3974
12 19 8 0.451301
(0.451295)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 415 878 1259 1629
1976 3731 3812
12 20 8 0.474157
(0.474152)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 415 878 1259 1629
1976 3399 3731 3812
12 21 8 0.496720
(0.496717)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 127 1778 1815 2715
2929 3285 3418 3644 4079
12 22 8 0.518970
(0.518970)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 127 1778 1815 2486
2715 2929 3285 3418 3644 4079
12 23 8 0.540878
(0.540878)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 127 988 1778 1815
2486 2715 2929 3285 3418 3644 4079
12 24 8 0.562346
(0.562346)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 127 988 1465 1778
1815 2486 2715 2929 3285 3418 3644 4079
12 25 6 0.574914
(0.571447)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 671 682
847 935 979 1001 1012 2168 2905 3900
12 26 6 0.595741
(0.590549)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 341 506 671
682 935 979 1001 1012 1662 2168 2905 3484
12 27 6 0.615682
(0.608983)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 341 506 671
682 847 979 1001 1012 1959 2168 2905 3486 3910
12 28 6 0.634616
(0.626344)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 341 506 671
847 935 979 1001 1012 1421 2168 2905 3486 3892 4064
12 29 6 0.652638
(0.643046)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 671 682
847 935 979 1001 1012 1624 1646 2168 2905 3597 3769 3900
12 30 6 0.669963
(0.659305)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 671 682
847 935 979 1001 1012 1624 1646 2168 2507 2905 3597 3769
3900
12 31 6 0.686494
(0.674852)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 341 506 671
847 935 979 1001 1012 1662 1706 2168 2315 2905 3183 3486
3766 3858
12 32 6 0.701519
(0.689781)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 638 671
682 847 935 979 1001 1012 1468 1797 2105 2543 2708 2849
2874 3596 3929
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12 33 6 0.717395
(0.704112)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 638 671
682 847 935 979 1001 1012 1365 2105 2543 2708 2849 2874
3164 3255 3813 3929
12 34 6 0.732451
(0.717837)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 638 671
682 847 935 979 1001 1012 1322 1468 1797 2030 2105 2543
2708 2849 2874 3596 3929
12 35 6 0.746769
(0.743336)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 253 319 506 638 671
682 847 935 979 1001 1012 1365 2105 2543 2708 2849 2874
3164 3255 3699 3813 3929 3970
12 36 6 0.759141
(0.758019)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1739 1924
1976 2385 2760 2893 2922 2976
12 37 6 0.772606
(0.771753)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1739 1772
1924 1976 2159 2385 2922 2976 3053 3268
12 38 6 0.785354
(0.784715)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1772 1924
1976 2385 2799 2893 2922 2976 3338 3719
12 39 6 0.797463
(0.796947)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1524 1715 1739 1772 1924
1976 2385 2437 2922 2976 3265 3338 3695 3957
12 40 6 0.808919
(0.808546)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1739 1772
1924 1976 2159 2385 2648 2754 2922 2976 3053 3190 3268
12 41 6 0.819852
(0.819566)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1524 1715 1739 1772 1924
1976 2385 2759 2922 2976 3193 3265 3498 3695 3934 3957
12 42 6 0.830230
(0.830044)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1739 1772
1924 1976 2159 2385 2504 2648 2754 2922 2976 3053 3190
3268 3602
12 43 6 0.840081
(0.839988)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1739 1772 1924
1976 2339 2385 2861 2922 2958 2976 3131 3481 3599 3602 3754
3902
12 44 6 0.849494
(0.849432)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1739 1772 1924
1976 2339 2385 2861 2922 2958 2976 3131 3481 3599 3602 3686
3754 3902
12 45 6 0.858427
(0.858420)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1524 1715 1739 1772 1897
1924 1976 2385 2504 2861 2922 2958 2976 3131 3599 3602 3686
3754 3902 3928
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12 46 6 0.866940
(0.866940)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1739 1772
1924 1976 2339 2385 2504 2861 2922 2958 2976 3131 3423 3599
3602 3754 3902 3928
12 47 6 0.875017
(0.875016)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1524 1715 1739 1772 1897
1924 1976 2339 2385 2504 2861 2922 2958 2976 3131 3423 3599
3602 3686 3754 3902 3928
12 48 6 0.882680
(0.882680)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 247 381 443 481 494
595 762 886 962 988 1069 1123 1190 1245 1524 1715 1739 1772
1897 1924 1976 2339 2385 2504 2861 2922 2958 2976 3131 3423
3599 3602 3686 3754 3902 3928
12 49 5 0.886172
(0.885947)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 690
717 783 981 1037 1207 1236 1314 1375 1380 1395 1409 1434
1566 1897 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2760
2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3770 3794 3877 3924
12 50 5 0.893084
(0.892827)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 690
717 783 981 1037 1207 1236 1314 1375 1380 1395 1409 1434
1566 1897 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2760
2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3721 3770 3794 3877 3924
12 51 5 0.899623
(0.899395)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 690
717 783 981 1037 1207 1236 1314 1375 1380 1395 1409 1434
1566 1897 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2760
2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 52 5 0.905840
(0.905576)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 690 749
783 963 981 1037 1207 1236 1314 1380 1395 1434 1495 1566
1653 1885 1897 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3770 3794 3877 3924
12 53 5 0.911634
(0.911416)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 690
749 783 963 981 1037 1207 1236 1314 1380 1395 1434 1495
1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549
2601 2628 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3770 3794
3877 3924
12 54 5 0.917092
(0.916930)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 690
717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409
1434 1566 1885 1897 1962 2074 2196 2327 2414 2472 2549
2601 2628 2639 2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3721 3770 3794
3852 3877 3924
12 55 5 0.922271
(0.922141)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 687
690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1380 1395 1409
1434 1566 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549
2601 2628 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770
3794 3852 3877 3924
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12 56 5 0.927142
(0.927042)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1395 1409 1434
1566 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2327 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628
2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3852
3877 3924
12 57 5 0.931739
(0.931666)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 687
690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1380 1395 1409
1434 1566 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2327 2373 2414 2472
2549 2601 2628 2639 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306
3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 58 5 0.936072
(0.936021)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395
1409 1434 1495 1566 1885 1897 1962 2074 2196 2327 2414 2472
2549 2601 2628 2639 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 3132 3306 3721
3794 3852 3877 3924
12 59 5 0.940148
(0.940113)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 687
690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395
1409 1434 1566 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2327 2373 2414
2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990
3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 60 5 0.943986
(0.943958)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 618 657 687
690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395
1409 1434 1566 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373
2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2790 2809 2818 2868
2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 61 5 0.947601
(0.947387)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395
1409 1434 1495 1566 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373
2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990
3132 3306 3721 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 62 5 0.951003
(0.950994)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395
1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327
2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868
2990 3132 3306 3721 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 63 5 0.954207
(0.954203)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380
1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074
2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2760 2790
2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 64 5 0.957222
(0.957222)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380
1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196
2327 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818
2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
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12 65 5 0.960062
(0.960062)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380
1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196
2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748 2760 2790 2809
2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 66 4 0.962563
(0.710374)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380
1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2054
2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748
2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794
3852 3877 3924
12 67 4 0.964938
(0.720589)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 292 309 345 549 618
657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374
1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962
2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748
2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3770 3794
3804 3852 3877 3924
12 68 4 0.967183
(0.721090)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 933 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374
1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962
2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2748
2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3721 3770
3794 3852 3877 3924 4086
12 69 4 0.969306
(0.728861)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 309 345 549 618 657
687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380
1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926 1962 2001
2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2585 2601 2628 2639
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3721 3746
3770 3794 3799 3852 3877 3924
12 70 4 0.971306
(0.729329)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1168 1207 1236 1314
1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926
1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3305 3306 3442
3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 71 4 0.973186
(0.729730)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1168 1207 1236 1314
1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897 1926
1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628 2639
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3305 3306 3442
3607 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
(Continues on next page)
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12 72 4 0.974954
(0.730124)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314
1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718 1885 1897
1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628
2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442
3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 73 4 0.976619
(0.736062)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236
1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1885 1897
1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628
2639 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442
3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 74 4 0.978181
(0.740797)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618 657
671 687 690 717 783 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236 1314
1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718 1885 1897
1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601 2628
2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306
3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 75 4 0.979648
(0.744526)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 818 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236
1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718 1885
1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549 2601
2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132
3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 76 4 0.981018
(0.747576)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 818 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236
1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718 1873
1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549
2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990
3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877
3924
12 77 4 0.982305
(0.749986)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 818 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207 1236
1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718 1873
1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2549
2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868
2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852
3877 3924
12 78 4 0.983510
(0.751983)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207
1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718
1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472
2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818
2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794
3852 3877 3924
(Continues on next page)
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12 79 4 0.984637
(0.753583)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 549 618
657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098 1207
1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653 1718
1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414 2472
2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818
2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794
3852 3877 3882 3924
12 80 4 0.985695
(0.754920)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549
618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098
1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653
1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373 2414
2472 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748 2760 2790 2809
2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770
3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 81 4 0.986682
(0.756032)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549
618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098
1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653
1654 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373
2414 2472 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790
2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721 3727
3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 82 4 0.987605
(0.756923)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549
618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098
1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566 1653
1654 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373
2414 2472 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2748 2760 2790
2803 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674 3721
3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 83 4 0.988468
(0.757672)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549
618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037 1098
1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1543 1566
1653 1654 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327
2373 2414 2472 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748
2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3442 3540 3674
3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
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12 84 4 0.989272
(0.758296)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 549
618 657 671 687 690 717 772 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037
1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495 1566
1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1962 2074 2196 2327 2373
2414 2472 2487 2549 2582 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722 2748
2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3417 3442 3540
3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3882 3924
12 85 4 0.990025
(0.758807)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 411
549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037
1064 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1932 1962 2074 2196
2327 2373 2414 2472 2487 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3306 3417 3442
3463 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 86 4 0.990727
(0.759250)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 411
549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037
1064 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1932 1962 2074 2196
2327 2373 2414 2472 2487 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3205 3306 3417
3442 3463 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 87 4 0.991389
(0.759621)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 411 449
549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037
1064 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1932 1962 2074 2196
2327 2373 2414 2472 2487 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659 2722
2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3144 3306 3417
3442 3463 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877 3924
12 88 4 0.992002
(0.759921)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 309 345 399 411 449
549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037
1064 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1599 1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1932 1962 2074
2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2487 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659
2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3144 3306
3417 3442 3463 3540 3674 3721 3727 3770 3794 3852 3877
3924
12 89 4 0.992574
(0.760178)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 73 119 309 345 399 411
549 618 657 671 687 690 717 783 875 882 953 963 981 1037
1064 1098 1207 1236 1314 1374 1380 1395 1409 1434 1495
1566 1599 1653 1718 1873 1885 1897 1926 1932 1962 2074
2196 2327 2373 2414 2472 2487 2549 2601 2628 2639 2659
2722 2748 2760 2790 2809 2818 2868 2990 3132 3144 3306




[1] A. D. Wyner, “The Wire-Tap Channel,” The Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54,
pp. 1355–1367, May 1975.
[2] M. Grassl, “Bounds on the minimum distance of linear codes and quantum codes,”
2007,online, Available:http://www.codetables.de.
[3] NTL. A tour of NTL @ONLINE. [Online]. Available: http://www.shoup.net/ntl/
[4] C. F. J. Cannon, W. Bosma and A. Steel, HANDBOOK OF MAGMA FUNCTIONS.
Sydney: Sydney University, 2011.
[5] G. A. Jones and J. M. Jones, Information and Coding Theory. UK: Springer-Verlag,
2002.
[6] R. W. Hamming, Coding and Information Theory. USA: Prentice-Hall, 1997.
[7] C. Arndt, Information Measures : information and its decription in science and
engineering. Berlin New York: Springer, 2001.
[8] T. M. Korn, Mathematical Handbook for Scientists and Engineers. New York:
Dover Publications.
[9] C. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell System Technical
Journal, The, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 379–423, July 1948.
[10] S. Haykin, Communication systems. John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2001.
[11] R. M. Roth, Introduction to Coding Theory. USA: Cambridge University Press,
2006.
183
[12] C. L. K. P. D.G. Hoffman, D.A. Leonard and J. Wall, Coding Theory. USA: Press
MARCEL DEKKER, INC., 1991.
[13] J. Bierbrauer, Introduction to Coding Theory. USA: Chapman and Hall/CRC,
2005.
[14] H. F. A. K. A. Betten, M. Braun and A. Kohnert, Error-Correcting Linear Codes.
Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[15] S. Roman, Introduction to Coding and Information Theory. USA: Springer, 1997.
[16] F. J. MacWilliams and N. J. A. Sloane, The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes.
Amsterdam: The Netherlands: North-Holland, 1977.
[17] T. K. Moon, Error correction coding. USA: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2005.
[18] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy Capacity of Wireless channels,” in
Information Theory, 2006 IEEE International Symposium on, July, pp. 356–360.
[19] S. Lin and D. Costello, Error Control Coding(second edition). Pearson Education,
2004.
[20] H.-C. Chang, H.-P. Lee, T. Lin, and T. K. Truong, “A weight method of decoding
the (23, 12, 7) Golay code using reduced table lookup,” in Communications, Circuits
and Systems, 2008. ICCCAS 2008. International Conference on, May, pp. 1–5.
[21] L. H.-P. Chu, S.-I. and H.-C. Chang, “Fast decoding of the (23, 12, 7) Golay code
with four-error-correcting capability,” Eur. Trans. Telecomm., vol. 22, p. 388–395,
july 2011.
[22] R. J. McEliece, The Theory of Information and Coding. UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
[23] C.-L. Chr, S.-L. Su, and S.-W. Wu, “Decoding the (23, 12, 7) binary Golay code,”
in Communications, 2005 Asia-Pacific Conference on, Oct., pp. 478–480.
184
[24] M. Elia, “Algebraic decoding of the (23,12,7) Golay code (corresp.),” Information
Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 150–151, 1987.
[25] E. R. Berlekamp, Algebric Coding Theory. New York: McGraw Hill, 1968.
[26] W. W. Peterson and E. J. Weldon, Error-Correcting Codes, second ed. MA: MIT
Press, 1972.
[27] C. Chen, “Construction of some binary linear codes of minimum distance five,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1429–1432, Sep
1991.
[28] T. Verhoeff, “An updated table of minimum-distance bounds for binary linear codes,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 665 – 680, sep 1987.
[29] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong, “On a special class of wiretap channels (corresp.),” Informa-
tion Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 625–627, Sep 1977.
[30] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The gaussian wire-tap channel,” Informa-
tion Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, Jul 1978.
[31] I. Csiszar and J. Korner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” Informa-
tion Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[32] G. Cohen and G. Zemor, “Generalized coset schemes for the wire-tap channel: ap-
plication to biometrics,” in Information Theory, 2004. ISIT 2004. Proceedings. In-
ternational Symposium on, June 2004, pp. 46–.
[33] G. Zemor and G. Cohen, “Syndrome-coding for the wiretap channel revisited,” in
Information Theory Workshop, 2006. ITW ’06 Chengdu. IEEE, Oct 2006, pp. 33–36.
[34] S. Y. E. Rouayheb and E. Soljanin, “On wiretap networks ii,” ISIT, pp. 551–555,
24-29 June 2007.
[35] L. Ozarow and A. Wyner, “Wire-tap channel ii,” AT T Bell Laboratories Technical
Journal, vol. 63, no. 10, pp. 2135–2157, Dec 1984.
185
[36] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. Calderbank, S. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “Ap-
plications of ldpc codes to the wiretap channel,” Information Theory, IEEE Trans-
actions on, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 2933–2945, Aug 2007.
[37] S. Reddy, P. Aparna, and S. David, “Syndrome coding of video with ldpc codes,”
in Signal Processing, 2008. ICSP 2008. 9th International Conference on, Oct 2008,
pp. 1985–1988.
[38] B. Dai, Y. Luo, and A. Vinck, “Wiretap channel with side information from part of
encoder,” in Network and Parallel Computing, 2008. NPC 2008. IFIP International
Conference on, Oct 2008, pp. 353–357.
[39] Y. Liang, G. Kramer, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Recent results on compound wire-tap
channels,” in Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, 2008. PIMRC
2008. IEEE 19th International Symposium on, Sept 2008, pp. 1–5.
[40] Y. Chen and A. J. Vinck, “On the binary symmetric wiretap channel,” Int. Zurich
Seminar on Communications(IZS), pp. 17–20, 3-5 March 2010.
[41] A. Suresh, A. Subramanian, A. Thangaraj, M. Bloch, and S. McLaughlin, “Strong
secrecy for erasure wiretap channels,” in Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2010
IEEE, Aug 2010, pp. 1–5.
[42] H. Bafghi, B. Seyfe, M. Mirmohseni, and M. Aref, “On the achievable rate region
of a new gaussian wiretap channel with side information,” in Information Theory
Workshop (ITW), 2012 IEEE, Sept 2012, pp. 657–661.
[43] K. Zhang, M. Tomlinsin, and M. Ahmed, “A modified mceliece public key encryp-
tion system with a higher security level,” in Information Science and Technology
(ICIST), 2013 International Conference on, March 2013, pp. 991–996.
[44] K. Zhang, M. Tomlinson, and M. Ahmed, “The average equivocation of random
linear binary codes in syndrome coding,” in Telecommunications (ICT), 2014 21st
International Conference on, May 2014, pp. 47–51.
186
[45] Y. Cassuto and Z. Bandic, “Low-complexity wire-tap codes with security and error-
correction guarantees,” in Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2010 IEEE, Aug
2010, pp. 1–5.
[46] K. Zhang, M. Tomlinson, and M. Ahmed, “A chain based syndrome coding scheme
for secure communication in the wiretap channel,” in Vehicular Technology Confer-
ence (VTC Spring), 2014 IEEE 79th, May 2014, pp. 1–5.
[47] I. Bouyukliev and E. Jacobsson, “Results on binary linear codes with minimum
distance 8 and 10,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 57, no. 9, pp.
6089–6093, Sept 2011.
[48] Y. Edel and J. Bierbrauer, “Inverting construction y1,” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 1993–, Sep 1998.
[49] W. Alltop, “A method for extending binary linear codes (corresp.),” Information
Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 871–872, Nov 1984.
[50] N. Sloane, S. Reddy, and C.-L. Chen, “New binary codes,” Information Theory,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 503–510, Jul 1972.
[51] K. Zhang, M. Tomlinson, M. Ahmed, M. Ambroze, and M. Rodrigues, “Best binary
equivocation code construction for syndrome coding,” Communications, IET, vol. 8,
no. 10, pp. 1696–1704, July 2014.
[52] K. Zhang, “Best equivocation rate codes,” 2013,online, Avail-
able:http://www.it.pt/auto temp web page preview.asp?id=1219.
[53] S. Bezzateev and N. Shekhunova, “Chain of separable binary Goppa codes and their
minimal distance,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 54, no. 12, pp.
5773–5778, Dec 2008.
[54] R. J. Mceliece, “A public key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory,” DSN
Progress Report 42-44, pp. 114–116, 1978.
187
[55] D. J. Bernstein, T. Lange, and C. Peters, “Attacking and defending the McEliece
cryptosystem,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/318, 2008, http://eprint.
iacr.org/.
[56] E. Berlekamp, R. McEliece, and H. Van Tilborg, “On the inherent intractability of
certain coding problems (corresp.),” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 384–386, May 1978.
[57] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures
and public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
120–126, 1978.
[58] H.-M. Sun, “Enhancing the security of the mceliece public-key cryptosystem.” Jour-
nal of Information Science and Engineering, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 799–812, 2000.
[59] H. C. van Tilborg, Fundamentals of Cryptology. USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2000.
[60] P. J. Lee and E. F. Brickell, “An observation on the security of mceliece’s public-
key cryptosystem,” in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT ’88, Workshop on
the Theory and Application of of Cryptographic Techniques, Davos, Switzerland,
May 25-27, 1988, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 330.
Springer, 1988, pp. 275–280.
[61] Y. X. Li, R. Deng, and X. M. Wang, “On the equivalence of mceliece’s and nieder-
reiter’s public-key cryptosystems,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 271–273, Jan 1994.
[62] K. Zhang, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson, “A modified syndrome-coding scheme
with a higher security level,” Unpublished.
[63] S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson, “Secrecy coding for the wiretap channel
using best known linear codes,” in Global Information Infrastructure Symposium,
2013, Oct 2013, pp. 1–6.
188
[64] S. Al-Hassan, M. Tomlinson, and M. Ahmed, “New best equivocation codes for
syndrome coding,” in Information and Communication Technology Convergence
(ICTC), 2014 International Conference on, Oct 2014, pp. 669–674.
[65] R. Bhattar, K. Ramakrishnan, and K. Dasgupta, “On computation of minimum
distance of linear block codes above 1/2 rate coding,” in Wireless Communications,
Networking and Information Security (WCNIS), 2010 IEEE International Confer-
ence on, June 2010, pp. 280–284.
[66] M. Askali, S. Nouh, and M. Belkasmi, “An efficient method to find the minimum
distance of linear block codes,” in Multimedia Computing and Systems (ICMCS),
2012 International Conference on, May 2012, pp. 318–324.
[67] S. Al-Hassan, M. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson, “Construction of best equivocation
codes with highest minimum distance for syndrome coding,” in Communication
Workshop (ICCW), 2015 IEEE International Conference on, June 2015, pp. 485–
490.
[68] S. Al-Hassan, M. Z. Ahmed, and M. Tomlinson, “Extension of the parity check
matrix to construct the best equivocation codes for syndrome coding,” in Global
Information Infrastructure and Networking Symposium (GIIS), 2014, Sept 2014,
pp. 1–3.
[69] M. Karlin, “New binary coding results by Circulants,” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 81 – 92, jan 1969.
[70] M. Karlin., “Decoding of Circulant codes (corresp.),” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 797 – 802, nov 1970.
189
